



IUE International Webinar

# 2020 Emerging Leaders Fellowship

*Peace on the Korean Peninsula and  
The Role of International Society*

2020.11.26.(Thurs)~11.27.(Fri)



Institute for Unification Education  
Ministry of Unification





IUE International Webinar


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# 프로그램 | Program

## DAY 1 11월 26일(목)

세션	시간	프로그램
개회식	12:45~13:00	개회사 백준기   통일교육원장
		환영사 이인영   통일부 장관 *사전녹화
<b>주제 : 김정은 시대 북한의 대외환경</b>		
세션 1 (아시아, 오세아니아)	13:00~15:00	사회자 문경연   전북대 국제학부 교수
		발표자 Seksan ANANTASIRIKIAT   태국, 외무부 국제학센터 연구원 Tianjiao JIANG   중국, 복단대 부교수 Waseem ISHAQUE   파키스탄, 국립대학 현대언어 부교수
		토론자 Adrian ANG   싱가포르, 라자나트남 국제연구원 연구원 Rahul KALE   인도, 사다탄 아우르베다 팀장 Zsuzsa FERENCZY   헝가리, 대만 시리카교육원 연구원
<b>주제 : 코로나19와 한반도 안보</b>		
세션 2 (유럽, 중동, 아프리카)	16:00~18:00	사회자 김지영   통일교육원 교수
		발표자 Elisabeth I-Mi SUH   독일, 외교정책협회 연구원 Tereza NOVOTNA   체코, 베를린 자유대 마리퀴리펠로우 Anna POLENOVA   러시아, 극동문제연구소 연구원
		토론자 Madeleine NICHOLSON   미국, 시카고국제문제협의회 프로그램담당자 Ksenia ANDRYUSHCHENKO   러시아, 국립고등경제대학 연구원 Edward HOWELL   영국, 옥스퍼드대 강사

## DAY 2 11월 27일(금)

세션	시간	프로그램
기조연설	09:50~10:00	기조연설 김준형   국립외교원장 *사전녹화
<b>주제 : 한반도 비핵화와 국제협력</b>		
세션 3 (아메리카)	10:00~12:00	사회자 조은정   국가안보전략연구원 부연구위원
		발표자 Matthew ABBOTT   미국, 시카고국제문제협의회 대외협력 팀장 James PERSON   미국, 존스홉킨스대 SAIS 한국학 수석팀장
		토론자 Tristan WEBB   영국, 켄트대 로스쿨 조교수 Steven DENNEY   미국, 토론토대 박사후 과정
<b>주제 : 한반도 평화공존과 국제협력</b>		
세션 4 (아시아, 오세아니아)	13:00~15:00	사회자 성기영   국가안보전략연구원 책임연구위원
		발표자 Dylan Alexander STENT   뉴질랜드, 빅토리아대 박사과정 Piti SRISANGNAM   태국, 쾰라롱폰대 부교수 Rahul MISHRA   인도, 쿠알라룸푸르 말라야대 부교수
		토론자 You-Jun CHEN   중국, 상하이국제관계연구원 교수 Sanjeev HUMAGAIN   네팔, 트리부반대 객원교수 Shawn HO   싱가포르, 라자나트남 국제연구원 부연구위원
<b>주제 : 북한의 국제사회 진입과 국제협력</b>		
세션 5 (유럽, 중동, 아프리카)	16:00~18:00	사회자 김지영   통일교육원 교수
		발표자 Nicolas LEVI   폴란드, 과학아카데미 지중해/동양문화연구소 조교수 Antoine BONDAZ   프랑스, 전략연구재단 한국담당 팀장
		토론자 Alina SHCHERBAKOVA   러시아, 국립고등경제대학 부교수 Alina SHARAFETDINOVA   러시아, 동방학연구소 연구원 s. Jamaluddin FIROZI   아프가니스탄, 주한아프가니스탄대사관 1등 서기관

# 프로그램 | Program

## DAY 1 Nov.26(Thurs)

Session	Time	Program
Opening Ceremony	12:45~13:00	Opening Remarks Jun Kee BAEK   President of IUE
		Welcoming Remarks In-young LEE   Minister of Unification * Video
<b>Topic: North Korea's External Environment in Kim Jong Un Era</b>		
Session 1 (Asia, Oceania)	13:00~15:00	Moderator Kyungyon MOON   The School of International Studies, Global Frontier College, Jeonbuk National University, Associate Professor
		Presenters Seksan ANANTASIRIKIAT   Thailand, Int'l Studies Center at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Researcher Tianjiao JIANG   China, Fudan University, Assistant Professor Waseem ISHAQUE   Pakistan, National University of Modern Languages, Assistant Professor
		Discussants Adrian ANG   Singapore, RSIS, Research Fellow Rahul KALE   India, Sadatan Ayurveda Pvt. Ltd., Director Zsuzsa FERENCZY   Hungary, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan Fellow
<b>Topic: COVID-19 and Security on the Korean Peninsula</b>		
Session 2 (Europe, Middle East, Africa)	16:00~18:00	Moderator Ji-young KIM   Professor at the IUE
		Presenters Elisabeth I-Mi SUH   Germany, DGAP, Research Fellow Tereza NOVOTNA   Czech Republic, Free University Berlin, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow Anna POLENOVA   Russia, IFES at Russian Academy of Sciences, Junior Research Fellow
		Discussants Madeleine NICHOLSON   US, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Program Officer Ksenia ANDRYUSHCHENKO   Russia, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Assistant Instructor Edward HOWELL   UK, University of Oxford, Stipendiary Lecturer

## DAY 2 Nov.27(Fri)

Session	Time	Program
Keynote Speech	09:50~10:00	Keynote Speech Joon Hyung KIM   Chancellor of KNDA * Video
<b>Topic: Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and International Cooperation</b>		
Session 3 (America)	10:00~12:00	Moderator Eunjeong CHO   Institute for National Security Strategy, Research Fellow
		Presenters Matthew ABBOTT   US, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Director of Government and Diplomatic Programs James PERSON   US, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, Senior Faculty Lead for Korean Studies
		Discussants Tristan WEBB   UK, Kent Law School, Assistant Lecturer Steven DENNEY   US, University of Toronto, Postdoctoral Research Fellow
<b>Topic: Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and International Cooperation</b>		
Session 4 (Asia, Oceania)	13:00~15:00	Moderator Ki-Young SUNG   Institute for National Security Strategy, Senior Research Fellow
		Presenters Dylan Alexander STENT   New Zealand, Victoria University of Wellington, PhD Candidate Piti SRISANGNAM   Thailand, Chulalongkorn University, Associate Professor Rahul MISHRA   India, University of Malaya, Senior Lecturer
		Discussants You-Jun CHEN   China, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Professor Sanjeev HUMAGAIN   Nepal, Tribhuvan University, Visiting Faculty Shawn HO   Singapore, RSIS, Associate Research Fellow
<b>Topic: North Korea's Participation in the International Society and International Cooperation</b>		
Session 5 (Europe, Middle East, Africa)	16:00~18:00	Moderator Ji-young KIM   Professor at the IUE
		Presenters Nicolas LEVI   Poland, Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Assistant Professor Antoine BONDAZ   France, Foundation for Strategic Research, Head of Korea Program
		Discussants Alina SHCHERBAKOVA   Russia, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Associate Professor Alina SHARAFETDINOVA   Russia, Institute of Oriental Studies, Researcher s. Jamaluddin FIROZI   Afghanistan, Embassy of Afghanistan in Seoul, First Secretary

## 참여자(발표 및 토론) | Participants (Presenters & Discussants)



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**Tianjiao JIANG**  
중국 | 복단대 부교수  
Session 1 발표



**Waseem ISHAQUE**  
파키스탄 | 국립대학 현대언어 부교수  
Session 1 발표



**Adrian ANG**  
싱가포르 | 라자나트남 국제연구원 연구원  
Session 1 토론



**Rahul KALE**  
인도 | 사다탄 아우르베다 팀장  
Session 1 토론



**Zsuzsa FERENCZY**  
헝가리 | 대만 시니카교육원 연구원  
Session 1 토론



**Elisabeth I-Mi SUH**  
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**Tereza NOVOTNA**  
체코 | 베를린 자유대 마리퀴리펠로우  
Session 2 발표



**Anna POLENOVA**  
러시아 | 극동문제연구소 연구원  
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**Madeleine NICHOLSON**  
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**Ksenia ANDRYUSHCHENKO**  
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Session 2 토론



**Edward HOWELL**  
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Session 2 토론



**Matthew ABBOTT**  
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**James PERSON**  
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Session 3 발표



**Tristan WEBB**  
영국 | 켄트대 로스쿨 조교수  
Session 3 토론



**Steven DENNY**  
미국 | 토론토대 박사후 과정  
Session 3 토론



**Dylan Alexander STENT**  
뉴질랜드 | 빅토리아대 박사과정  
Session 4 발표



**Piti SRISANGNAM**  
태국 | 쾨라롱콘대 부교수  
Session 4 발표



**Rahul MISHRA**  
인도 | 쿠알라룸푸르 말라야대 부교수  
Session 4 발표



**You-Jun CHEN**  
중국 | 상하이국제관계연구원 교수  
Session 4 토론



**Sanjeev HUMAGAIN**  
네팔 | 트리부반대 객원교수  
Session 4 토론



**Shawn HO**  
싱가포르 | 라자나트남 국제연구원 부연구위원  
Session 4 토론



## 참여자(발표 및 토론) | Participants (Presenters & Discussants)



Nicolas LEVI

폴란드 | 과학아카데미 지중해/동양문화연구소 조교수

Session 5 발표



Antoine BONDAZ

프랑스 | 전략연구재단 한국담당관


Session 5 발표



Alina SHCHERBAKOVA

러시아 | 국립고등경제대 부교수

Session 5 토론



Alina SHARAFETDINOVA

러시아 | 러 과학아카데미 동방학연구소 연구원

Session 5 토론



s. Jamaluddin FIROZI

아프가니스탄 | 주한아프가니스탄대사관 1등 서기관

Session 5 토론





# Session I

김정은 시대 북한의 대외환경

North Korea's External Environment in Kim Jong Un Era



## 발표 1

### Seksan ANANTASIRIKIAT

---

태국, 외무부 국제학센터 연구원

Thailand, Int'l Studies Center at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Researcher

# TAKES WHO TO TANGO?: BIDEN PRESIDENCY AND NORTH KOREA'S STRATEGIC CHOICES

Seksan Anantasirikiat  
Researcher, International Studies Center (ISC),  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand  
26 November 2020

This study is the author's analysis. It does not represent the views of ISC or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand.  
This paper is in a finalizing process. Please do not refer without permission.

## Abstract

- This study argues that Biden presidency creates a new strategic context for North Korea's foreign policy behaviors due to a number of significant shifts in the U.S. foreign policy, including re-orientation of value-based foreign policy, re-emphasis on multilateralism and alliance, and formulation of more sophisticated China's policy. Although this new strategic context might limit strategic choices for North Korea, it could enhance South Korea's constructive role in connecting North Korea to the international community, which has been recognized by President Moon Jae-in's government as core interest in both foreign and unification policy.

# KIM JONG UN'S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

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## What is North Korea's strategic priority?

This sub-section assesses North Korea's strategic response to the external environment. My key point is that Kim Jong Un's strategic priority, during his first few years of leadership, was to consolidate his power and cope with internal issues rather than dealing with the strategic environment. I agree with Cheong (2014) that Kim Jong Un's leadership style prefers change to continuity. He could grip his power within four months while his father spent four years. Cheong (2014, p. 9) underlined several enabling factors: Kim Jong Il's mandate on the designation of Kim Jong Un as new leader, a stable line of command in the military and public security organizations, North Korean and Russian ideology, support from his family members and partisans, and North Koreans' political inaction.

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## Kim Jong Un's First Year: International Context


Moreover, there was a transitional period for leadership in North Korea's neighboring countries in 2012, the first year of Kim Jong Un as leader after the passing of his father in December 2011. In South Korea, 2012 was the final year for Lee Myung-bak's presidential term. Similar to South Korea, Japan was going to change its prime minister from Democratic Party's Noda Yoshihiko to Liberal Democratic Party's Abe Shinzo in December 2012. In Russia, Vladimir Putin returned to his presidency after 4-year administration of Dmitry Medvedev in May 2012. In China, Hu Jintao was going to step down but it was explicit that Xi Jinping would be the next generation's leader. It was the U.S. that was under Obama administration until the end of his presidency in 2016. Therefore, the external environment was also conducive to Kim Jong Un's strategic priority.

## Kim Jong Un's Threatening Behaviors

Apart from the internal organization of his regime, there is an evidence that Kim Jong Un is the most threatening leader of North Korea. The country has least amount of estimated nuclear warhead inventories (30-40) but most threatening because of its ongoing development of nuclear weapon capabilities as well as intimidating missile tests. It is anticipated that North Korea has successfully developed a "hydrogen bomb" that could be a potential explosive head to its intercontinental ballistic missile. The explosive power of its nuclear is approximately 140 plus kilotons, five times larger than the experiment in September 2016 (Missile Threat, 2020). In addition, Missile Threat (2020) also noted the firing of 25 missile launches in 2017. North Korea claimed that the range of the missiles could cover "anywhere in the world." This sort of situation causes instability in the global and regional arena. I believe that North Korea's behavior was a test for international waters rather than an expression of its insecurity.



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## Kim Jong Un's Leadership Style

As I have already argued, Kim Jong Un prefers change to continuity. He is prone to project North Korea's power and image to serve its national interest based on regime survival and strategic calculation with proper ability than his predecessors. The number of missile launches and capacity of nuclear development programs had been accelerated to the degree that could endanger all neighboring countries, including the U.S. Timeline of the nuclear development program is essential. The first nuclear test under Kim Jong Un leadership was conducted in February 2013, two years after his succession. Three years later, North Korea conducted its fourth and fifth nuclear test in January and September 2016, which was also the final term of Obama's presidency. I analyze North Korea's efforts to reach out to the U.S. and international society as its strategic priority to survive.

## Stepping Up Nuclear Programs

In 2016, there were two key events that influenced the security situation of the Korean Peninsula: the fifth nuclear test and the candlelight movement. On September 9, North Korea revealed its fifth nuclear test, implying the magnitude of 5.0 higher than the previous experiment. It also conducted two failed missile tests, the intermediate-range *Musudan* ballistic missile. On October 25, James Clapper, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, stated that denuclearization was far to be reached. He accepted that North Korea acquired its nuclear weapons for its survival (Chronology of U.S.-North Korea, 2020). In February 2017, North Korea became the top headline because of enigmatic assassination of Kim Jong Nam, the elder half-brother of Kim Jong Un, in Malaysia. In spite of the news about Kim Jong Nam, North Korea was still trying to develop the capability of its ballistic missiles.

## Missile Testing for Preference Pitching

Considering from the North Korean side, President Moon Jae-in's effort had by no means been taken during his first six months. There appeared attempts to test the missile and nuclear weapons. Five days after Moon's inauguration, North Korea tested the Hwasong-12 missile, another intermediate-range ballistic missile with its range of 4,800 kilometers on a standard trajectory (Chronology of U.S.-North Korea, 2020). Responding to this missile test, UNSC imposed additional sanctions. The circumstance in this period deteriorated when Trump started to fight on the war of words, particularly his "fire and fury" speech on August 8. Three days later, he added that the military solution was on the table. He hoped that "Kim Jong Un will find another path! (Chronology of U.S.-North Korea, 2020)." After Trump's speech, Kim declared Guam strike plans and its success in testing the ballistic missile. On September 3, North Korea announced its sixth nuclear test.

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## Kim Jong Un's Strategic Move after the 1<sup>st</sup> Inter-Korean Summit in the Series

After the first inter-Korean summit in the series of Moon's summit diplomacy was successfully organized in April 2018, Kim further enhanced his strategic move. First, he traveled to China for a second meeting with Xi. Kim called for Xi's support of the political process to attain denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, the U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, planned to visit Pyongyang for the preparation of the historic U.S.-North Korea summit (Chronology of U.S.-North Korea, 2020). Second, North Korea released three American detainees on May 9 to express its commitment to the Panmunjeom Declaration (Chronology of U.S.-North Korea, 2020). Third, it called off the talks with South Korea on May 16 by claiming its dissatisfaction of U.S.-South Korea joint military drills. This reaction deemed a signal to the remarks of the U.S. National Security Advisor, John Bolton, as he mentioned Libya as the case of denuclearization of North Korea (Saunders, 2018, para. 2). Snyder (2018, para. 5-6) pointed out that North Korea's action was strategic as it did not expect to end the process of negotiation but to guarantee that Bolton's model would not be seriously taken by the high-level decision-making of the U.S.

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# BIDEN PRESIDENCY AND NORTH KOREA'S STRATEGIC CHOICES

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## What Will Biden's Foreign Policy Look Like?

There was a speculation that President-Elect Joe Biden's foreign policy would not be different from Obama's. He would emphasize re-orientation of value-based foreign policy by addressing human rights and democratic development issues, re-emphasis on multilateralism and alliance by either fostering existing multilateral platforms or initiating a new platform, and formulation of more sophisticated China's policy that would engage or accommodate China. On North Korea issue, Biden might take "strategic patience" or "constructive engagements" rather than taking low-hanging fruits or gaining volatile popularity for re-election like his predecessor. However, strategic patience might be criticized as not taking any necessary actions towards North Korea's provocations. I think there would be more time and space for the two Koreas to rethink about their strategies.

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## North Korea's Strategic Choices

From North Korean point of view, Kim Jong Un might enjoy the projection of North Korea's image and popularity to the outside world as he had done during Trump presidency. However, during Biden presidency, it would not be easy for North Korea to draw attention from the world by exploding the inter-Korean cooperation office or testing its missiles and nuclear. This was not the first time Kim Jong Un dealing with the U.S. president from Democrat Party. Therefore, North Korea might calculate it easier. For South Korean side, it seems that Biden presidency could provide an opportunity to ensure President Moon's efforts on North Korea policy with emphasis on constructive engagement, both bilaterally and multilaterally. It will be South Korean side to work harder in order to convince the new U.S. administration to formulate strategic convergence between the two sides on North Korea issue. South Korea should point out that the two countries share fundamentals of engagement with North Korea. What South Korea would require more is U.S.-China cooperation to exercise carrot and stick approach towards North Korea.

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2020

Seksan Anantasirikiat

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## Lessons Learned from the Past


A valuable lesson that could be drawn from the two major attempts to denuclearize North Korea – 1994 Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks – is the logical relations between cause and cure. The success of the 1994 Agreed Framework can be considered an effective combination between the U.S. notions of North Korea's domestic situation and its negotiation approach in dealing with the issue. However, President George W. Bush shifted the country's policy from soft approach to hard approach that could threaten North Korea's regime survival. North Korea responded to this threat by provocation and conflict escalation while the Six-Party Talks could not achieve much because they had become a platform for power play with complex issues, multi-party negotiation, and different approaches in settling the issue. The consequence is that the conflict had been around talks, sanctions, and escalation (Picture 2).

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## Conflict Cycle of North Korea's Nuclear Issue



Source: The author's analysis

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## Take Who to Tango?: South Korea!

Therefore, I would propose South Korea to play a role as bridge-builder between North Korea and international society, with particular support from the U.S. government. His approach on North Korea is relevant to the new strategic context, which could be reinforced by his political will. In details, Moon's policy on the Korean peninsula has three goals, four strategies, and five principles. Under the label of peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity, the government will pursue (1) South Korea's driving seat of the denuclearization process (2) the maintenance of peace based on an equipped national defense (3) the advancement of inter-Korean relations based on mutual respect (4) the engagement and communication with people (5) international cooperation (2018 Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee, p. 10). Moon's personal experiences related to North Korea is an additional component that has shaped his policy and actions. He felt a sorrow of those who were influenced by division and war as a child of a displaced family from the North. Moreover, he was in key positions to support the family reunion as well as the chair 2007 inter-Korean summit preparation committee (2018 Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee, pp. 12-13).

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## President Moon's Multi-faceted Approach

After his inauguration in May 2017, President Moon has taken multi-faceted approach toward peace on the Korean Peninsula. In his inaugural speech, he expressed his willingness to bridge all the stakeholders such as China, Japan, and the U.S. with North Korea. He emphasized the importance of peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity with North Korea at several occasions such as remarks at a Wreath Laying Ceremony on June 28, Address at the Körber Foundation (Berlin Initiative) on July 6, Address at the Seventy Second Session of the UN General Assembly on September 22, Commemoration Speech at the General Meeting of the National Unification Advisory Council on October 31, Opening Remarks at a Joint Press Conference Following Korea-U.S. Summit on November 7, and Address at Peking University in Beijing on December 15 (2018 Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee, 2018, pp. 15-16). He also urged North Korea to attend the Olympic Games held in February.

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## Engaging Washington

Following to this, Moon visited Washington to discuss the possibility of the summit between the U.S. and North Korea on June 12. Two days before the 2018-second summit, North Korea eliminated its nuclear testing site at Punggye-ri. It received a number of international journalists to observe the destruction, except those from South Korea (North Korea refuses, 2018). Trump wrote a letter to Kim, stipulating his intention to halt the summit with North Korea if it was still insidious but he left a room for North Korea to return to the negotiation table (Chronology of U.S.-North Korea, 2020). Responding to Trump's letter, North Korea reiterated its willingness to talk with the U.S. by saying it had considered Trump's statement soberly (Huang, 2018). Moon and Kim had an informal meeting for the second time at Panmunjeom on May 26. In his speech, Moon reaffirmed Kim's willingness to (1) have a direct talk with the U.S. (2) commit to denuclearization and implementation of the Panmunjeom Declaration (3) improve inter-Korean relations (Full address, 2018). On June 1, both sides marshalled the high-level talks to implement the Declaration and talk over the foundation of the joint liaison office (2018 Inter-Korean Summit Pyongyang, 2018).

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## Confidence-building

The second inter-Korean summit in May contributed to the confidence-building between the U.S. and North Korea and triggered the closer ties between the two Koreas. It paved the way for the Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore, where the two sitting leaders signed the comprehensive joint statement, which reinforced the two countries' endeavors to foster the bilateral relations as well as "lasting peace" on the peninsula (Joint Statement, 2018). A week after the historic meeting in Singapore, Kim called on Xi for the third time to disseminate the summit with Trump (Chronology of U.S.-North Korea, 2020). For South Korean side, Moon stressed the effort to move forward the Panmunjeom process to the complete denuclearization of North Korea and his intention to declare the end of the Korean War by signing a peace treaty in his speech on the National Liberation Day. He also raised the importance of peace as a precondition for further economic engagement between the North and the South (Chronology of U.S.-North Korea, 2020).

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## Ensuring Concrete Actions

Prior to the third inter-Korean summit in September, South Korea expressed its keen interest in engaging North Korea. Numerous South Korean conglomerates such as Hyundai, KT, Lotte set up the task force to study and work out on the investment plan in North Korea while the small and medium enterprises businessmen looked for the opportunity to re-invest in Kaesong Industrial Complex. In June – July, the South Korean government was interested in infrastructure investment to connect the Korean Peninsula with the region as well as the attempt to create a one Korea team playing at the international sports competition and joint sports events (Chandran, 2018, para. 3-4). Apart from the economic engagement, the North and the South held the twenty-first reunion of separated families in Kumgang Tourist Resort as a result of the second inter-Korean summit in May (Korean reunions, 2018). The South Korean government dispatched the emissaries to Pyongyang for setting the agenda of the third 2018 inter-Korean summit on September 5 (Kim & Hahm, 2018). Two weeks later, South Korea and North Korea established the liaison office in Kaesong to open the channel for person-to-person contact (Chronology of U.S.-North Korea, 2020).

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The third inter-Korean summit took place for three days in September. Moon was warmly welcomed by the North Koreans on the first day he arrived Pyongyang for the state ceremony (Cole, 2018, para. 1-3). The two leaders signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, laying the groundwork for further cooperation on civilian exchanges, military agreement, and the progress of denuclearization (Pyongyang Joint Declaration, 2018). Moon had an opportunity to deliver a speech at May Day Stadium with the number of audiences around 150,000 paying standing ovation after listening to his remark underlining “people’s principle of sovereignty,” “our fate” to improve inter-Korean relations, and “nuclear-free peaceful land for the next generation (Lee, 2018).” On the third day of the summit, Moon visited Mount Paektu and Heaven Lake. This place is meaningful for both North and South Koreans because it has been apprehended as “the birthplace of the mythical founder of the first Korean Kingdom (Berlinger & Seo, 2018, para. 10).” His visit at Mount Baektu concluded the third inter-Korean summit in 2018.

As an idiom says, “it takes two to tango.” North Korea would, by no means, need South Korea’s support to connect itself to the international community, particularly in the current period of COVID-19. I hope my assessment is useful for the Ministry of Unification’s missions to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula. Let us hope for the best!

## Key Takeaways

- Kim Jong Un is a strategic leader. Therefore, the parties have to deal with him “strategically.”
- Biden’s foreign policy shift would map out a new strategic context for all parties on the Korean Peninsula issues.
- Although Biden’s foreign policy might limit strategic choices for North Korea, it could enhance South Korea’s constructive role in connecting North Korea to the international community.
- North Korea should/could take South Korea to tango. It is time for South Korea to re-play its role as bridge-builder.

## 발표 2

**Tianjiao JIANG**

중국, 복단대 부교수

China, Fudan University, Assistant Professor


# Three Spikes and You Are Out China-DPRK Relations after the Cold War

TIANJIAO JIANG  
FUDAN UNIVERSITY

## Puzzle

- Exchanges of visits between Chinese and DPRK leaders and high-level delegations have been relatively rare since the end of the Cold War.
- However, meetings between leaders saw three abnormal peaks in 1999-2001, 2010-2012, and 2018-2019.

China-DPRK Bilateral Relations Curve (1992-2018, Exchange of Visits Data, MOFA, PRC)



The Exchange of visits between Chinese and DPRK high-level delegations based on the data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and International Department, Central Committee of CPC

- Due to the socialist political system, the party to party exchange between the Communist Party of China and Korean Workers Party is an essential part of bilateral political relations.
- Even if the bilateral relations face tensions, the party to party exchange usually continues. That is why combing the data from both Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and International Department, Central Committee of CPC, makes the curve smoother.

China-DPRK Bilateral Relations Curve (1992-2018)



## Assumption

- The Sino-US relationship is the major external factor affecting China-DPRK ties.
- When conflicts arose between China and the United States, the relationship between China and the DPRK would grow closer; when China and the United States were friendly to each other, China-DPRK relations would be alienated.
- Not only have there been three spikes in interactions, the degree of closeness has grown from one spike to another.
- The recent peak in leadership communications represents a point of no return, although the year 2020 has seen both Beijing and Pyongyang close their borders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

## Chinese Thinking about North Korea

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- Over time, the existence of this brotherhood served as a common perception in China and the entire world. However, the ups and downs of China-DPRK relations defied this simplistic perception.
- There was volatility in the Cold War era and, later, as North Korea became a de facto nuclear weapons-possessing state, China-DPRK relations were subject to higher volatility.
  - ✓ After China participated in United Nations sanctions against the DPRK in March 2013, relations turned cold again. Heads-of-state visits halted, and the official media of both countries published very few reports on bilateral relations.
  - ✓ After China announced its embargo against North Korea in 2017, both sides even openly blamed each other.
  - ✓ In 2018, the situation suddenly improved. Just one month before his summit with Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un visited China twice and proposed a "new strategic line".

## Chinese Thinking about North Korea

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- After the Cold War, major differences regarding their core interests reemerged between China and the DPRK.
- China gave priority to economic development and no longer crafted its diplomatic policies on the basis of ideology alone. It sought to fit into the international community, following the US-led world economic order, and establishing friendly ties with neighboring developed countries to get their capital, technology, and markets.
- The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, and the long-term hostility with the US made DPRK vulnerable to serious external threats.
  - ✓ Its nuclear program harmed China's core interests in at least three respects: 1) the nuclear issue raised tensions on the peninsula, undermining China's security environment and the conditions it had created for economic development;
  - ✓ 2) nuclear tests have increased safety risks, including nuclear leaks, unauthorized launches, and nuclear terrorism;
  - ✓ 3) this challenged the NPT order, while China's accession to the NPT in the 1990s represented its desire to fit into the international community at the political and security levels.

## Chinese Thinking about North Korea

- China has multiple motives for its policies toward North Korea. Some have mentioned the shared socialist legacy and sacrifices of the Korean War. Others speak of geographical needs such as boosting economic prospects for Northeast China and avoiding refugee inflows.
- The record of the past three decades supports another explanation as primary: the geopolitical factor centered on the United States.
  - ✓ Even North Korea's actions are only been a secondary factor to the US. It has angered China at times, but its policies toward China have mattered less than US ones.
  - ✓ The main driving force in China's thinking about the DPRK is Chinese thinking about Sino-US ties.

## China-US Relations in 1999-2001 and the First Spike in China-DPRK Relations

- The political turmoil of 1989 shocked China-US relations, completely exposing the differences in political system and ideology, which have underlined the cyclical setbacks in bilateral relations.
- After Bill Clinton became president, conflicts between the two in ideology and human rights soared. In 1995, the US issued a visa to Lee Teng-hui, which triggered a political crisis. China conducted military exercises which, however, were soon followed by the Clinton administration's tough stance in sending warships to the Taiwan Strait. The administration even put China on the list of targets for a nuclear strike.
- The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 again sent relations into a trough. Demonstrations broke out across China, strongly condemning US hegemony. Vice President Hu Jintao promptly delivered a televised speech condemning the brutal atrocities of NATO.
- On April 1, 2001, a US EP-3 reconnaissance plane collided with and damaged a Chinese fighter jet that was monitoring the US spying operations over the South China Sea, resulting in China's protests to the US.
- This series of incidents drove relations from bad to worse. President George W. Bush made it clear during his election campaign that China is a rival rather than a strategic partner.

## China-US Relations in 1999-2001 and the First Spike in China-DPRK Relations

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- From 1999-2001, the tensions between China and the United States were obvious. While China-DPRK relations had plummeted after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, in June 1999, Kim Young-nam visited China, resuming high-level visits. Soon foreign ministers exchanged visits.
- In September 2001, President Jiang Zemin paid a visit to the DPRK. China and the DPRK began to acknowledge each other's political position, which improved the relationship.
- In Jiang's visit, China's statement mentioned that both sides had reached a consensus on the further development of relations in the new century and on major international and regional issues of common concern, opposition to US hegemony, in addition to reaffirming the traditional friendship.
- The deterioration of China-US relations can thus be seen as an important reason for closing the China-DPRK gap.

## China-US Relations in 1999-2001 and the First Spike in China-DPRK Relations

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- The 9/11 attack gave China and the United States an opportunity to repair their relations.
- Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said, "In the fight against terrorism, the Chinese people stand together with the American people and the entire international community." The next day, in a phone call Jiang Zemin and George W. Bush agreed to cooperate on counter-terrorism issues.
- In addition to the war in Afghanistan, the DPRK nuclear issue was a major concern of the United States. Secretary of State Colin Powell once said to President Hu Jintao, "Please continue to play an important role as you are already doing, as our forerunner, as the convener and participant of the Six-Party Talks."
  - ✓ denuclearizing the peninsula became a common interest
  - ✓ warming relations with the United States inevitably affected China-DPRK relations

## China-US Relations in 2010-2012 and the Second Spike in China-DPRK Relations

- Around 2010, profound changes occurred in China-US relations as both vied for new development opportunities and strategic advantages.
  - ✓ The global financial crisis from 2008 rocked the Western developed countries including the United States, opening a Pandora's Box. Although China expressed its willingness to cooperate in global economic governance, the power balance began to tip towards China.
  - ✓ In 2010, after China overtook Japan to become the world's second largest economy, tensions began to rise with the US. Competition outweighed cooperation.
  
- ✓ The Obama administration took on China.
  - ✓ anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations of China's export
  - ✓ punishing China for "currency manipulation"
  - ✓ the US "pivot to Asia" and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) widely interpreted in China as a policy of containment against China aimed at consolidating US hegemony

## China-US Relations in 2010-2012 and the Second Spike in China-DPRK Relations

- North Korea's resumption of nuclear tests in 2009 and withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks had had a tremendous negative impact on China's regional security and soft power. However, contacts became unexpectedly close.
- To a great extent, the alienation between China and the US during this period spurred the exchanges between China and the DPRK.
- From 2010 to 2011, seven high-level DPRK delegations came to China, and Chinese leaders visited North Korea once. Kim Jong-il paid visits to China, reiterating the importance of cooperation between China and the DPRK in economy and trade.
- In 2011, Vice Premier Li Keqiang visited North Korea, implying both countries should try to address the common challenges facing socialist countries from a strategic perspective in a complex international environment.



## China-US Relations in 2010-2012 and the Second Spike in China-DPRK Relations

- As had happened from 2001, as China-US relations had recovered, China-DPRK relations grew cold again.
- After Obama was re-elected in 2012, then Vice President Xi Jinping visited the United States, arguing in a speech that China-US friendship met the needs of the times. He proposed to build a new model of major-power relations between the two.
- In June 2013, as president he met Obama at the Annenberg Retreat, both pledging to build this new model with no conflict, no confrontation, but mutual respect and win-win cooperation.
  - ✓ Meanwhile, the US trade deficit with China shrunk, the currency exchange rate issue began to cool down, and the trade war was not expanding.
  - ✓ China and the US carried out effective cooperation on a number of global governance issues, e.g., addressing climate change and fighting the Ebola virus.
  - ✓ China not only supported the Nuclear Security Summit mechanism championed by Obama, but also began to join the UN sanctions on the DPRK, publicly exerting pressure to denuclearize. China worked hard to make the Iran nuclear deal possible. Nuclear non-proliferation again become a highlight in cooperation.

## China-US Relations in 2018-2019 and the Third Spike in China-DPRK Relations

- In 2017, Trump's administration exerted "extreme pressure" on North Korea. China also exerted pressure on North Korea, embargoing commodities such as coal and steel, which triggered a very rare public verbal war between China and the DPRK.
- However, from late 2017 to early 2018, China-US relations and the DPRK-US relations experienced U-turns at the same time.
- After the Trump administration published its new National Security Strategy, which defined China as a "major strategic rival," tensions soared in trade, security, and ideology. Soon, the Trump administration launched a hostile campaign against China, exerting extreme pressure, containment, and even decoupling.
- While China-US relations turned sour, DPRK-US relations suddenly improved. In an unexpected way, Trump broke the deadlock between the DPRK and the United States, and built certain grounds for mutual trust and renewed denuclearization negotiations.
  - ✓ Of course, the conflicts between the DPRK and the United States cannot be solved through occasional summit meetings.

## China-US Relations in 2018-2019 and the Third Spike in China-DPRK Relations

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- China-DPRK relations heated up rapidly while DPRK-US tensions eased.
- China did not want the situation on the peninsula to deteriorate, but it is even less eager for the DPRK to help the US exert greater geopolitical pressure on China after the easing of DPRK-US relations.
- In the context of the escalating trade war with the United States, the two meetings in 2019 were especially meaningful.
  - Kim Jong-un's visit in January coincided with conflict escalation in which China and the US imposed tariffs on each other.
  - In June, the trade war underwent a period of tit-for-tat, and it was hoped that the leaders of China and the United States would restart negotiations at the G20 summit. On the eve of that summit, China suddenly announced that Xi Jinping planned to visit North Korea.
  - There, Xi not only emphasized the need to maintain strategic communications between China and the DPRK, but also stated for the first time that "China is willing to provide assistance to the DPRK to address its own legitimate security and development concerns."

## China-US Relations in 2018-2019 and the Third Spike in China-DPRK Relations

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- At the same time, with the failure of the Hanoi summit, North Korea has repeatedly tested short-range missiles. The US continues to exert extreme pressure on DPRK, and South Korea is also difficult to carry out economic cooperation with the North alone.
- Since the end of 2019, the top of the North Korean government has clearly signaled that it will turn tough. The outbreak of the COVID-19 may delay the implementation of the tough line. But the economic sanctions and the impact of the pandemic have been strengthening the urgency of the DPRK to lift the external restrictions of development as soon as possible.
- Under the background of increasingly fierce strategic and economic competition between China and the US, on the one hand, North Korea is more inclined to take advantage of the political, economic and strategic support brought by the honeymoon of China-DPRK relations as the favorable conditions for its implementation of the brinkmanship policy.
- On the other hand, due to the serious lack of strategic mutual trust between China and the US, Washington is unlikely to rely on Beijing again in the DPRK nuclear issue. So the possibility of cooperation between China and the US on the nuclear issue is further reduced, while the possibility of crisis on the peninsula is rising again.

## 발표 3

### Waseem ISHAQUE

파키스탄, 국립대학 현대언어 부교수

Pakistan, National University of Modern Languages, Assistant Professor



**SESSION 1**  
**SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULAR**



**BY DR. WASEEM ISHAQUE**  
**NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES (NUML) ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN**

1



**CHAIRMAN KIM JONG UN'S STRATEGIC COMPULSIONS UNDER SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE, PEACE OVERTURES AND PROSPECTS OF ENDURING PEACE IN KOREAN PENINSULA**

**DR. WASEEM ISHAQUE**  
**NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN**

2



## Strategic Environments

**HISTORICAL LEGACY OF KOREAN WAR**

**EXISTANTIAL THREAT- ARMISITICE NO PEACE DEAL**

**DPRK UNDER ECONOMIC SANCTION AND ISOLATION**

**US MILITARY PRESENCE AROUND DPRK-PROVOCATION**

**US – JAPAN AND US-ROK JOINT MILITARY DRILLS**

**THAAD MISSILE SYSTEM AS DETERRENT**

**PROPOGANDA ALONG DMZ AND THREATS OF FORCE**

**DPRK REGIME INSECURITY- SURVIVAL AND SELF HELP**

3



## Armistice along 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel



**Despite end of Korean war, opposing parties remain engaged in hostile posture since last 70 years**

**Absence of permeant peace deal - a major blow to lasting peace and cause of distrust**

**Prolonged international isolation and sanctions causing a heavy toll of population**

4



## Joint Military Maneuvers & Provocations



**US-Japan and US-ROK defence alliance- conduct of joint military drills a precursor to regime change**

**Deployment of THAAD in ROK- A provocation and direct military threat**

**Possession of nuclear weapons and delivery means- sole guarantor of DPRK national security**

5



## President Trump's Speech



**Diplomatic Breakdown after fire and furry speech**

**Exchange of rhetoric and heightened tension**

**Risks of nuclear exchange in case of miscalculation**

**Needed immediate risk mitigation measures**

6



## Six Party Talks on Korea



**Six Party Talks – Excellent Forum for negotiated settlement**

**Made good Progress- but stalled due to over ambitious expectations from all parties to conflict**

**Viable diplomatic forum for constructive engagement with all parties- Stalled process to be re-energised**

7



## Propaganda & Provocations



**Use of loud speakers and Balloons along DMZ for propaganda against chairman Kim- highly antagonizing**

**National esteem, regime survival and territorial integrity core national interests of DPRK in face of looming threats**

8

 **Unprecedented Statesmanship**

**Chairman Kim Jong Un's surprise new year speech - cautious optimism**

**Overwhelming support by ROK President Moon Jae-In**

**Jubilations in DPRK and ROK for breaking years of stalemate**

**Unprecedented enthusiasm displayed by international community**

**9**

 **Shuttle Diplomacy- Breaking Isolation**

**Chairman Kim Jong Un's initiative of engaging with world leaders**

**Constructive meetings with President Xi and President Putin**

**Stressed on comprehensive peace deal through step by step process**

**Confidence building & respect of DPRK's core national security concerns – key to all future settlements**

**10**





## Shuttle Diplomacy- Breaking Isolation



**Enthusiastic response by Singapore and Vietnam- paving the way for direct summits**

**Chairman Kim's meeting with key diplomats-ground work for presumed grand bargain**

**Broad based discussions on conflicting issues and their resolution**

**Unfathomable support and engagement by President Moon Jae-in**

11



## Amazing Summits- Inconclusive



**Unprecedented summits at Singapore and Vietnam**

**Watched by the world with enthusiasm and optimism**

**Fog of war now replaced by hope, confidence and prosperity**

**Unrealistic expectations and less ground work led to inconclusive results**

12



## Amazing Summits- Inconclusive



**A great movement of accomplishment for ROK as President Moon personally remained engaged and accommodative**

**Hospitality of President's of Singapore and Vietnam much appreciated**

13



## Conflicting Issues and Contradictions

**US military presence in ROK/ Japan, joint military drills and deployment of THAAD- existential threat for DPRK**

**Threats of sanctions, isolation and regime change prime national security concerns for DPRK**

**Use of Propaganda loud speakers and balloons considered provocative and degrading the leadership of DPRK**

**Varying perspectives on enduring peace- Denuclearization of DPRK along-with demilitarization of Korean Peninsula a complimentary process**

14



## Recommendations

**Step by step confidence building and mainstreaming of DPRK**

**Concurrent progress on sanctions lifting and comprehensive peace deal-**

**DPRK feels that nuclear weapons sole guarantor of national security and regime security-Needs alternate assurances**

**Direct confrontation between US and DPRK less likely- miscalculation remain a possibility**

15



## Recommendations

**Enduring peace and stability desired by all- needs to be pursued vigorously by accommodating interests of all parties**

**All out efforts by regional countries, Six Party Talks forum, and marked statesmanship is required to end years of hostilities and make peace a reality**

**Constructive engagement by DPRK and ROK with renewed vigour to maintain clam and stability along DMZ**

**Reassurance for regime security and economic development of DPRK is the need of time**

16



***Conclusion***

17



***I Thank You All for Patient Hearing***

**DR. WASEEM ISHAQUE  
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES  
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN**

18

## 토론 1

### **Adrian ANG**

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싱가포르, 라자나트남 국제연구원 연구원  
Singapore, RSIS, Research Fellow

## Navigating the External Environment Facing North Korea in 2020: COVID-19, the Sino-U.S. Rivalry, and U.S. Presidential Elections

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RESEARCH FELLOW  
UNITED STATES PROGRAMME  
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## COVID-19 Pandemic

- ▶ KJU's speech on the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Korean Workers' Party: weather and the coronavirus blamed for DPRK's difficulties in 2020.
- ▶ KJU reassures North Koreans worst is over and things will get better.
- ▶ Not everything is bad, however: strides in military capabilities – unveiling of promised new strategic weapon (Hwasong-16).
- ▶ Development of DPRK nuclear force no longer dependent of U.S. actions.
- ▶ DPRK nuclear “deterrence”

## Sino-U.S. Rivalry

- ▶ COVID-19 and sanctions regime has made Pyongyang more dependent on Beijing.
- ▶ China's interest remains stability on Korean peninsula and management of DPRK's nuclear ambitions.
- ▶ As Sino-US tensions increase, the value of the DPRK increases.
- ▶ John Bolton: Beijing wants to use DPRK's nuclear weapons program as "wild card" in Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry
- ▶ Peace regime for Korean peninsula: Beijing views opportunity to maximize strategic interests.
- ▶ Xi Jinping: shared socialist ideology between Beijing and Pyongyang.
- ▶ 2018 Sino-Russian "roadmap" for DPRK denuclearization?
- ▶ Beijing needs clarity about what DPRK is seeking.

## U.S. Presidential Elections

- ▶ DPRK tried to stay low key during the U.S. election campaign.
- ▶ 2020 Democratic Party Platform: "Together with our allies – and through diplomacy with North Korea – we will constrain and contain the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program and its regional belligerence."
- ▶ Little tangible progress in fulfilling the Singapore Joint Statement beyond repatriation of remains of American MIAs.
- ▶ Trump has obtained little in exchange for granting KJU's regime legitimacy and making meaningless and vague commitment to denuclearization.
- ▶ What will Biden do? Return to policy of strategic patience? Resistance in the US to accepting DPRK as an acknowledged nuclear power.
- ▶ Will the Korean Peninsula be a new front in Sino-US rivalry?

## 토론 2

### Rahul KALE

---

인도, 사다탄 아유르베다 팀장  
India, Sadatan Ayurveda Pvt. Ltd., Director



## A personal observation on how external & internal factors are creating subtle changes in the mindset & attitudes of North Korean youth

26<sup>th</sup> November 2020 Virtual Discussion of 2020 IUE Emerging Leaders Webinar  
Theme: Peace on the Korean Peninsula and the Role of International Society  
Topic: Shifting International Landscape and the Korean Peninsula  
Name of Discussant: Rahul Kale, Director Sadatan Ayurveda, India

### Background:

I have had the opportunity to travel to North Korea thrice. The first time in 2018, as a tourist, and twice in 2019 as a Workshop Leader with Choson Exchange, an organisation that supports entrepreneurs and business-minded individuals in North Korea through workshops, internships & mentorships.

While interacting with the participants (who came from a variety of backgrounds, but mostly from Pyongyang and around), one realised that there were marked differences in attitudes between the older and younger generation of participants.

Although our conversations were mainly limited to the Workshop Modules, the Business Plans and Product Concepts they were working on, and we thought it best not to put anyone in an awkward situation by asking any intrusive questions, one could interact quite freely with the participants. Within a few days, one began to notice subtle yet perceptible changes in the attitude of the newer generation and they seemed more aware of the ways of the outside world.

This would hardly be surprising in other countries considering the changes that have manifested across the world over the past 20 years or so. But, the differences here are quite striking, and one wonders how these changes came about in a society that is supposedly completely isolated, where access to information, the internet and mainstream media is monitored carefully.

Thinking further, the changes were most noticeable through three aspects:

### First: Access to Information

Whether it be in terms of technology, media or entertainment, there is a level of awareness among North Korean millennials that didn't seem to be present among older participants.

Technologically they seemed very comfortable using their computers to make presentations & spreadsheets, most knew about Social Media & Video Chatting and even if they hadn't experienced it first hand, they knew the impact these were having on the rest of the world. The scientists we worked with seemed familiar with present day laboratory & testing equipment. Like wise most other participants seemed to have access to some form of current technology at their work places.

On a lighter note, they seemed aware of the latest high-end models of smart phones released only a few months back, fashion trends like Pandora bracelet charms and even internet viral sensations from across the region.

How do they get this information? One can safely assume that the Yalu river and porous DPRK/China border is not limited to goods but a wide variety of information also flows freely through multiple channels. They do have some foreign content on TV – soccer, wholesome entertainment from friendly countries, Bollywood films, even international email and phone calls are possible for a very select group of people, although heavily monitored. And while scientists and researchers have access to the global internet, it is unlikely that they would use this to access entertainment and news from the outside world.

### Second: Dependence on the System

It seemed to me that this generation, while remaining firmly aware of the realities of their country and the fact that they need to operate within the given parameters, knew they had other, even if very limited, options. The situation that came about in the late 90s and the break down of the Public Distribution System, forced citizens to look beyond ration tickets and long lines at public distribution centres.

Getting used to buying products at informal markets, the wide range & quality of goods that such markets offered and the employment and business opportunities that subsequently emerged, have given the citizens access to choices and options - which would be difficult to let go of having experienced them first hand.

This has perhaps shaped the present generation to become more individualistic and less averse to taking risks. One could notice a marked difference in approach while problem solving, the group discussions and team dynamics during our workshops.

### Third: Perception of their Country

One of the most frequent questions that we would be asked by youngsters everywhere was how North Korea was perceived in our respective countries, and I tried my best to answer that question without seeming offensive.

How the outside world perceives them, and how they perceive their own country, again seemed to be areas where there were marked differences between the generations. Although I didn't hear any mention of anyone living in the ultimate 'Socialist Paradise', I am guessing no one, no matter from which generation, will volunteer anything too revealing about the latter anytime soon. What they think of the outside world, and their role in it are pretty important considerations too.

So what remains the same and what has really changed?

To all outward appearances, belief in the leadership & country remains firm and strong, although one cannot infer what goes on in their heart of hearts. They know they still live in DPRK and must respect its framework.

My guess is that the Government is aware of these subtle but very significant changes taking place in North Korean society. They know that millennials have very different aspirations and hence even the manner in which the leadership is portrayed in North Korean media and communicates with its citizens is changing, slowly but surely.

One can see Water Parks, Coffee Houses, Spas, fancy Department Stores cropping up everywhere. The Government realises that many have access to outside information and they are trying to create a semblance of the outside world for them in Pyongyang.

Is there a fundamental change in the society and mindset of common North Koreans? I am not sure, but the present generation is certainly more confident, aware and ambitious.

The desire to learn new things, discover the world, see how others live, and perhaps experience many of these, might have been forbidden fruits to previous generations but are almost within reach of millennials, agonisingly close at times, and how this plays out over the next few years would be very interesting to observe.

26<sup>th</sup> November 2020 Virtual Discussion of 2020 IUE Emerging Leaders Webinar  
Name of Discussant – Rahul Kale, Director Sadatan Ayurveda, India, kale.rahul@gmail.com

## 토론 3

**Zsuzsa FERENCZY**

헝가리, 대만 시니카교육원 연구원  
Hungary, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan Fellow

# The External Environment Facing North Korea Under Kim Jong Un Leadership – a Perspective from Europe

Dr. Zsuzsa Anna FERENCZY

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## Global context

- **Global challenges:** poverty, climate change, rising authoritarianism, disinformation, interconnectedness, rivalry, nuclear threat, terrorism, undermining human rights; uncertainty.
- **COVID-19** – amplified rivalry; intensified perceptions.
- Return of **great power politics**.
- Power, influence; perceptions, narrative.
  
- The great international dilemma affecting the Indo-Pacific & the world: how to respond to a stronger and coercive **China** without conflict?

## Global context


- **US-China** – central to shaping global political and economic dynamics.
- **US-EU** – common values & concerns on China, but divergence on means to address China.
- **EU-China** – from “strategic partner” to “systemic rival”.
- Assertive/aggressive **China** w/econ., pol. & milit. presence in the region & beyond; ambitious **India**; **US** “abdication” of leadership; **Japan** seeking to regain influence; a divided **Korean Peninsula**.
- An **Indo-Pacific** fever taking hold - China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, SE Asia, Australia, India all depend on Indian Ocean sea lanes for energy, prosperity, security.
- **EU** seeking to be a “geopolitical Commission” – “My Way”.


## US & Europe – approach to China & North Korea

- **US** – bipartisan consensus; “China a strategic competitor”. NSS, 2017
- **EU** – strategic autonomy; closer transatlantic relations. Conceptual shift – tougher language, shift in policy. “Europe needs to be a player, not a playing field”. Consistent driver of international human rights advocacy efforts on North Korea.
- **China** – North Korea’s sole ally, biggest trade partner, vital in denuclearization & in addressing human rights but, undermining UN hr mechanisms
- **North Korea** – a security threat. Regime survival – coronavirus likely the biggest threat right now. Zero progress on giving up nuclear programs.
- **Beijing & Pyongyang** – common goal to weaken US-ROK alliance, reduce US regional influence.

## The way forward

- Global challenges demand return to cooperation.
- No alternative to dialogue.
- EU – HR Borrell: "It is important to have strong **cooperation** with like-minded democracies. The EU and US should be at the heart of this effort, but we should also be working closely with Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada".
- Europe – more internal unity, analytical clarity, ambition.
- Need for honest consultation to incentivize denuclearization.





# Session 2

코로나19와 한반도 안보

COVID-19 and Security on the Korean Peninsula

## 발표 1

**Elisabeth I-Mi SUH**

독일, 외교정책협회 연구원  
Germany, DGAP, Research Fellow



## Security on the Korean Peninsula in 2020 / in times of COVID-19

Elisabeth I-Mi Suh

*Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)*

*Visiting Fellow at SWP, PhD Fellow at IFSH*

### Outline of presentation

1. Threats from the DPRK
2. Inter-Korean relations
3. ROK-US joint military readiness
4. Impact of COVID-19
5. Remaining issues and open questions



# 1. Threats from the DPRK in 2020

- DPRK ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons program
- DPRK operations in cyber space

## Missile developments

Four test-events with multiple launches of KN-24 & KN-25 in March

- framed as trainings (not tests)
- improvement of multiple launch rapidity (KN-24: 5 minutes; KN-25: 20 seconds)
- road-mobile, flexible systems
- dual-capable: conventional and nuclear payload?

Image from author's publication, August 2020:  
<https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/inferring-from-signaling-north-koreas-deterrence-strategy-and-bargaining-tactics/>

Table 1: North Korea's short-range ballistic missiles, selection of newest models

Model	Range	Characteristics	Payload	Test period	Operationality
KN-25	340 km	• □	•	2019 - 2020	Operational
KN-24	470 km	• □	• •	2019 - 2020	Likely operational
KN-23	450 km, max. 490 km	• □	•	2019	Uncertain
KN-18 (Sud Madu)	450 km	• ○	•	April 2017	Uncertain
KN-02	120 - 170 km	• □	•	2006	Operational

These short-range ballistic missiles put the entire South Korean territory (peninsula and islands) within range.

Table 2: North Korea's long-range ballistic missiles, selection of flight-tested models

Model	Range	Characteristics	Payload	Test period	Operationality
Threatening 15 (KN-12)	4,500 - 11,000 km, ICBM	• ○	•*	November 2017	Uncertain
Threatening 14 (KN-16)	10,000 km, ICBM	• ○	•	July 2017	Uncertain
Threatening 13 (KN-17)	4,500 km	• ○	•	2017	Uncertain
Pukgukdong-3 (KN-26)	1,000 km	• □	•	October 2018	Uncertain
Pukgukdong-2 (KN-13)	1,000 - 1,000 km	• □	•	2017	Operational
Pukgukdong-1 (KN-11)	1,200 km	• □	•	2015 - 2016	Likely operational
Musudan	2,500 - 4,000 km	• ○	•	2016	Uncertain
Taepodong-3 (Taebaek) 3-rod-type launch vehicle	10,000 km	• ○	•**	2012, 2016	Likely operational

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) reach the mainland of the United States; a range of 71,000 km can cover the East Coast. Ballistic missiles with more than 11,000 km range can target Japan, with more than 1,400 km the island of Okinawa and Guam (key military base of the United States).

• road-mobile    □ solid propellant    • conventional payload  
 • sea-launched    ○ liquid propellant    • nuclear warhead possible  
 • fixed launch platform    • unknown payload

\* multiple or larger warheads technically possible  
 \*\* nuclear warhead on testbed

Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project, "Mission of North Korea's 'Sungri' Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles," <https://www.missiledefense.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/07-10-2017-North-Korea-Tested-Missile-Missiles>, "Sungri/Threatening 15 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Model," <https://www.missiledefense.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/07-10-2017-North-Korea-Tested-Missile-Missiles>. © 2020 DGAP, German Council on Foreign Relations.

## Mass activities despite COVID-19

- Multiple military exercises (ground forces, air forces) between February – August
- Mass games/preparations for military parade throughout 2020
- Military parade on 10 October, showcasing weapons developments
  - new intercontinental ballistic missile
  - new sea-launched ballistic missile Pukguksong-4
  - general modernization of military equipment

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## Newest missile developments

Showcasing on parade = teaser, image of resolve  
→ questionable credibility

Actual launch & flight-testing = genuineness, technical validity  
→ information from trial & error



Images from NK News:  
<https://www.nknews.org/2020/10/north-korea-reveals-new-giant-icbms-at-rare-predawn-military-parade/>  
(above: new ICBM; below: new SLBM)

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## Other military developments

- Activities at Sinpo naval base
  - missile ejection test in April
  - construction of new submarine (Sinpo Class C, ballistic missile launchable), NIS lawmakers briefing in November
- No tests of nuclear explosives since September 2017
  - no observable relevant activities on Pungye-ri nuclear test site
- Activities at Yongbyon nuclear complex
  - inactive plutonium reprocessing
  - continuing uranium enrichment activities
- Continuous activities at Kangson (suspected undeclared uranium enrichment site)
- Continuous activities at Pyongsan uranium mines (mining and reprocessing operations)

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## Cyber threats from the DPRK

- General increase of cyber operations attributed to the DPRK
  - quantitative increase
  - technical sophistication
  - global reach, targets in private and public sector
- US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) reports increasing criminal operations in cyber:
  - resurgence of 2018's FASTCash-campaign since February 2020: targeting retail payment system infrastructure, fraudulent transfers & ATMs cash-outs
  - increase of using cryptocurrencies

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## 2. Inter-Korean relations in 2020

- Diplomatic dialogue, political relations
- Cross-border issues

### Inter-Korean dialogue

- No high-level talks since February 2019

#### Tough month of June 2020:

- Harsh statements by Kim Yo Jong directed against President Moon Jae-in
- Destruction of military hotline
- Destruction of Kaesong liaison office
- Additional threats of reversing other DMZ-related achievements 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement

## Security-relevant defections

- Latest high-level defection: Jo Song Gil, former chargé d'affaires for the DPRK embassy in Rome
  - missing since 2018
  - in ROK since 2019
- DPRK defector's redefection from ROK near Gimpo to DPRK in July
  - late detection by ROK military
  - number of security mistakes by ROK military
- DPRK defector crossing Military Demarcation Line (Eastern part) in early November
  - initial military alert
  - security loophole at MDL/DMZ?

## DPRK defections to ROK

- General number of defections from DPRK very low compared to previous years
  - DPRK border shutdown since January due to COVID-19

Number of North Korean Defectors Entering South Korea

Category	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	20.09 (preliminary)	Total	
Male	831	945	1,191	1,674	1,826	1,824	1,715	1,571	1,428	1,402	1,391	1,295	1,212	1,211	1,088	1,146	1,200	1,024	1,118	999	969	845	64	15,427	
Female	116	478	652	811	1,272	1,963	1,519	1,981	2,196	2,252	1,811	1,911	1,088	1,146	1,200	1,024	1,118	999	969	969	845	64	1,011	14,291	
Total	947	1,423	1,843	2,485	3,098	3,787	3,234	3,552	3,624	3,653	3,202	3,206	2,376	2,357	2,288	2,170	2,318	2,023	2,087	1,968	1,834	1,914	1,909	1,655	29,718
Percentage of female defectors	12.2%	33.6%	35.3%	33.1%	37.8%	49.4%	38.6%	41.6%	37.3%	37.2%	34.4%	34.5%	29.5%	27.7%	25.4%	25.6%	28.2%	30.3%	28.4%	33.5%	35.2%	30.7%	72.1%	72.0%	

Source: Ministry of Unification

## The case of Lee Dae-jun

- 22 September: ROK individual (Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries worker) shot and killed by DPRK soldiers
  - actual trip & reason for crossing Northern Limit Line unclear
  - DPRK reason: shoot on sight-rule as COVID-19 pandemic provision, immediate destruction (burning) of all items
  - apology from Kim Jong Un in United Front Department letter to President Moon Jae-in
  - civil demand for UN investigation

## 3. ROK-US joint military readiness

- ROK-US joint military exercises
- COVID-19 cases in US forces & military bases

## ROK-US joint military exercises

### Usually scheduled

- Annual spring exercises (Key Resolve/Foal Eagle) in March
- Smaller-scale air & maritime drills, defense drills
- Annual fall exercises (Ulchi Freedom Guardian) in August

### Actually taken place

- Cancellation of large-scale annual spring exercises
- April 1-week combined air exercises
- Spring joint air and missile defense exercises
- May maritime combined arms drills postponed, conducted in June
- May, June ROK firing drills
- August 2-week joint drills (minor delay): combined command post training, computer simulations
- August ROK civilian-military Ulchi-Taegeuk drills postponed
- ROK defense drills in October

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## COVID-19 & ROK-US joint drills

- COVID-19 and ROK-US joint military exercises
  - cancellation, postponement
  - adjustments in size
  - increasing proportion of computer simulations
- ~150 cases of COVID-19 infections among USFK and USFK-affiliated individuals between February – November
- Adjustments to joint exercises since 2018
  - decreasing inter-operability?
  - situation likely to continue in the medium-term

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## 4. Impact of COVID-19

### Impact of COVID-19

#### Causation

- general lower numbers of defections
- shoot on sight-policy as pandemic provision

#### Correlation

- DPRK military activities, weapons developments, military parades
- worsening inter-Korean relations, DPRK hostility & lack of dialogue

- increase of criminal activities (targeting banks) in cyber space
- challenges to military inter-operability, necessary adjustments to ROK-US joint military drills

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## 5. Remaining issues and open questions

- US-ROK alliance issues, defense budget-related issues
- Uncertainty regarding DPRK activities in 2021

### Alliance-related issues

- Defense cost sharing/Special Measures Agreement
  - no successful conclusion of negotiations
  - last agreement on employee labor costs, 3 June 2020
- ROK-US Working Group: last consultations in September
  - now rather individual-level contacts between Moon administration and Trump administration as well as Biden/Harris-team?

## Budget-related issues

- ROK defense ministry requests 52.92 trillion won (\$44.73 billion) for 2021 budget
  - 5% increase from 2020, defense capabilities, OPCON, procurement & maintenance, military forces & security operations at bases, etc.
  - budgetary shortages in the long-term: public health, economic recovery, defense costs?

## DPRK activities in 2021

- Uncertainty regarding DPRK behavior
  - Party Congress in January 2021
  - showcased systems (new SLBM & ICBM) to be flight-tested?
  - continuing hard stance vis-à-vis Moon administration likely, no room for dialogue
  - room for dialogue possible with Biden administration?

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Thank you for your attention!

Elisabeth Suh  
[suh@dgap.org](mailto:suh@dgap.org)

## 발표 2

### **Tereza NOVOTNA**

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체코, 베를린 자유대 마리퀴리펠로우

Czech Republic, Free University Berlin, Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow

# The Korean Peninsula Between COVID19 and US-China Tensions: What Role for Europe?

*Dr Tereza Novotná*  
*Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow*  
*Free University Berlin*

**IUE International Webinar 2020 Emerging Leaders Fellowship**  
26 November 2020



## **"EUSKOR"**

**Europe, the United States and the Crisis on the Korean Peninsula:  
Between a Rock and a Hard Place**

*Marie Skłodowska-Curie Project*

<https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/polwiss/forschung/international/europa/euskor/index.html>


**Friends of Europe/Europe's World**  
6 March 2020

<https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/what-s-wrong-with-the-eu-policy-towards-north-korea-and-how-to-fix-it/>



**38 North**  
6 February 2020

<https://www.38north.org/2020/02/tnovotna020620/>



**Asia Center Paris**  
10 November 2020

<https://centreaasia.eu/evenement/eu-korea-convergence-and-partnerships-10-years-after-the-eu-korea-fta-in-the-post-covid-era-and-within-the-us-china-trade-war/>

*"...perhaps the best way is to see COVID-19 as the great accelerator of history. It strengthens trends that were already present before... everywhere we look we see increasing rivalries, especially between the US and China. The pressure to choose sides is growing. As EU, we should follow our own interests and values and avoid being instrumentalised by one or the other. We need a more robust strategy for China, which also requires better relations with the rest of democratic Asia. That's why we must invest more in working with India, Japan, South Korea et cetera."*

Josep Borrell, 25 May 2020

Speech to German annual ambassadors conference



## Covid-19 and Security on the Korean Peninsula

- US & China competition as a result of the current Covid crisis, but also underlying long-term trends
- EU & ROK face a similar challenge of “being caught between the US and China”



- i) EU & ROK – to deepen their Strategic Partnership (health, multilateralism, climate..)
- ii) EU & ROK – to create a *network of like-minded partners*
- iii) EU & ROK – to look for areas where they can pre-empt Sino-Amer. rivalry from escalating & come-up with joint proposals acceptable for both sides



North Korea

## Geopolitics vs Pandemics






# EU & ROK between China & US


## 70th Anniversary of the breakout of the Korean War

- Entry of the Chinese volunteer army on the DPRK side interpreted by President Xi Jinping as a defense of motherland against the US aggression



## Relations with Taiwan & One China Policy

- Visit to Taiwan by the speaker of the Czech Senate Vystřcil with a business delegation while FM Wang Yi on a tour of Europe and preceded by a surprise visit by SoS Mike Pompeo




## 1) Strengthening of the EU-ROK Strategic Partnership

- Health
- Trade
- Digitalization / 5G
- Climate
- Multilateralism



Soft Power / Human Security



### a) Health: How to deal with Covid19 AND North Korea?

**COVAX**

Continuing Global Response  
04  
05  
20

**AMC-Eligible economies**  
52 low- and middle-income economies are eligible to have their participation in the COVAX Facility supported by the COVAX AMC.

**The Last Coronavirus-Free Countries On Earth**  
Countries that have not reported COVID-19 cases (as of November 11, 2020)

statista

## b) Trade: How to set the global trading rules?



## c) Climate: How to collaborate on climate change?



## Working with Like-Minded Countries



“The EU has always claimed that it needs to be asked by the relevant parties to get engaged on the Korean peninsula affairs. President Moon’s call for the EU to ‘play a big role’ did just that. It is now up to the EU to respond appropriately, revamp its policy towards the DPRK and work closely with its South Korean partner to draft proposals that could help resolve the North Korean conundrum without alienating either Washington, or Beijing – or, indeed, Pyongyang. .”

## What Can (and Should) the EU Do? Big Picture

- *Plan*: Draft a new "EU Korean Peninsula Strategy"
- *Set the Agenda*: Propose a "Borrell Peace Plan"
- *Multilateralize*: A Set of Confidence-Building Measure & Network of Like-Minded Partners



Individual Concrete Policy Options

## Policy Options for the EU on DPRK

1. *Resume dialogue*
  - start with "easier" human rights (e.g. labor, of the disabled)
  - nominate a "Special Envoy for Peace on the Korean Peninsula"
2. *Offer (and offer to pay for) verification expertise*
3. *Open a Pyongyang EU Mission*
  - and let the DPRK move their mission from Berlin to Brussels
4. *Resume humanitarian aid (+ create an NK Instex 2.0)*
5. *Promote EU as a convening point*
  - including a Brussels high-level conference on DPRK
6. *Drop (some of) the EU's autonomous sanctions*
  - an example of a reverse step-by-step approach
7. *Promote educational (& cultural) exchanges*
8. *+ include in COVAX & Green Deal negotiations*





## 발표 3

**Anna POLENOVA**

러시아, 극동문제연구소 연구원

Russia, IFES at Russian Academy of Sciences, Junior Research Fellow

Anna POLENOVA  
Junior Research Fellow  
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COVID-19 and the Security on the Korean peninsula is an issue that might be viewed from different perspectives. Security is often regarded as a military and political matter, still, in my presentation, I would like to address its humanitarian aspect. I took courage to reshape this broad topic and to take a specific angle, as I wanted to discuss DPRK during the COVID-19 crisis as a showcase of how flawed sanctions regime might be, especially when we are facing a common threat such as a current pandemic. During my presentation, I will address the dangers of those sanctions to DPRK during the COVID-19 outbreak. Further, I will cover recent initiatives to lift sanctions and international reaction to it. My final point will be a brief assessment of the lack of flexibility of the sanctions regime. Here I will try to highlight the connection between the rigidity of sanctions and the absence of a vision of international society as a true community that can form a shared front to face global threats. As we know, Pyongyang was quite determined in its actions as it faced the challenges of the current pandemic. Being neighbour to both China and the Republic of Korea that were significantly harmed by the virus, North Korea did not hesitate to close its borders in late January, shortly after the outbreak of COVID-19. Other preventive measures included long quarantine for both people and wares, disinfection for any imported goods, restrictions of movement for foreign personnel, temporary suspension in the work of schools and universities, etc. To build up the resilience of the country forces were also thrown to build new hospitals that would back up already existing facilities. As for the effect of these steps Pyongyang claims there are no registered cases in the country [1]. The risk of the outbreak was once confirmed in Kaesong in late July - mid-August, but the period of isolation of the town seemed to prevent



the possible spread of the disease. The data on the absence of COVID-19 cases in the DPRK is confirmed by some and questioned by others. For example, Russian embassy, which takes a big effort in publishing in its social media information on North Korean daily life and most important news, kept record on the quarantine regime in Pyongyang. According to the Ambassador, there is no reason to question the official North Korean stance, as there is no visible evidence showing the spread of the virus [2]. The World Health Organisation reports no deaths caused by new virus, but states that 32 011 people were placed into isolation centers as for late October. An alternative point of view is represented by Daily NK: according to their information, in March the DPRK had more than 200 deaths due to COVID-19, more than 300 confirmed cases and over 4000 people with no clear diagnosis. As for early November their anonymous source reported more than 81 000 people in quarantine [3].

Though taken measures are much more severe than those taken in other countries, it was a safe option for North Korea. DPRK has more doctors per capita (3.7) than its southern neighbour (2.4), China (2), or the US (2.6) [4], but it lacks the up-to-date medical training and, most importantly, medical equipment, drugs, vaccine, test kits, etc. For North Korea, the most appropriate strategy would be to prevent the appearance of the virus within its borders instead of controlling its spread. The DPRK knows its resources are scarce, and acts accordingly. Latest news from North Korea show that their way to respond to the international spread of the virus results in economic hardships - Pyongyang seems to lack imported goods, observers say [7]. It is still unclear though, how are the provinces impacted by North Korea's so-called self-embargo.

As international trade is anyway almost impossible to North Korea due to the sanctions, it has to rely on aid by the World Health Organisation, Doctors Without Borders and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to secure medical supplies import. To make a shipment of

resuscitators, surgical face masks and protective face shields, gloves, and thermometers it took a plea to the UN that approved special waivers lasting six months [5]. Russia also donated test kits that are strongly needed to monitor the situation. Still, the sanctions have set a bar that effectively prevents trade, banking operations and import of technology or spare parts for equipment. Impossibility of wire money transfer hampers the work of aid groups, while the ban on technology and equipment spare parts makes impossible any quick update of hospital facilities to a cutting-edge level. Diagnostics and monitoring of the state of patients are made with the help of simple affordable instruments that are near at hand.

Here is the moment to address the flawed logic of the sanctions regime in general. Both UN and unilateral sanctions have proved ineffective as a long-term measure. If sanctions' object demonstrates resistance to restraints and capability to adapt to the circumstances, sanctions appear to be a nearly meaningless instrument that does not stop economic progress, but only slows it down, and hardens the life of the general population thus damaging the image of the actor or actors initiating said sanctions.

The general idea of sanctions would be political change triggered by economic challenges. Still, North Korean example shows that sanctions, if ever viewed as a critical obstacle to development, are now considered a constant of the external environment. Recent speeches of North Korean leader clearly state that [1]. The lift of unilateral US sanctions would sure lighten the burden North Korean people carry, but the key reason for Pyongyang to seek that is not even economic gains. The lift of sanctions would indicate the readiness of the US to a more balanced interaction.

In other words, sanctions - both unilateral and those by the UN Security Council - have not proven effective in the way they were expected to be. Inside the DPRK they are viewed as a malevolent act of external forces and by no means help the dialogue, and, what is important in the context of my presentation, they

lay a burden on average citizens and harden their life. The UN Panel of Experts 2019 report also points this out, calling it an unintended impact of sanctions: a threat to lives of workers in industries affected by the restrictions, repercussions in harvesting due to the lack of fuel, disruption of medical supply chains. All of the effects listed were noticeable and considered worth concern in 2019, the year before the pandemic. Although the UN seems to react faster to the humanitarian exemption requests, all of the mentioned problems are still on the table [6].

2020 only highlights the problems in discussion. It was a very challenging year for North Korea, in that it was exposed to a variety of threats including the typhoons and the pandemic. The outbreak of COVID-19 is in this regard a more important topic for discussion, as it is a global threat and impacts not solely the DPRK but the world in general.

To manage the severe aftermath of the pandemic it takes a lot even in case of a country with a more advanced medical care system, more resources and more possibilities to acquire needed supplies through trade etc. The cases of developed countries are showing a dramatic decrease in the economy, threats to local businesses, and human losses. People of every country that was affected by the spread of the disease are fighting to adapt to the changing conditions of everyday life, facing hardships in their work, household management.

Those hardships are a common occurrence, a common threat. Concerning the fact that the states challenged by the sanctions will have a hard time trying to overcome more than a familiar list of obstacles in order to support their population, several calls were made to lift the sanctions off them. Such pleas were made by the EU, by the UN General Secretary, who addressed G20 countries, etc. The idea of a humanitarian pause in sanctions for such countries as the DPRK, Syria, Iran, and Venezuela was suggested several times, though is still not implemented somehow.

The main obstacle to that to me seems to be the lack of political will and the lack of strategic vision. The COVID-19 outbreak, as other common threats, in order to be effectively dealt with, requires the international community to see its interconnectedness, its interdependence. The search for medical treatment, fight to save human lives, the pursuit of economic sustainability are shared goals that are impossible to achieve in a divided world.

Marginalizing some states on the basis of political conflict does not seem to be the best strategy here. On the contrary, it appears to be oppressive and discriminatory. Cooperation of states in the fight with the pandemic clearly excludes some members of the international community.

As I see it, this situation might possibly derive from two major problems.

The first one is that we underestimate global threat and are not ready to face it. We found ourselves in the 2020 coronavirus crisis questioning the consequences of the first wave of disease spreading, debating quarantine measures, wandering about the second wave of virus incidence and morbidity.

The second possibility is that we are not a true international community yet in a sense that we do not see each other in a shared future. One of the deterring factors in forming such a vision would be the obsolete understanding of the world as a hierarchic structure. It is rooted in the Cold war and post-Cold war IR structure. Still this structure is no longer in place, and one should get used to the idea of the multipolar world, characterized amongst other things by international solidarity and cooperation. The idea of a hegemon, suppressing others by unilateral sanctions outside the UNSC practices seems outdated in this context.

The topic I chose to discuss today is, in my opinion, a good example of the hardships and challenges we will have to face if we proceed with the same attitude towards global threats.

Current COVID-19 outbreak is quite similar to other global issues, such as climate change, in that it requires shared strategy and full cooperation. The

difference is, that the speed of the changes during 2020 pandemic was much faster than that of the environmental processes. Rapid developments of the crisis highlighted our unpreparedness to common action, that has rather grim consequences. Continuing with rigid sanctions regimes will accentuate the marginalisation of a list of states, that will keep the world from becoming a true community with shared future.

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## 토론 1

### **Madeleine NICHOLSON**

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## Public Health Status, COVID Response, and Security on the Korean Peninsula

*Madeline Nicholson, MPH*  
Program Officer, Chicago Council on Global Affairs





## The Korean Peninsula: Population Health at a Glance

### ROK

Population: 51.64 million  
Life expectancy: 82.6

**Notable Stats:**

- Universal healthcare coverage
- Prior pandemic planning due to MERS and SARS responses
- Major investments in pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and medical devices

### DPRK

Population: 25.55 million  
Life expectancy: 71.9

**Notable Stats:**

- 11 million people undernourished, and thus immunocompromised
- Endemic communicable diseases like malaria and Tuberculosis
- Humanitarian organizations provide additional relief to the weak health care system



## The Korean Peninsula: COVID Response

### ROK

Reported Cases\*: 29,311

Reported Deaths\*: 496

Response:

- Fast-tracked testing kits
- Advanced contact tracing technology
- Universal mask compliance
- Regular government communication
- Investments in innovation and vaccines
- Never needed to shut down economy
- Global assistance and cooperation

### DPRK

Reported Cases\*: ?

Reported Deaths\*: ?

Response:

- Border closures
- Shuttered tourism
- Choked economy
- Continued hostilities
- Continued international sanctions

\*Numbers reflect statistics as of November 18, 2020.



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## An Unlikely Advantage

Ultimately, a country's success in fighting the virus not only alleviates the burdens it brings but provides opportunities to address other competing national priorities, and the ROK has done this well.

Its frontline position on public health innovation and vaccine development might prove to be an indirect national security strategy, bolstering their already robust health system, cementing their global leadership, and strengthening their alliances with critical partners in the inter-Korean conflict.

Perhaps the DPRK will be able to simultaneously strengthen its health system, fight the virus, and continue building up its nuclear arsenal, but with little resources or outside assistance, the odds are slim.

The next months of the pandemic may prove to be an unlikely advantage for the ROK as tensions on the Peninsula continue.



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## 토론 2

**Ksenia ANDRYUSHCHENKO**

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## COVID-19 and Security on the Korean Peninsular

Ksenia Andryushchenko

November 26, 2020



## COVID-19 and International Security

- ▶ What are the factors driving national responses from a policy perspective?
  - ▶ The rising role of the crisis management experts to fight COVID-19
  - ▶ The significance of both strategic and psychological factors
  - ▶ Collective emotions (elite panic and limited government attention span) as an explaining factor in rapid policy shifts
  - ▶ Political considerations regarding policy choices as strategic factors
- ▶ What does it mean for International Security?
  - ▶ The situation is still unfolding leading to difficulties with analysis.
  - ▶ The need to draw lessons from both approaches.
  - ▶ COVID-19 has both global and regional security implications and the Korean Peninsular is not the exception.



## Pandemic Response and Border Politics

- ▶ Borders politics as part of the broader pandemic response
- ▶ One of the most commonly used means by the states
- ▶ Border orientation as the extent and structure of the state attempts to control their borders
  - ▶ Before the COVID-19 border orientation was rising.
  - ▶ A convenient way to respond to threats
  - ▶ Is this type of decision psychological or strategic?
  - ▶ Growing anxieties about border security as a contributing factor
  - ▶ The Korean Peninsular is a unique case for border orientation research.
- ▶ Kenwick, Michael R., and Beth A. Simmons. 2020. "Pandemic Response As Border Politics". International Organization, 1-23. doi:10.1017/s0020818320000363.



## COVID-19 and Security on the Korean Peninsular

Ksenia Andryushchenko

November 26, 2020



## 토론 3

**Edward HOWELL**

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영국, 옥스퍼드대 강사

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# The External Environment Facing North Korea Under Kim Jong Un's Leadership: Security and COVID-19

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## How is the external environment changing?

- US policy towards North Korea: a shift from “strategic patience” to “maximum pressure”
  - The weakened US leadership of the global nuclear order
- Broader systemic Sino-US conflict
- Sino-DPRK ties, manifest in Xi-Kim meetings
- Inter-Korean relations under the Moon Jae-in administration
- The role of covid-19 in impacting DPRK's understanding of security
- How North Korea has contributed to this changing geopolitical environment

## From “strategic patience” to “maximum pressure”

- “Strategic patience” of the Obama administration was dismissed by the DPRK, and marked by increasingly provocative behaviour
  - 2010 sinking of ROKS Cheonan; subsequent Yeongpyeong Island shelling
- ‘Leap Day Deal’ of February 2012 collapsed following a “satellite launch” in April 2012.
- Continued UNSCR sanctions enforcement met with ongoing nuclear and missile testing from the DPRK.
  - Four nuclear tests from 2009-2016
- “Maximum pressure” of Donald Trump – contradictory engagement and containment?
  - ICBM launches on 4 and 28 July 2017; 28 November 2017.
  - Nuclear test of September 2017

## Sino-DPRK relations

- Not “as close as lips and teeth” as Mao once stated.
- PRC’s support of UNSCR led to backlash from the DPRK in 2017.
- Revived relations during the Trump era of “maximum patience”, especially considering unsuccessful US-DPRK summitry of 2018 and 2019.
- Closure of Sino-DPRK border in January 2020 owing to coronavirus pandemic and deleterious implications on North Korean economy.
- A revival of relations in 2020?

## Inter-Korean relations

- Obama administration's value of the US-ROK alliance countered by the approach of Trump.
- Three inter-Korean summits in 2018, but relations would fray in the latter Trump administration
- COVID-19 has worsened inter-Korean relations; increased DPRK provocations and bombing of the inter-Korean liaison office in June 2020.
  - Trump administration's policies within the context of a pro-engagement approach by ROK President Moon.

## The view from London


- UK government's policy of "critical engagement" vis-à-vis North Korea.
- Support for sanctions enforcement until the DPRK takes concrete steps towards nuclear dismantlement.
- Role of the EU in supporting dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang, although not a key stakeholder?



## Quo Vadimus?

- North Korea's wish for recognition as a nuclear-armed state whilst also gaining concessions from the international community.
- How might Kim Jong-un resolve the aim of reconciliation with the South and the United States – as desired by Kim Il-sung in the 1990s – with that of a continued pursuit of nuclear development, and the promise of domestic economic development for North Korean citizens?
- These aims are strange bedfellows from the perspective of the international community. Is working-level dialogue the way forward (combining sanctions imposition with trust-building)?





# Session 3

한반도 비핵화와 국제협력

Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and  
International Cooperation

## 발표 1

### **Matthew ABBOTT**

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## Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and International Cooperation

Matt Abbott

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For years the international community engaged in efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Despite attempts with a variety of methods by unilateral and multilateral international actors including diplomacy, sanctions, and engagement, North Korea has failed to denuclearize and has instead developed an increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons program over time.

North Korea's nuclear program was established in the early 1950's, and North Korean nuclear knowledge, capabilities, and facilities [expanded significantly](#) in the coming decades. In 1985, North Korea agreed to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. In 1994 the United States and North Korea [signed](#) the Agreed Framework after North Korea announced it intended to withdraw from the NPT. The Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002, after which North Korea again signaled it would be withdrawing from the NPT.

China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States then [participated](#) in the Six-Party talks beginning in 2003 which led to a pledge from North Korea in 2005 to abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs" while returning to the NPT. By 2009, however, the talks had broken down. The next major diplomatic efforts from the international community on denuclearization came in 2018 after Kim Jong Un stated the North Korean nuclear arsenal had been completed. By this time the North Koreans had tested six nuclear weapons and had made significant progress on delivery systems. The subsequent international diplomacy led to meetings between Kim Jong Un and several world leaders including Chinese President Xi Jinping, South Korean President Moon Jae In, and United States President Donald Trump, which made history as the first time a sitting American president met face-to-face with a sitting North Korean leader.

Yet despite years of efforts, North Korea retains its nuclear arsenal in spite of the denuclearization of North Korea being a longstanding priority of the international community. President Trump and Kim Jong Un both affirmed the [commitment](#) to "work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" during the Singapore Summit in 2018. Yet both countries have offered different definitions of denuclearization.

The stated [goal](#) of the United States is the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear program. Yet [according](#) to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), "When we (North Korea) refer to the Korean peninsula, they include both the area of the DPRK and the area of [S]outh Korea where aggression troops including the nuclear weapons of the US are deployed." The KCNA commentary [continues](#) to state that "When we refer to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it, therefore, means removing all elements

of nuclear threats from the areas of both the north and the south of Korea and also from surrounding areas from where the Korean peninsula is targeted.”

Though the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, both South Korea and Japan are [afforded assurances](#) as part of the American “nuclear umbrella.” Yet, the North Korean definition of denuclearization that applies to American weapons that are not physically present on the Korean peninsula versus the American definition that encompasses CVID of the North Korean program remains a sticking point in progress toward denuclearization.

One must consider North Korean motivations for maintaining its nuclear weapons program. Ultimately, the survival of the regime is a national priority and nuclear weapons are a deterrent against any attempts to attack North Korea or bring about a change in leadership. One needs to look only as far as the [experience](#) of Moammar Gadhafi who agreed to abandon his nuclear program in 2003 but later was overthrown and killed in a civil war in his country in which NATO helped topple him. Kim Jong Un surely views this as a cautionary tale about abandoning his own nuclear program particularly now that it is so well-developed and has proven to be a successful deterrent even in light of [threats](#) from President Trump of “fire and fury.”

The incoming administration of US President-elect Joe Biden will now have to tackle the ongoing effort to denuclearize North Korea, an issue that has been one of the most intractable problems in American foreign policy as well as for the broader international community. While President-elect Biden has yet to announce many of the key appointments and policies in his administration, an examination of his past record and statements proves instructive as to how he will approach the denuclearization of North Korea.

The official [website](#) for the Biden-Harris transition lists four policy priorities: COVID-19, economic recovery, racial equity, and climate change. North Korea is notably absent, but this should not be taken as a sign that the denuclearization of North Korea will not be a priority for the administration. Indeed, then-candidate Biden took the unprecedented step of publishing a special [contribution](#) in a South Korean media outlet in the year of a US presidential election.

One can glean some insight into the new administration’s approach to North Korea in this [excerpt](#) from his contribution: “Words matter – and a president’s words matter even more. As President, I’ll stand with South Korea, strengthening our alliance to safeguard peace in East Asia and beyond, rather than extorting Seoul with reckless threats to remove our troops. I’ll engage in principled diplomacy and keep pressing toward a denuclearized North Korea and a unified Korean Peninsula, while working to reunite Korean Americans separated from loved ones in North Korea for decades.”

At least initially the top-down approach to diplomacy adopted by President Trump may not be replicated by President-elect Biden. President Trump made history by

becoming the first sitting American president to meet with the sitting leader of North Korea. Yet while he pursued this personal, top-down approach to engagement, many efforts to engage North Korea from the bottom-up were curtailed. From the “maximum pressure” campaign to restricting the ability of American passport holders to travel to North Korea, opportunities for engagement were generally limited to only those at the highest levels.

During the campaign, President-elect Biden also [indicated](#) he would be unwilling to meet Kim Jong Un without preconditions and referred to Kim as a “thug” during one of the presidential debates. Though it should be noted that President Trump also [traded](#) his own insults with Kim, which despite this rocky start to their relationship, did not prevent them from meeting multiple times in person and developing a seemingly close and friendly bond.

It will also be telling should North Korea engage in any provocative actions leading up to or after President-elect Biden’s inauguration. There have notably been neither new nuclear tests nor long-range missile tests recently by North Korea that has helped to ease tensions with the United States and also in the region. Yet, a major provocation could set back some of the progress that has been made and also potentially force the Biden administration into a posture in which engagement is not embraced, at least not initially.

President-elect Biden will also have to elucidate how his current strategy will differ from the Obama administration’s strategy of “strategic patience.” As Vice President in the administration, Biden was certainly tied to its policies, and [strategic patience](#) did not yield results on denuclearization.

Given this likely trajectory of American policy in the Biden administration that reverts to a more traditional approach, what steps could be taken to enable an environment for eventual denuclearization? Despite their statements at the Singapore Summit, the North Koreans are [unlikely](#) to relinquish their nuclear weapons program anytime soon. Yet a policy of strategic patience would likely be admitting the issue is too intractable to be solved and would be tantamount to admitting defeat on the issue from the outset. President-elect Biden’s [statement](#) that he will “keep pressing toward a denuclearized North Korea” is vague and does not offer specific steps or a strategy that would lead to denuclearization.

One step that President-elect Biden could take is to clearly outline what preconditions would need to be met for a leader-to-leader meeting to take place. Now that the precedent has been set that a sitting American president has met with a sitting North Korean leader, there is less political capital for the North Koreans to gain in future meetings. Offering clear, concrete, and realistic steps, developed in consultation with key American allies in the international community, that the North Koreans could take to make the meeting a reality would be a helpful and transparent step and establish the new administration’s good faith efforts to engage North Korea.

In addition to providing a roadmap for top-down diplomacy to work, bottom-up diplomacy should also be enabled. While bottom-up diplomacy may not engender immediate denuclearization, it can prove beneficial in trust building and creating an environment that over time may lead to denuclearization. The administration should work collaboratively with universities, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and other groups with experience related to North Korea. Harnessing this collective expertise will be very beneficial. In addition, trusting and empowering key experienced officials other than the President to work on North Korea issues within their portfolio will help the government approach North Korea strategy more efficiently and effectively.

Making progress on issues that are not directly tied to denuclearization should also be a priority. Incremental progress on engaging with North Korea and building trust will pay dividends down the road. President-elect Biden's [statement](#) on "working to reunite Korean Americans separated from loved ones in North Korea for decades" is encouraging. This humanitarian effort is one area where concrete progress is possible in the near term should the administration invest fully in it. And the trust building that would accompany any successes on these efforts could then be applied to tackling more challenging and contentious issues such as denuclearization.

President-elect Biden should also work in tandem with the international community to realize the denuclearization of North Korea. Further investing in America's relationships with allies like South Korea will be critical to ensure allies are approaching denuclearization efforts through their collective strength and shared expertise. South Korea in particular has a track record of engagement with North Korea from which the United States should learn. As opportunities open for engagement with North Korea, policymakers should examine which levers of engagement have been most efficacious in the past in building trust and relationships. Learning from the history of engagement will help to streamline new efforts and maximize their chances of success.

Also, multilateral talks with China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States should be resumed. Effectively engaging the United Nations should also be a priority. The United Nations has issued [biting sanctions](#) on North Korea that have taken a toll over the years on the North Korean economy. Continuing to use the United Nations and other coordinated multilateral approaches will be helpful when addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. Yet it will also be imperative to demonstrate to the North Korean leadership that sanctions can be removed with proper progress on denuclearization and other issues. The United Nations and countries that have imposed unilateral sanctions should reinforce this message and present a realistic roadmap to North Korea that will help it become further integrated in the international community should it abide by international laws and norms.



While it is [expected](#) that the Biden administration will take a more traditional approach to North Korea, the less than traditional approach to engagement adopted by the Trump administration has certainly been historic in its efforts to bring about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, despite its lack of success in attaining its ultimate goal. The coming weeks and months will be telling as the Biden administration makes key appointments and further develops policy related to North Korea. Regardless of whether the new administration adopts a fully traditional policy or incorporates some less traditional elements to its policy, it will be wise to engage with the international community broadly, work in tandem with allies like South Korea, and seize opportunities when offered for principled direct engagement with North Korea.

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## 발표 2

**James PERSON**

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# DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF NORTH KOREA'S DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

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## DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF NORTH KOREA'S DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

- The history of North Korea's diplomatic and political behavior reveals several patterns that policymakers should bear in mind when formulating effective policies for curtailing North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. If, as President-Elect Biden has indicated, he is willing to continue engaging North Korea, any policy should bear in mind the following patterns:
  - There exists a profound sense of mistrust at the basis of the Sino-DPRK relationship that limits Beijing's political influence over Pyongyang, making a return to the default U.S. policy of outsourcing our North Korea problem to China inadvisable;
  - North Korea has long been hyper-sensitive to asymmetry in relationships with other nations and to the high-handed behavior of friends and foes alike. Thus, North Korea is likely to shun or violate any negotiated agreement with the U.S. if Washington messages that the agreement represents a North Korean defeat or a U.S. victory over the North;
  - North Korea has demonstrated time and again throughout its history that it does not want the same things that most other nations want. One example of this is integration into the global economy. What many in the West perceive as a carrot, North Korea likely views as a stick that will lead to an erosion of economic sovereignty. Early negotiations should thus seek to ascertain what North Korea hopes to get out of negotiations rather than offer things that it will likely reject.



## THE LIMITS OF BEIJING'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE

- Starting in March 1973 Pyongyang began reaching out to Washington to replace the Korean War armistice with a peace agreement. Yet, as declassified U.S. records suggest, as Washington prepared to normalize relations with Beijing in the late 1970s, President Carter's national security team determined that there was little intrinsic value to talking directly with North Korea. Instead, the U.S. would rely on what it believed—incorrectly—to be China's influence over the DPRK. This approach reflected a poor understanding of the historical relationship between China and North Korea; exaggerated the docility of Pyongyang to Beijing; and failed to take into account historical factors that limited China's influence over the DPRK.
- Yet, the diplomatic record of North Korea's former communist allies reveal that there is a profound sense of mistrust at the foundation of the Sino-DPRK relationship. The history of Sino-DPRK relations is littered with incidents that have created in Pyongyang the perception that China is overly interventionist and not respectful of Korean sovereignty:
  - Korean War;
  - 1956 August and September plena of the KWP CC;
  - Cultural Revolution;
  - Opposition to Kim Jong Il's succession;
  - Support for maximum pressure?
  - Etc.
- As a result of this tortured history, pressuring China to exercise political influence over North Korea means the United States is asking Beijing to do precisely what Pyongyang has most resented over the years. This will only antagonize North Korea even more.



## THE LIMITS OF BEIJING'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE

- This does not mean that the United States should abandon efforts to encourage China to exert pressure on North Korea. While China does not have the ability to exercise political influence over the DPRK, it enjoys greater material leverage over, and access to, Pyongyang than any other country. Surely that has to account for something. Without greater participation from China, the US policy of relying on sanctions to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs is doomed to fail.
- Yet, there are also limits to a policy of relying on China to utilize its material leverage over North Korea. In any unequal alliance relationship, there exist clear limits to the ability of the patron ally to utilize its material leverage over its protégé to influence, at will, the latter's policies.
- Protégé allies on both sides of the Cold War conflict often exhibited a far greater degree of autonomy than had been previously assumed. One only need think of the US relationship with South Korea's Syngman Rhee or Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek. Despite being wholly dependent on the United States for economic support and security, both Rhee and Chiang were obstreperous allies.
- China's ability to utilize its support to North Korea to influence Pyongyang's policies for most of the past half-century was similarly limited. There is no reason to believe that this fundamental dynamic will change no matter how much the United States expresses its disappointment with China or imposes sanctions on it for Beijing's failure to rein in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.



## THE LIMITS OF BEIJING'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE

- Moreover, carrying Washington's water is also not in Beijing's interests. China's interests on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia do not align with those of the United States, and no amount of arm twisting will get Beijing to do the US' bidding.
- While China prefers a nuclear-free and more compliant North Korea, it is not willing to bring the DPRK to its knees to achieve this goal. China's enormous material leverage over North Korea is a double-edged sword. Cutting off the lifeline could lead to state and societal collapse in North Korea. This is the last thing Beijing wants. It would invite instability on China's borders, precipitate a refugee crisis, or worse. The collapse of North Korea would be a national security nightmare for China, bringing a U.S. treaty ally to its doorstep at a time when Beijing aspires to reassert its regional hegemony in East Asia. Moreover, China's support to the DPRK in "The War to Resist America and Aid Korea" is central to the legitimacy narrative of the Chinese Communist Party. Following a "century of humiliation," a brutal invasion by Japan, and a fierce civil war, the PRC—just one year after coming to power—fought the greatest power in the world to a standstill in a war to help its smaller communist ally.



## THE LIMITS OF BEIJING'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE

- Since North Korea has been trying to reach out to the United States since 1973 to establish a new relationship, this gives Washington greater leverage over North Korea than any other state.



## ASYMMETRY IN RELATIONSHIPS

- North Korea probably will reject or renege on any diplomatic agreement with the U.S. where Washington portrays itself as a victor over Pyongyang. Far beyond any desire to save face, this tendency is historically rooted in North Korea's—and its leadership's—nationalist emphasis on its ability to stand up to large foreign powers. The Kim family's legitimacy has in many ways rested on each ruler's ability to resist foreign pressure, and therefore even an agreement that benefits the North is likely to be violated if the US portrays the agreement as an American victory and a North Korean concession.
- North Korea's resistance to appearing deferential to foreign powers is longstanding. Tensions in Sino-DPRK and Soviet-DPRK relations were frequently a result of North Korea's perception that Beijing or Moscow sought to impose their political will on Pyongyang.
- Throughout the US-North Korea summitry of the past four years, Pyongyang's state media has consistently portrayed the U.S. as the country most desperate for a diplomatic agreement and painted Kim Jong Un as an equal to President Trump.
- In October 2019 the *Rodong Sinmun* cautioned that "One step of concessions" to sanctions would lead down a path of "hundreds" of concessions and lead the country to "perish in the end." This is consistent with North Korean rhetoric since Kim Il Sung, who argued in 1972 that economic dependence on any foreign country would make it impossible to be politically independent. Kim posed the *Juche* ideology as a response to "the big-power chauvinistic tendency to restrain the independent and comprehensive development of the economy of other countries."



## ASYMMETRY IN RELATIONS

- Calibrating the U.S.'s bilateral and public messaging on diplomatic progress with North Korea to suggest that any meetings or agreements are win-win—and perhaps even victories over the U.S.—could encourage North Korean buy-in on the arrangement. The Maximum Pressure Campaign, while responsible for economic strain that could increase Pyongyang's want for a diplomatic solution if maintained, has probably aggravated the North's ability to portray an agreement with the U.S. as a win-win or any kind of victory;
- A successful resolution to the U.S.-North Korea nuclear and political disputes is far more likely if Washington avoids suggesting the agreement represents a victory of the Maximum Pressure Campaign over North Korea. While this messaging is only one piece of a whole-of-government strategy to entice concessions from North Korea, it is one that should not be supplanted by an American desire to demonstrate its strength and influence;
- North Korea's record upholding its international agreements suggests that even a well-presented agreement might not result in lasting change in the country's weapons programs. However, the since-stalled inter-Korean cooperation framed around reunifying the Peninsula "led by the Koreans" was at least initially hailed by Pyongyang as a nationalist and patriotic victory, suggesting that diplomatic progress is possible if the message is properly curated and presented.
- Portraying a negotiated agreement as a win-win is one part of a broader strategy necessary for diplomatic progress with North Korea, and the theme should be carefully counterbalanced to not overstate US weakness.





## WHAT DOES NORTH KOREA WANT?

Not all new-car shoppers want the same features in a new vehicle. That is why automakers typically offer several trim choices, options packages, or stand-alone options for each model car they sell. These let you configure a new vehicle to suit your needs and desires.

In many ways, we have been offering North Korea a make and model of an agreement that does not entirely suit Pyongyang's needs and desires. For example, does North Korea want integration into the global economy as an incentive? That may have worked for Libya in 2003, but it won't likely work for the DPRK.



## WHAT DOES NORTH KOREA WANT?

- North Korea has long feared the idea of pooled economic sovereignty. Any limits on full sovereignty are perceived as a threat as long as asymmetries in development exist;
- The DPRK never integrated into the socialist camp's trade group, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), fearing that as a result of the asymmetry in development, it would lead to future dependency relationships:
  - “[...] when Khrushchev made the proposal, he declined that proposal because there was such a discrepancy between the Soviet Union and North Korea in the context of economic capability and he was likening North Korea in terms of kindergarten as against the Soviet Union in a graduate university. So if he joined COMECON, then the discrepancy would expand and North Korea's participation in COMECON would leave North Korea with a lot of empty holes, where the Russians would be digging all the natural resources in exchange for finished products that the Soviet Union would be providing North Korea. So he declined to Khrushchev, by saying that we are going to remain kindergarten kids and you may go and you may advance as graduate students. That is the way we will feel safe.”

**Conversation between Lee Hurak and Kim Il Sung, 1972**



## WHAT DOES NORTH KOREA WANT?

- The DPRK economy is in far worse shape today than it was during the Cold War era when Kim resisted integration into COMECON. The risks associated with pooled economic sovereignty are thus far greater:
  - Loss of freedom of action in determining what to import and what to export;
  - Exploitation of North Korean mineral and natural resources;
  - Major corporations dictating to the DPRK terms for development, etc.;
  - Lopsided development of national economy, focusing on extraction and primary processing, while being dependent on other states for finished goods and spare parts.



## WHAT DOES NORTH KOREA WANT?

- Don't assume what North Korea wants. Early in working-level negotiations try to ascertain what they hope to achieve out of the deal. Let them be the car buyer and give a list of what model and options they want.





## 토론 1

### Tristan WEBB

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영국, 켄트대 로스쿨 조교수  
UK, Kent Law School, Assistant Lecturer

**‘Peace on the Korean Peninsula  
and the Role of International Society’**  
Ministry of Unification, Institute for Unification Education  
26-27 November 2020

**Session 3:**  
**‘Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula  
and International Co-operation’**

Discussant: Tristan Webb  
ELF 2017, tw353@kent.ac.uk

*Prepared in draft 2020.11.19*

## **The Principles of the United Nations Charter**

1. As an introduction or reminder, they are:
  - 1.1. a post-war legacy of our predecessors (“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”);
  - 1.2. core principles of the international legal order; and
  - 1.3. also known as or associated with the principles of ‘good-neighbours’, ‘peaceful coexistence’, and ‘friendly relations and co-operation’.
2. They are inherent in the topic, because:
  - 2.1. they are binding on all regional parties as Members of the UN; and
  - 2.2. are incorporated into various international instruments regarding the denuclearisation of the DPRK/ the Korean peninsula (e.g. the 2005 Six Party Joint Statement, and UNSCR 2397 in light of Article 24(2) of the UN Charter) and the world (e.g. preamble of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons).
  - 2.3. They also share points with the goals and principles of President Moon Jae-In’s ‘Policy on the Korean Peninsula’.
3. I would like to suggest that one of the principles—the principle of self determination—deserves more attention with regards to this topic, and that its fuller application could assist:
  - 3.1. the UN Security Council;
  - 3.2. international relations generally and intra-Korean relations particularly; and
  - 3.3. President Donald J. Trump personally.

**References:**

United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI  
UN General Assembly, *Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV) (available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda1f104.html>)  
Ministry of Unification, ‘Moon Jae-In’s Policy on the Korean Peninsula’, [https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng\\_unikorea/policy/issues/koreanpeninsula/goals/](https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/policy/issues/koreanpeninsula/goals/)  
(accessed 2020.11.19)

*Prepared in draft 2020.11.19*

## 토론 2

**Steven DENNEY**

미국, 토론토대 박사후 과정

US, University of Toronto, Postdoctoral Research Fellow

## Discussion Questions for Session 3: Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and International Cooperation

Steven Denney, Ph.D.  
University of Toronto

27 November 2020

### Brief Review

2

- ▶ Mr. Abbott provides a high-level but comprehensive overview of where the Biden administration will stand with regards to North Korea following a historically different, and somewhat erratic, approach pursued by the Trump administration. He advocates a return to the pre-Trump years, with some important caveats.
- ▶ Mr. Person looks at historical events and leadership/state discourse to infer an articulation of national identity and interests. National pride, autonomy, and independence are clearly important elements of North Korea's state and/or national identity.

## Questions for Matt Abbott

3

- ▶ Given (geo)political changes since the Obama administration, including a notable deterioration in U.S. regional standing, intensifying Sino-U.S. competition, and continued absence of regional and multilateral institutions (that include the U.S.), the following questions are posed for consideration:
  - 1 Is a policy other than “strategic patience” even possible? Is there even a desire to do anything other than recover on the home front?
  - 2 Must there be a resolution pursued, at least for the Biden administration, to the nuclear problem? Is problem/crisis management not a solution? What might that look like?
  - 3 Resumption of multilateral talks and international engagement is cited as a must, but absent better relations with Beijing, is this even possible? What would that look like?

Denney

Discussion Questions for Session 3: Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula 4

## Questions for James Person

4

- ▶ The reading of state discourse and certain historical events begets at least a few questions, including:
  - 1 Is North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons not tightly bound, and thus fundamental, to state identity and national sovereignty (see, e.g., ‘Nukes and Peace’ in *Rodong Sinmun*, 24 April 2013)? If so, what is it that we are debating exactly? If not, why?
  - 2 An important historical point is made about the importance of 1972/3 for North Korea (Sino-DPRK split on détente with the U.S.) in setting a preference for bilateral negotiations with the United States. Can you elaborate further on this (often overlooked) point, explaining how this position has remained consistent over time and what the implications are regional and international cooperation now?


Denney

Discussion Questions for Session 3: Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula 4

Thank You

Denney

Discussion Questions for Session 3: Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula z



# Session 4

한반도 평화공존과 국제협력

Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and  
International Cooperation

## 발표 1

### Dylan Alexander STENT

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뉴질랜드, 빅토리아대 박사과정

New Zealand, Victoria University of Wellington, PhD Candidate





South Korea's 40 Year Search for an Inter-Korean Breakthrough: Is the Unification Formula Appropriate to Bring Peaceful Coexistence?

VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON  
DYLAN.STENT@VUW.AC.NZ

## Major Questions

1. What is South Korea's unification formula?
2. Why have South Korean elites landed on this formula?
3. Will this unification formula establish peaceful coexistence?

## South Korean Elites

▶ I concentrate on elites as South Korea's "policymaking structure has remained highly closed, personalized, and informal, thus constituting a serious deficit in the democratic quality of South Korea's North Korean policy formulation."



## Four Scenarios of Unification... Consensus is the Only Accepted Scenario

- ▶ Via absorption akin to the German case;
- ▶ Through force, as evidenced in Vietnam;
- ▶ Via consensus like Yemen;
- ▶ Or by trusteeship.



**민족화합 민주통일방안이란**  
 남북한 대표로  
 민족통일협의회를 구성하여  
 통일헌법 초안을 마련한 후  
 국민투표에 붙여 통일헌법을 확정짓고  
 총선거를 실시하여  
 통일국회와 통일정부를  
 수립하자는 것입니다

## Early Unification Plans

— 428 —

통일이 **합의과정**을 거치고 **합의결과**를 통해 이루어져야 하는지 구체적으로 생각해 본 적 있어?



**SINCE 1989. 9. 11.**

통일에 대한 '비판'과 '과방'을 담은  
**'한민족공동체통일방안'**은  
 이미 **30년** 짝에 관철되었다는 사실!

## Roh Tae-woo's Plan

## Kim Young-sam's Formula



The formula envisioned unification occurring in three stages.

- First, the Koreans would recognize each other as separate states and engage in exchanges and cooperation, resulting in coexistence and co-prosperity.
- The second stage would see a South-North Union in which the two country's systems, and governments, would co-exist.
- The final stage would be unification, where a unified constitution would be introduced with the creation of a single government with democratic freedoms.



## Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun



Lee  
Myung-  
bak and  
Park  
Geun-hye




Moon Jae-in's Formula



Progressives and  
Conservative  
visions  
Differ...But not as  
much as you'd  
expect

## Political party positions in the April 2020 Legislative election





Has the Formula failed?

Other  
questions to  
think about

- ▶ Regional actors
- ▶ What North Korea wants
- ▶ An effective road map
- ▶ Alternative visions for the future
- ▶ Should unification be the be all end all of policy?



Con**clu**sion



## 발표 2

**Piti SRISANGNAM**

태국, 쫘라롱꼰대 부교수

Thailand, Chulalongkorn University, Associate Professor

## **Dealing with North Korea Nuclear Problem by Mixed Strategy**

Seksan Anantasirikiat

Researcher at International Studies Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand

and

Piti Srisangnam, PhD

Associate Professor and Director of Academic Affairs, ASEAN Studies Center,  
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

### **Executive Summary**

The recent statistics from the Arms Control Association indicates that there are currently nine countries possessing the nuclear weapons. North Korea is one among them. The latest sixth nuclear test, which can be considered as the highest potential threat to the surrounding countries, was conducted in September 2017. There is also a tendency that North Korea's nuclear test will be more frequent with higher capabilities. This sort of situation triggers instability in the region as there are some risks and uncertainties of either launching nuclear missiles or proceeding the use of force that can lead to war.

This policy paper argues that North Korea nuclear problem should be settled peacefully by mixed strategy that draws the accurate causes of the conflict with the relevant policy tools. It will firstly analyze the causes of conflict via the concept of Kenneth Waltz's three images: international system, regime type, and subjective factor of the leader. It is explicitly that the North Korea preoccupies the nuclear weapons to guarantee the survival of the regime, the maintenance of Kim Dynasty and his supporters. There is no significant difference between the first and second image in the North Korea's authoritarian regime.

However, considering only the domestic factor may distort the whole picture of North Korea's sixth nuclear test as there is also a structural factor: the decline of balance of power. It is likely that the United States' changing leadership and policy toward North Korea may affect North Korea's security as most of the nuclear test happened when the United States have a new president. China's increasing military and economic capabilities could also provide a conducive external environment for North Korea to continue its nuclear development program while Japan and South Korea as a military alliance of the United States always have conflicts.

There were two major bilateral and multilateral efforts in dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue: the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks. None of them could not completely settle the conflicts so far but they can be useful lessons for solving today conflict. The most urgent action is that both the president of the United States and the leader of North Korea have to manage their self-restraint in political communication in order to avoid any escalation to war or military conflict. Then, the following political methods are required to implement: credible deterrence, negotiation, sanctions, economic assistance, and socialization.

## Introduction

As of August 2020, there are nine countries possessing the nuclear warhead inventories. Davenport (2020) approximates the number of global nuclear warhead inventories as follows: Russia (6,375), United States (5,800), China (320), France (290), United Kingdom (215), Pakistan (160), India (150), Israel (90), and North Korea (30-40). Signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), five countries are legitimately recognized as “Nuclear States”. They are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Being a member of the treaty allows them the legitimate possession of nuclear arsenals keeping in mind the purpose of maintaining peace and stability. In case of India and Pakistan, both countries have declared their objective of having nuclear weapon capabilities as “tit-for-tat” strategy. While Israel does not take any explicit actions concerning its nuclear development program.

North Korea is the country having least amount of nuclear warhead inventories but most threatening because of its ongoing development of nuclear weapon capabilities as well as intimidating missile tests. It is anticipated that North Korea has successfully developed a “hydrogen bomb” that could be a potential explosive head to its intercontinental ballistic missile. The explosive power of its nuclear is approximately 140 kilotons, five times larger than the recent experiment in September 2016 (Beyond Parallel, 2017a). In addition, North Korea has tested more missile tests amid the pandemic (Al Jazeera News, March 29, 2020). North Korea claimed that the range of the missiles could cover “anywhere in the world”. This sort of situation causes instability in the global and regional arena. Therefore, it is critical to discuss the causes of North Korea’s nuclear problem and suggest the policy recommendations.

## Background

North Korea has a long history of nuclear development since the Korean War ended with the armistice agreement in 1953. Leader Kim Il Sung came up with the idea of having nuclear weapon with technical support provided by the Soviet Union as a result of Soviet-North Korea Nuclear Agreement signed in 1959 (Bolton, 2012). In 1970s, North Korea attempted to improve its nuclear technology by discussing with the Belgian scientists at the conference in Vienna (Kalvapalle, 2017). However, North Korea had been inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that there was a possibility for North Korea to develop its nuclear capabilities; although, it had signed NPT in 1985. In 1994, North Korea agreed with the United States to suspend its project. It also requested the international assistance in building the light-water reactors (CNN Library, 2017).

North Korea withdrew from NPT in 2003 responding to President George W. Bush’s address criticizing North Korea as an “Axis of Evil” as well as the revelation on North Korea’s secret activities that could violate the 1994 agreement. In the same year, the Six-Party Talks which are the multilateral effort to solve the nuclear issue took place. There had been six principal rounds with several phases of talks among five countries (China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States). During the negotiation process, there were many forms of interaction between North

Korea and other parties. For example, North Korea pledged to “freeze” its program if the other parties promised to provide economic assistance (Collins, 2017; Davenport, 2017b). Nonetheless, the first and second nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 had aborted this multilateral effort. It was followed by sanctions and discontinuation of the talk.

After Leader Kim Jong Un took power in 2012, there have been a tendency that Kim Jong Un’s North Korea will be more threatening than his father’s, Kim Jong Il. Figures of nuclear and missile tests including short- and medium-range missile under Kim Jong Un’s rule has been doubly increased (Al Jazeera News, 2017). Not only nuclear and missile capabilities but also chemical weapons have been possessed by North Korea. It is estimated that North Korea also possesses chemical weapons between 2,500-5,000 tons (Albert, 2017a). They could be used as a composition of shells, rockets, and missiles. Since 2012, North Korea has been conducted nuclear tests for four times: February 2013, January 2016, September 2016, and September 2017. Beyond Parallel (2017b) predicts that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities would be elevated and more frequently tested than in the past.

### Analysis

This section will analyze the logic behind North Korea’s nuclear possession and its militarization project by the concept of Waltz’s three images. In the introduction chapter of *Man, the State, and War*, Waltz raises the key question of this work: what are the main sources of war/conflict. His preliminary answers to this doubt are within the unit of analysis so-called “image” comprising man, the type of the state, and the international system (Waltz, 1959, p. 12). Waltz starts his analysis of the first image by assuming the human nature and psycho-social human behavior. Instincts or drives of human could lead to war. Waltz also points out the academic dialogue between the ‘pessimists’ and ‘optimists’ on human nature and behavior that whether human could be changed for better conditions or it would enjoy the preservation of self-interest (Waltz, 1959, pp. 18-20).

Moving to the second image, Waltz adds the sociological dimension into the analysis. He agrees that sometimes the state could employ war/conflict as a political tool in reaching the national consensus and solving geographical and socio-economic problems (Waltz, 1959, pp. 81-82). Reformation of state organizations could bring about world peace but there is still a question on to what extent the state should apply (Waltz, 1959, p. 83). The final level of analysis is the international system. Waltz assumes that the international system is generally in an ‘anarchy’ meaning that there is no “central authority” to organize the international system (pp. 159-161). Building on the basic assumption of the individual level, the state is a unitary actor given the power of nationalism and harmonious act during the wartime crisis (Waltz, 1959, pp. 178-180) because the first priority of the state in international system is its survival.

Drawing from the conclusion chapter, there are three main theoretical assumptions related to the conflict management. Firstly, there are several factors and levels in analyzing the conflict. Waltz reminds us that the focus on single factor may distort the reality (Waltz, 1959, p. 227). So, he persuades the reader to consider the third image, international system, as the most relevant level of analysis. Second,

signaling the influence of international system on the state as a unitary actor would provide more comprehensive study on the cause of war/conflict. It is the reason why the state acts differently in different place and time (Waltz, 1959, pp. 231-232). Lastly, the application of the three levels to the real-world case studies is likely to be flexible but systematic (Waltz, 1959, pp. 237-238). The analysis of causes of North Korea's nuclear development will follow Waltz's framework of three images.

### 1. *First image: leader's fear*

The first image mainly focuses on subjective factor of the political leader that brings about the conflict. Linking with the nuclear issue, Hymans (2008, p. 263) argues that North Korea's nuclear is driven by its leader's national identity conception of constructing fear and pride. It aims at two main goals: to control fear and decrease actual danger as well as to produce a marker for autonomy and power. North Korea is not an exceptional case that the political leader has put a big effort in maintaining self-interest preservation. It has a long history of personality cult since its first leader, Kim Il Sung, took power after the division of Korea. The bottom line of this personality cult is to mobilize the loyalty from the people to the leader by any ideological practices that reinforces Kim Il Sung and his family as the god-like leader. This characteristic has been continuously succeeded to the current leader, Kim Jong Un (Callick, 2017).

### 2. *Second image: regime survival*

The second image deals with the type of state regime. North Korean regime is explicitly defined as authoritarian for three reasons (Ahn, 2010, p. 104). First of all, there is no political opposition to the government. Next, there is no intermediary institution that could disseminate the interests among different groups. Lastly, there is no freedom of expression for the media. At the state level, there are three main political institutions having run the country: the government, the military, and the party. However, these institutions have been strengthened due to the social control system in North Korean society. Most of high-level officials are from the family or factions that are very close to the leaders. Keeping these traits in mind, the political power is mostly centralized to the national leader and narrow circle of elites. Therefore, it can be analyzed that there is no significant difference between the first and second image.

### 3. *Third image: declining balance of power and changing external environment*

The third image concerns international system. The state, as a unitary actor under the anarchy, has to improve its relative strength in order to survive. There are many ways to do so such as to increase military capability, to enhance diplomatic relations, to make alliance, and to make nuclear. Nuclear is the option that North Korea has used to deter the United States from invading or taking military action (Mansourov, 2014). One of the structural reasons why North Korea has tested nuclear weapon more frequently than in the past is the declining of balance of power which China's military

and economic capabilities are rising while President Donald Trump’s behavior and policy of East Asia is uncertain. Moreover, there are some conflicts between Japan and South Korea that has weakened the military alliance against North Korea.

*Interplay of three images*

Building on the discussion about the first and second image, it can be analyzed that there is no significant difference between the leader and the regime. This feature causes the independence and compatibility of North Korea’s national interest. All three North Korean leaders have made clear in their speeches that the United States are the most serious threat for them. Then, the analysis of the third image will be essential to understand any decision on nuclear made by the regime through the underlying causes and immediate causes. It is very clear from Table 1 that there is no single cause of each nuclear test. The underlying cause used in the table means the structural or systematic factor that allows the possibility of nuclear test from the author’s analysis while the immediate cause refers to the key event taken place before the nuclear test according to the chronology outlined by Davenport (2017a).

<b>Nuclear test</b>	<b>Underlying cause(s)</b>	<b>Immediate cause(s)</b>
First (October 3, 2006)	- United States’ hostile policy toward North Korea (Axis of Evil)  - The fall of the “Rogue Regimes”	- Japan and Australia’s sanctions targeting multiple foreign entities tied to North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs in response to resolution 1695
Second (May 25, 2009)	- The failure of the Six-Party Talks  - Obama’s first office	- UNSC’s financial restrictions on three North Korean firms believed to be participating in proliferation
Third (February 12, 2013)	- Xi Jinping’s ascendancy  - Obama’s second office	- UNSC’s Resolution 2087 in response to North Korea’s satellite launch, which used technology applicable to ballistic missiles in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009)
Fourth (January 6, 2016)	- China’s increasing military and economic capabilities  - Obama’s strategic patience and the preparation for presidential election	- Additional designations under Executive Orders 13551 and 13382 punishing the banks engaged in activities that contribute to delivery vehicles capable of carrying WMDs
Fifth	- China’s increasing military and economic	- THAAD deployment in South Korea

(September 9, 2016)	capabilities - Trump's ascendancy	
Sixth (September 3, 2017)	- China's increasing military and economic capabilities - Trump's rhetoric and volatile actions	- Trump's Twitter on "fire and fury" and possibility of "military solution"

Table 1. Underlying causes(s) and immediate cause(s) influencing each nuclear test

Source: Author's analysis

Table 1 offers the analysis on possible causes triggering North Korea's nuclear test. It is explicit from the table that both underlying and immediate causes have played an important role. The first two nuclear tests were the direct consequences from the failure of the Six-Party Talks in achieving the practical conclusion. From the table, it is likely that the United States' changing leadership and policy toward North Korea may affect North Korea's security as most of the nuclear test happened when the United States have a new president. China's increasing military and economic capabilities could also provide a conducive external environment for North Korea to continue its nuclear development program while Japan and South Korea as a military alliance of the United States always have conflicts. It is also clear that North Korea tested its nuclear when there were any circumstances that could violate the interest and survival of the regime.

#### *Recent developments*

Following the sixth nuclear test, it is critical to investigate the recent developments of the conflict on the Korean peninsula. There were series of "war of words" between President Trump and Leader Kim Jong Un. For example, President Trump says on his Twitter on September 22, 2017, "Kim Jong Un of North Korea, who is obviously a madman who doesn't mind starving or killing people, will be tested like never before." He also called Leader Kim Jong Un as "rocket man", "short and fat". Leader Kim Jong Un also responded that he had sentenced Trump to death for insulting him (Agence France-Presse, 2017). These rhetorical fight between President Trump and Leader Kim Jong Un has raised the tension on the possibility of war on the peninsula (Figure 1) as both of them are at the top of line of command in their countries. They could order any nuclear attack without prior warning.




Figure 1. Current status of conflict as of early December 2017

Source: Author’s assessment

**Policy Options**

Given that the situation has leveraged to high-intensity conflict, it is exactly that the first priority of conflict management for today North Korea’s nuclear issue is to avoid any escalation leading to war or military conflict. Then, the policy options to settle the problem will be discussed. Generally speaking, the nature of North Korea’s nuclear issue is mostly political. Thus, the policy options will be based on the diplomatic and political tools such as negotiation, sanctions, economic assistance, etc. This section will be separated into two parts. Firstly, it will analyze what has been done and its implications for solving today conflict, particularly the 1994 United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks. Next, it will suggest implementable policy recommendations with the assessment of advantages, risks, and concerns of those methods. Finally, the author’s idea of mixed strategy will be proposed.

*Past Actions*

There are two key past actions that should be mentioned here. The first is the 1994 United States-North Korea Agreed Framework. This is the attempt of both parties to solve the issue at the pre-conflict stage. The principal provisions that were agreed by two countries comprise freezing and dismantlement of North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors and its facilities, permitting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect the suspected activities, fully complying with the safeguards agreement under NPT, advancing closer cooperation with South Korea on North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, the United States pledged to provide 150,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, light-water reactors, and formal assurance against the threat of nuclear weapons. Both sides also agreed to leverage bilateral political and economic relations (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011).

Another essential effort to denuclearize North Korea is the series of Six-Party Talks. Tension evolved when President George W. Bush announced in his State Union address that North Korea is a “Rogue State”. It violated the 1994 Agreed Framework by pursuing the uranium enrichment program which is critical to future nuclear weapon



development as well as expelling the inspectors from IAEA. Bajoria & Xu (2013) propose that the main characteristic of Six-Party Talks is “stop and go” negotiation. The parties achieved the pact in 2005 that North Korea would abandon its nuclear as well as leverage its relations with the United States and Japan. This pact was followed by the sanctions from the United States Treasury Department on the Banco Delta Asia, a company suspected in North Korea’s money laundering. After that, North Korea tested its missile and underground nuclear experiment in 2006.

A big lesson that could be drawn from these two major attempts to denuclearize North Korea is the logical relations between cause and cure. The success of the 1994 Agreed Framework can be considered an effective combination between the United States’ understandings of domestic situation of North Korea and its negotiation approach in dealing with the issue. However, President George W. Bush shifted the country’s policy from soft approach to hard approach that could threaten North Korea’s regime survival. North Korea responded to this threat by provocation and conflict escalation while the Six-Party Talks could not achieve much because they had become a platform for power play with complex issues, multi-party negotiation, and different approaches in settling the issue. The consequence is that the conflict had been around talks, sanctions, and escalation (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Conflict cycle of North Korea’s nuclear issue

Source: Author’s analysis

#### *Assessment of policy options*

To overcome the conflict cycle in Figure 2, the policy options ranging from the least to the most feasible and desirable options are compared in Table 2. President Trump once said that he had thought of military action as one option to deal with North Korea. Military option itself is not peaceful settlement. It could also create the risky and uncertain situation that would change the international structure and cause tremendous damage to the international arena. Softer approach of use of force is deterrence. Deterrence refers to prevent an adversary from doing something. An acceptable punishment could be implemented if the leader violates it. However, this action could lead to miscalculation and misperception. For example, the United States has joint military exercise with South Korea. North Korea perceived this exercise as threatening action to its security.

To make deterrence credible to the other side, the carrot and stick approach should be applied. What the United Nations have been doing so far is to impose sanctions through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and to offer economic assistance. However, both methods are criticized ineffective in some ways. The basic condition for effective sanctions is the enforcement by the willing of member countries and some private companies. Most of the pro-sanction analyst generally based their own analysis that North Korea will collapse. While economic assistance is a part of humanitarian action toward North Korean people, it would not affect much on changing behavior of the regime. Last option is negotiation. This option is the most desirable because it is widely used as a basic framework for peaceful settlement, cheap and less risky. Also, the parties can control the results.

<b>Policy tools</b>	<b>Advantages</b>	<b>Risks/Concerns</b>
Military operation	n/a	- Not peaceful settlement - High cost and very risky - High possibility of losing control of the situation
Deterrence	- Deter North Korea's war-like behavior	- Miscalculation/Misperception - Short-term solution
Sanctions	- Cut off material capabilities - Bargaining tool	- Misperception - Effectiveness (member countries' and private sectors' willing to enforce)
Economic assistance	- Humanitarian issue - Bargaining tool	- Effectiveness (North Korea's willing to change behavior)
Negotiation	- Parties' control of the process and outcome - Cheap and less risky	- Lack of trust and confidence to start negotiation

Table 2. Comparison of advantages, risks, and concerns of each policy tool

Source: Author's assessment

*Mixed strategy and its feasibility*

To solve the North Korea's nuclear issue, the author comes up with the idea of mixed strategy (Table 3). The most urgent action is that both the president of the United States and the leader of North Korea have to manage their self-restraint in political communication in order to avoid any escalation to war or military conflict. Then, credible deterrence is required to cure the declining balance of power by reinforcing the United States-Japan-South Korea alliance. According to Nam (2017), the combination of these three countries' military personnel and weapons is the

strongest in the world. Although China has good relations with North Korea, it is only for keeping the stability of the region not to make a military alliance (Albert, 2017b). However, some sorts of deterrence such as military drill should be avoided at this stage. It could be perceived by North Korea as a threatening action that would be later retaliated.

<b>Image</b>	<b>Cure</b>	<b>Expected outcomes</b>
Third image (declining balance of power)	- Credible deterrence	- Balance of power as a stable external environment for strategic calculation
First and second image (leader's fear and regime survival)	- Self-restraint - Negotiation - Sanctions/Economic assistance - Socialization	- Nuclear non-proliferation - Policy change - Denuclearization in the long run

Table 3. Logical relations between image and cure of mixed strategy

Source: Author's analysis

Simultaneously, the United States should express the intention to start the bilateral or multilateral negotiation with North Korea as soon as possible in order to reduce tension in the region and find the way to solve nuclear issue peacefully. Learning from the 1994 Agreed Framework, the first-mover will be benefit in determining the rule of the game. Bilateral framework would be more efficient and effective. Sanctions and economic assistance taken by the United Nations, then, could be a carrot and stick approach in case North Korea violates the agreement. However, this approach could end up like the 1994 Agreed Framework when the government changes. To avoid the loop of conflict cycle in Figure 2, the United States has to engage China as a responsible stakeholder of the issue aiming at non-proliferation, policy change, and denuclearization in the long run.

Final policy suggestion is the socialization of North Korea. This is very new issue when talking about policy recommendations on this topic. The author suggests that ASEAN could play this role for many reasons. First, ASEAN countries have good relationship with North Korea. There are North Korean embassies in eight ASEAN countries. On the other hand, there are five ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and Vietnam) establishing their own missions in Pyongyang (DPRK Global, 2017). Second, North Korea has been a participant in ASEAN-led regional confidence-building so-called ASEAN Regional Forum<sup>1</sup> (ARF) since 2000

<sup>1</sup> The current participants in the ARF are as follows: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States, and Viet Nam.

(Parameswaran, 2017). Third, ASEAN countries themselves signed the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ). Fourth, North Korea is looking to and learning from the economic development model of Singapore and Viet Nam (Tan, Govindasamy, & Park, 2017).

There are also critical voices from the United States and China pushing ASEAN to take action on the Korean peninsula issue. The ASEAN foreign ministers were asked by the United States' Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Patrick Murphy, to "fully implement the U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang, which is working to develop a nuclear-tipped missile capable of reaching the United States, and to show a united front on the issue" at the first ministerial meeting on Thursday, May 4, 2017 (Brunnstrom, 2017; Ching, 2017). Murphy also emphasized that "ASEAN remained a very important strategic partner" (Brunnstrom, 2017). Therefore, ASEAN in his speech, could cooperate with the United States by decelerating the ties with North Korea both formal and informal. At the same time, President Xi Jinping made a call to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte encouraging the negotiations toward "a denuclearized peninsula" (The Associated Press, 2017).

#### *Desirability of prescription*

The mixed strategy is not a new concept. It is an effort to go beyond the debate between sanctions and economic assistance and to solve the issue from the understanding of accurate image of North Korea's nuclear issue. However, there are three concerns regarding the implementation. First is the issue of collapse. This issue is a big debate in both academic and policy circles. Different understanding of collapse makes different approach in dealing with North Korea. For example, the scholar who believe in collapse assumption is likely to support the sanctions to the regime (Song, 2012). On the other hand, the scholar who conclude that no action can be taken because North Korea could muddle through by its economic development (Lankov, 2017). The author's standpoint is that whether North Korea will collapse or not, mixed strategy is the most relevant to the causes of conflict.

Next is the dynamics of the conflict. What should be set as the goal for solving the issue? Denuclearization or non-proliferation? Denuclearization itself is the most attainable for all parties including China but the way to achieve this goal is not easy. Ending the conflict at the policy change and non-proliferation will narrow the chance to reach the denuclearization as the ultimate goal. This is because the nature of the North Korea's nuclear issue itself always changes following the international structure and external environment. It is very interesting that even the parties realize that North Korea's first priority is the regime survival but there is no efficient way to tackle the regime. Strategy helps answer what to do but one more important question is "by whom". This is another important point for effective implementation of mixed strategy. The actor's role should be seriously discussed.

The final concern of this paper is that the making of non-nuclear Korean peninsula could be attained with the cost of human rights violations. This is the most difficult dilemma to solve here. North Korea is well known for its harassment and trafficking of its people. Sanctions could hurt people who are in need of aid (AFP at the

United Nations, 2017) instead of the regime. As the author has analyzed, the regime survival is the first priority for North Korea. Raising the issue of human rights violations directly could be perceived by North Korea as a threatening action to the regime. It may lead to conflict and the negative effects on nuclear policy change. However, this does not mean that the issue of human rights and abuse of power would be acceptable. The issue can be included as one condition in the negotiation for package of nuclear non-proliferation and policy change.

## **Recommendations**

To the Government of the United States:

1. Exercise self-restraint and mutual respect over the political communication with the leader of North Korea
2. Encourage the Government of China to create and sign the trilateral agreement on peaceful settlement of North Korea's nuclear issue
3. Continue its efforts in constructing friendly talk with North Korea either bilaterally or multilaterally
4. Reinforce close alliance cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo to ensure credible deterrence posture that would not be perceived as a threat to North Korea
5. Utilize the ASEAN Regional Forum as a platform for negotiating with North Korea

To the Government of North Korea:

1. Exercise self-restraint and mutual respect over the political communication with the president of the United States
2. Consider the elimination of the nuclear development program and its related activities as soon as possible
3. Ratify NPT and other treaties concerning non-proliferation
4. Avoid any actions that would be perceived as a threat to its neighboring countries
5. Engage the international community through bilateral and multilateral platforms

To the Government of China:

1. Encourage North Korea to eliminate its nuclear development program and its related activities as soon as possible
2. Cooperate with the Government of the United States in developing and signing the trilateral agreement on peaceful settlement of North Korea's nuclear issue
3. Continue its efforts to socialize and share its experience of economic development with North Korea

To the Government of Japan and South Korea:

1. Reinforce close alliance cooperation with Washington to ensure credible deterrence posture that would not be perceived as a threat to North Korea
2. Continue their efforts in promoting long-term peaceful settlement of the North Korea's nuclear issue together with the Government of the United States and China
3. Work closely with the Government of the United States in crisis management operation
4. Utilize the ASEAN Regional Forum as a platform for negotiating with North Korea

### Summary

This policy paper deals with the North Korea's nuclear issue. It argues that the issue should be solved peacefully by mixed strategy. There are two main sources of the conflict: the decline of balance of power and regime survival. North Korea preoccupies the nuclear weapons to guarantee the survival of the regime, the maintenance of Kim Dynasty and his supporters. Also, the changing external environment opens the space for North Korea to improve its security by having nuclear. To cure the declining balance of power, the credible deterrence by strengthening the United States military alliance is required. At the same time, the United States should express its intention in opening the negotiation with North Korea first and set the rule of the game aiming at nuclear policy change and non-proliferation like what it succeeded for making the 1994 Agreed Framework.

In addition, other political tools such as sanctions and economic assistance should be supplemented to the effective implementation of this new agreement. The author also suggests that ASEAN should play a role in socializing North Korea for many reasons: good relationship with North Korea, ARF as the only existing platform that North Korea has been participated, ASEAN's nuclear weapon free zone, and learning from the ASEAN experience of economic development. The final part of the policy paper raises concerns over the implementation of mixed strategy. Firstly, mixed strategy will work whether North Korea will collapse or not. Second, aiming at policy change and non-proliferation will narrow a chance for full denuclearization. Finally, the attainment of peaceful settlement of nuclear issue may need to be weighed with human rights issues.

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## Appendix: Key Incidents of North Korea's nuclear problem

Leader	Year	Incidents
Kim Il Sung	September 1959	Soviet-North Korea Nuclear Agreement
	December 1985	Signing NPT
	January 1986	Operation of a five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon
	March 1993	North Korea's announcement of intent to withdraw NPT
Kim Jong Il	October 1994	United States-North Korea Agreed Framework
	January 2002	"Axis of Evil" speech
	December 2002	Beginning of the Six-Party Talks
	October 2006	First nuclear test
	January 2003	North Korea's withdrawal of NPT
	February 2005	North Korea's announcement of nuclear weapon possession
	September 2007	Final Round of the Six-Party Talks before suspension
	May 2009	Second nuclear test
Kim Jong Un	February 2013	Third nuclear test
	January 2016	Fourth nuclear test
	September 2016	Fifth nuclear test
	July 4, 2017	First Test of Hwasong-14 ICBM
	July 28, 2017	Second Test of Hwasong-14 ICBM
	August 29, 2017	Missile plunging into the Pacific Ocean
	September 3, 2017	Sixth nuclear test

Sources: Synthesized from Al Jazeera News (2017); Associated Press (2017); Bolton (2012); CNN Library (2017); Collins (2017); Davenport (2017a, 2017b)

### **Glossary of terms**

ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
UNSC	United Nations Security Council



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## 발표 3

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SO CLOSE, YET SO FAR:  
*THE CURRENT STATE OF INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS*  
&  
*PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PEACE*

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## INTRODUCTION

- Origin and evolution of the inter-Korean relations
- Legacy of the Cold War politics
- Deep divisions and differences
- The off-again, on-again nature of relations between South Korea and North Korea
- Recent developments
- Current state of play
  - Relations not moving in the right direction due to several glitches
  - Diplomatic differences
  - North Korea recently termed South Korea an enemy; closed the entire mechanism of dialogue with it again.
  - This decision has caused considerable turmoil and confusion in diplomatic circles.

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## WHY NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS SEEM DIFFICULT

- North Korea has been expressing its displeasure with South Korea for the past several months
- Strategic nature of ties between South Korea and the US
- Military exercises between South Korea and the US
- Agreements signed earlier have not been honoured
- North Korean anxieties have not been addressed
- Economic and developmental challenges remain unaddressed
- North Korean nuclear and missile programme unacceptable for South Korea and the US

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## NORTH KOREA'S CONCERNS

- Rebels who fled North Korea constantly send leaflets criticizing the leaders in North Korea – a major irritant according to North Korea
- For the past several years, North Korean rebels settled in South Korea have been sending pamphlets against the North Korean government against its anti-human rights and dictatorial attitude with the help of big balloons from across the border
- North Korea opposes it
  - Hotline established between North and South Korea since the 1970s has been closed
  - North Korea has done this before, but this is the first time since 2016.
  - After this decision of North Korea, all channels of communication between the two countries have been closed, although the hot line between the two countries was limited to test calls in the same way.
- It is believed that this decision has been taken by Kim Jong Un's sister Kim Yo Jong and the ruling party's Vice Chairman Kim Yong-Chol.
- With this decision, Kim Yo Jong is trying to show his influence on power, who has recently been reinstated as a member of Politburo.

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## KOREAN PENINSULA & THE POST-TRUMP WORLD

- North Korea's aggressive attitude reflect its frustration with failed talks
- North Korea did not benefit much from talks with Donald Trump or President Moon Jae-in
  - While Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un held three summits in 2018, Trump and Kim also met in Singapore and Vietnam.
- North Korea has taken an aggressive stance since the Trump-Kim summit in Vietnam in 2019
- No tangible results on North Korea's nuclear program and other issues
- North Korea is struggling with economic troubles, while continuing its nuclear and missile program
- Conducted several missile tests in recent months
- New anxieties emerging with Trump no longer in power in the US
- Would Biden administration engage North Korea?

---

## CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR SOUTH KOREA

- Whenever there has been any international action on North Korea, its first response and retaliation has been on South Korea
- The Kim administration knows that South Korea will have the greatest impact on its diplomatic and military powers
- South Korea has come under pressure and in the last three days its diplomats have also made several unsuccessful attempts to get back to North Korea
- The US has been a major factor shaping North Korea's response to South Korea (China has also played a key role)
- How Biden administration engages North Korea would be a key determinant in shaping inter-Korean relations



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## ASSESSING NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE

- Important to understand here why countries like North Korea move towards ending dialogue?
  - The first reason is that they do not see a solution to their problems through diplomatic communication
  - They feel that the round of negotiations is not only increasing their negotiating power at the political level, but also reducing their credibility from the perspective of the debtors
  - They feel that other countries are starting to judge them lightly, and hence they take an aggressive approach back
  - These countries have their own internal problems and ups and downs which cannot be overlooked

---

## NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE CONTD..

- North Korea is currently grappling with all these issues
- The Covid-19 epidemic has also affected North Korea
- Rumors of Kim Jong-un being ill have been reported
- There is no reliable data of people affected by Covid-19 in North Korea
- Due to the sanctions of the United Nations, the economy is deeply affected and China, its closest country, has already reduced trade

---

## PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PEACE

- North Korean internal uncertainty and frustration arising out of the negotiations must be minimized
- If South Korea and the US do not take any big positive step, then this situation will continue for the next few years
- It remains to be seen how soon South Korea will start trying to convince North Korea by promising them financial help
- The Joe Biden administration can swing things back in favour of regional peace
- Much depends on Biden administration's approach as also how China perceives the US role in the Korean peninsula
- South Korea must come up with its own 'out of the box' solutions. Afterall, any crisis would affect peninsula the most.



**THANK YOU!**

**감사합니다!**

Twitter @rahulmishr\_

## 토론 1

### **You-Jun CHEN**

중국, 상하이국제관계연구원 교수

China, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Professor

# The economic integration in Asia-Pacific Region

## ----Present situation and Prospect

Prof. & Dr. CHEN You-Jun  
Director, Center for Regional Economy  
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

### RCEP : new achievement of regional economic integration

1, Signature, 15 November 2020

2, 15 countries

population: 2.27 Billion

GDP: 25.8 Trillion USD

Exports: 5.5 Trillion USD (30% of global exports)

3, a big market

4, change of the supply chain

## RCEP & TPP



## Cooperation in the Future Trade and Investment Regime of Asia-Pacific region

- 1, US foreign policy (new administration)
- 2, RCEP; TPP; CJK FTA;
- 3, FTAAP
- 4, Cooperation in digital economy, new energy and innovation development

Thanks for your attention.

Prof. Dr. CHEN You-Jun  
Director, Center for Regional Economy  
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS)

Email: [youjun21@163.com](mailto:youjun21@163.com)

## 토론 2

### Sanjeev HUMAGAIN

---

네팔, 트리부반대 객원교수  
Nepal, Tribhuvan University, Visiting Faculty

2020 Emerging Leaders Fellowship

## Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and International Cooperation

### Asiaization of the Peace Building Process in Korean Peninsula


Humagain Sanjeev, Visting Faculty, Tribhuvan University

## Background

### The Asian century is about to begin

Share of world GDP at PPP\$

— Asia — Rest of the world



United definition of Asia  
Sources: IMF, @valentinarnesi  
E. 27





## Asiaization of Peace Building in Korean Peninsula

connecting the importance of peace in the peninsula to the completion and sustainability of the rising Asian era

the wider acceptance of the importance of the peaceful coexistence on the peninsula in the peace and prosperity of the whole Asia can create a positive pressure and discourse on smooth peace building process.

a good departure point for the development of a model of peaceful coexistence of whole Asia in a new era

### Asiaization of Peace Building



#### Broadening the Scope

we need to open and wider discussion on connecting Moon government's new economic community on the Korean peninsula and Asian era



#### Extension of Idea to Whole Asia

the model of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula can be a good departure point for the discussion of a new Asian model of peaceful coexistence among all nations



#### Non Material Value

we need to create some common agendas where whole Asian countries continuously discuss and find better ideas.

# Thank You

Insert the Sub Title of Your Presentation

## 토론 3

### Shawn HO

---

싱가포르, 라자나트남 국제연구원 부연구위원  
Singapore, RSIS, Associate Research Fellow

# Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and International Cooperation

Shawn Ho

Associate Research Fellow

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),  
Singapore

## Assumptions to be reviewed?


- (Almost) nothing lasts forever
- Impact of COVID-19
- Title of this session
  - “Peaceful coexistence”
  - “International cooperation”
- Internal factors
- External factors
- Beyond Northeast Asia
- Bilateral, Minilateral and multilateral cooperation

## Roles of ASEAN and the EU

- What possible roles can states within ASEAN and EU play?
- What possible roles can these multilateral groupings play?
- What role can Track 2 play?
- E.g. of Kaeseong Industrial Complex and Kumgang Resort

## Major Question

What **IF** the DPRK does not want to be engaged?



# Session 5

북한의 국제사회 진입과 국제협력


North Korea's Participation in the International Society  
and International Cooperation

## 발표 1

### Nicolas LEVI

---

폴란드, 과학아카데미 지중해/동양문화연구소 조교수  
Poland, Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of  
the Polish Academy of Sciences, Assistant Professor



# WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE DPRK IN A POST COVID-19 SOCIETY?


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27 November 2020

Nicolas Levi, PhD. MBA

Assistant Professor


Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

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1. The COVID-19 Pandemic in the DPRK.
2. Chosen Measures against the COVID-19 Pandemic.
3. Sanctions toward the DPRK.
4. Sanctions versus COVID-19 consequences
5. A closer cooperation with PRC.
6. The continued destabilization of the world.
7. Covid-19 collapse of the DPRK?
8. Findings.



## SUMMARY


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The longer the COVID-19 pandemic lasts, the more likely it is that the post-virus world will be significantly different from the pre-virus world.

The longer the COVID-19 pandemic lasts, the more the DPRK will be fully dependent on its neighbors.

The longer the COVID-19 pandemic lasts, the more the DPRK will be a dangerous neighbor.

2



## 1. THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN THE DPRK

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As of the 27 November 2020, there are no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the DPRK.


It's impossible to know if DPRK's claims to be virus-free are true.

Since January 21, the DPRK has introduced a series of hardline measures to combat COVID-19 and ensure it is prevented from entering the country.

However, DPRK's battle against COVID-19 has come with various costs on both local and foreign residents in the country, as well as at political, economic, and social levels.

3






## CHOSEN MEASURES AGAINST THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

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- In January 2020, borders became closed.
- On 22nd January 2020, borders became closed for tourism. As of the 26 November 2020, Travel to the DPRK is restricted since 297 days.
- The DPRK is rejecting PRC proposals to repatriate defectors.
- Imported items should be kept under isolation for "10 days".
- The majority of diplomats were removed from Pyongyang.

4



## SANCTIONS TOWARD THE DPRK

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**Sanctions emerged as a political tool against the DPRK in the 1950's.**


The strongest sanctions were implemented after the nuclear test in October 2006.

On August 2017, **the UNSC Resolution no. 2371** banned exports of coal, iron, iron ore, and seafood products, all of which are major export items for the DPRK.

On September of the same year, **the UNSC Resolution no. 2375** put some restrictions on oil supplied the DPRK and banned DPRK's export of textiles and a new dispatch of its workers overseas.

On December of the same year, the level of restrictions on the oil supplied to North Korea had been elevated and exports of machine, electronics appliances, cars, and metals to the DPRK were banned under **the UNSC Resolution no. 2397**.

5



## SANCTIONS TOWARD THE DPRK

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
As of 2020, sanctions affected not only production but also consumption trends.

However, up until 2019, the shocks felt in the consumer sector appeared to be relatively less damaging compared to the production sector.

Most consumer materials except for some durable consumer goods, such as electronic appliances, were exempted from sanctions.

Sanctions seem to have had a limited effect on North Korean residents in their daily life.

6



## SANCTIONS VERSUS COVID-19 CONSEQUENCES


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Unlike U.N. sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic has had more of an impact on DPRK's illicit trade, albeit temporarily.

Private PRC people are also afraid of trading with DPRK partners.

The trade on the Yalu River is particularly affected. This is due to restrictions on the cross-border movement of goods and people.

7



## WHAT IS THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE DPRK?


- The International Society for NK consists of the following countries: PRC, Japan, Russia, the United States.
- The state of paralysis will continue with selected partners of the DPRK.
- A limited world due to the opacity of the regime.

8

## DPRK'S FOREIGN POLICY

From the late 1990s, the DPRK diplomacy is characterized by global proactivity to respond to economic imperatives while simultaneously maintaining national defense capabilities.

The DPRK policy is characterized by a dynamic and an erratic approach with its main partners.




Source: Northkoreaintheworld.org, NKReports.com

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## A CLOSER COOPERATION WITH THE PRC

- The DPRK will be highly dependant on the PRC economy.
- The cooperation will also increase in areas exempted by sanctions.
- An increasing official academic partnerships with military-affiliated DPRK universities is expected.



Source: KINU

10


## RELATIONS WITH THE USA

"One bed for two dreams" is a formula taken from a Chinese proverb, used by Chou En-lai (PRC MOFA under Mao).

A key security commitment for US authorities will be to protect the ROK from the DPRK.

The strategy of inteligent intervention can be considered as a succes for Donald Trump. With Joe Biden, there will be a return of a multilateral diplomatic approach.

11



## RELATIONS WITH THE ROK

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The ROK was successful in building relationships in the humanitarian and economic sectors such as these spillovers gains were made in the security sector.


The ROK's policy of economic engagement brought a rapprochement, which reduced the perceived threat from the DPRK.

If Moon Jae-in wins presidential election scheduled in 2022, this engagement policy will continue.

This opening is seen as a necessary part of bringing peace to the Peninsula. An hardline policy is barely possible.

Being a strategical partner for the ROK, the DPRK will be also assisted by a medical suport from Seoul. However, the DPRK will accept this humanitarian aid?

12



## RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

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
In order to ease tensions, Russia will continue to reduce sanctions toward the DPRK.

Russia has local conflicts with the DPRK mainly related to cross-border issues.

Russia will continue to suport the DPRK, as the most important goal is the stability in Northeast Asia.

Economically, Russia is too preoccupied with its own difficulties and view the DPRK a a secondary priority in its international policy.

13




## THE CONTINUED DESTABILIZATION OF THE WORLD

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- Vaccine issues - Invisible auctions;
- Cyber Capabilities;
- The Nuclear Project.

14



## COVIDO-COLLAPSE OF THE DPRK?

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The Covid-19 is threatening the economic stability of the DPRK which was based on informal trade.

The DPRK economy is mainly based on its trade with PRC (more than 90%).


It will not be easy to replace a significant number of items that are lacking by a decreased amount of imports, considering DPRK's limited production capability even with the use of domestic production.

**This will inevitably lead to a reduction in production and consumption.**

Due to a loss in Export, DPRK faced with a major reduction of its foreign reserves.

In a such context, PRC might come forward to actively aid the DPRK economy.

15



## COVIDO-COLLAPSE OF THE DPRK?


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The DPRK military is large and contains multiple sources of international conflict.

In case of crisis, an open conflict may start between the KPA and security forces, and the winner of the conflict may dictate the transition process.

With countries such as Venezuela and Belarus, a closer axis with friendly countries may be set up.

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## RECONSIDERATION OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE DPRK


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If the PRC find a medical solution to the COVID-19 issue, **the DPRK will be even more dependant from this country.**

The COVID-19 crisis will strongly affect market trade and people's private economic activities.

PRC and the ROK will actively aid the DPRK for stability reasons.

17



## FINDINGS

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**From a global perspective:**


The DPRK will not be abandoned by its closest neighbors.

DPRK authorities will continue to destabilize the world at difference scales.

**From an internal perspective:**

The COVID-19 crisis will strongly affect market trade and people's private economic activities.

The population of the DPRK will continue to distrust Pyongyang authorities.



## THANKS YOU!

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## 발표 2

### Antoine BONDAZ

---

프랑스, 전략연구재단 한국담당 팀장

France, Foundation for Strategic Research, Head of Korea Program

**2020 IUE Emerging Leaders Webinar  
November 27, 2020**

## **From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis**

**Dr. Antoine Bondaz**

**FONDATION**  
*pour la* RECHERCHE  
STRATÉGIQUE

**SciencesPo**

- 
- 1. A not so isolated country:** diplomatic history and diplomatic interactions
  - 2. The EU and EUMS' evolving policy:** from active engagement to active pressure
  - 3. A strategy of credible commitments:** coordinated, multisector and incarnated
  - 4. Q&A**

## UN AND EU AUTONOMOUS SANCTIONS



EU Sanctions Map

## DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF THE DPRK



THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE  
ON NORTH KOREA

## A MEMBER OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Organization Name	Date joined	Notes
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)	1973	
World Health Organization (WHO)	1973	
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	1974	Withdrew membership in 1994
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)	1974	
Universal Postal Union (UPU)	1974	
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	1974	
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)	1975	
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)	1975	
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	1977	
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)	1977	
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	1979	
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)	1981	
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	1985	
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	1985	
United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)	1986	
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	1986	
International Maritime Organization (IMO)	1986	
World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)	1987	
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNDFW)	1989	
United Nations (UN)	1991	
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)	1992	
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	1994	
Conference on Disarmament (CD)	1996	

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE  
ON NORTH KOREA

## NORTH-KOREAN EMBASSIES



## EMBASSIES IN NORTH KOREA



## THE EVOLUTION & PARTIAL FAILURE OF THE EU STRATEGY OF CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT

- 1. Active engagement (1995–2002):** diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and trade
- 2. Critical engagement in (2002–2013):** pressure with interactions
- 3. Active pressure (2013-today):** pressure without interactions

## **A RENEWED STRATEGY OF CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS BASED ON MULTI-LEVEL COORDINATION**

---

*« This renewed proactive stance should build on the many initiatives already being taken at all levels to seek to increase coordination through the publication of a strategy and the appointment of an EU Special Representative on North Korea ».*

### **Credible commitment to political engagement**

---

- 1. Strengthening and institutionalizing interactions :** the EU-DPRK political dialogue, parliamentary diplomacy, and liaison offices
- 2. Facilitating international negotiations :** a unique EUMS diplomatic network and building on the key role played by some EUMS
- 3. Providing an independent European source of analysis and evaluation**

## **Credible commitment to non-proliferation**

---

- 1. Strengthening European declaratory policy** : at the UN General Assembly and at the RevCon to the NPT, and via condemning North Korean violations of UNSC sanctions
- 2. Promoting international nonproliferation and arms control treaties** : to incentivize North Korea to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
- 3. Better highlighting existing European technical and intellectual expertise** : France and other EUMS

## **Credible commitment to implementing restrictive measures**

---

- 1. Responding more effectively to North Korea's sanctions evasion techniques** : cyber sanctions and ship to ship transfers
- 2. Providing more assistance to promote capacity building on conventional arms and dual-use goods** : improve export control mechanisms through existing programs and better support the work of the UN Panel of Experts

## **Credible commitment to engaging with the North Korean people**

---

- 1. Addressing the North's humanitarian crisis, as well as the unintended consequences of international sanctions** : to augment financing for the Global Fund and accelerate efforts to help North Korea build a more efficient and responsive disaster relief mechanism
- 2. Focusing on the human rights situation while engaging with North Korean society** : foster exchanges with North Korean society in nonsensitive sectors

## **A final credible commitment to cooperating more and better with South Korea**

---

- 1. Strengthening the joint promotion of multilateralism** : the Alliance for multilateralism to support initiatives related to North Korea
- 2. Promoting key concepts to improve conditions of living in North Korea** : human security as a neutral and positive concept
- 3. Facilitating inter-Korean interactions** : the role of education and training in Europe



## Q&A

---



## 토론 1

**Alina SHCHERBAKOVA**

러시아, 국립고등경제대학 부교수

Russia, National Research University, Higher School of Economics,  
Associate Professor

# North Korean's Participation in the International Society and International Cooperation

Discussant: Dr. Alina Shcherbakova,  
Associate professor,  
HSE University, Moscow, Russia

## Sustainable development goals

### *North Korea and FAO: SDG2 ZERO HUNGER*

- FAO assistance in DPR Korea is centered on five priority areas for technical cooperation: Strengthening national food and nutritional security; Improving natural resource management, with a particular focus on land protection and environmental rehabilitation; Improving rural livelihoods, intensifying and diversifying productive activities in the rural sector with the aim of increasing and diversifying income generation and raising conditions in rural communities; Coping with climate change, with a focus on mitigating the impact of natural disasters on agriculture; Strengthening institutional capacity for agricultural research, extension and administration.
- Within the framework of FAO's Corporate COVID-19 Response and Recovery Programme, the proposed actions have been identified to meet the urgent short-term needs of the most vulnerable food-insecure populations and protect their assets. It also represents FAO's contribution to the United Nations Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19.
- Outputs Country Programming Framework (CPF) Outcome A1: Increased and sustainable food production, productivity and livelihood opportunities in agriculture, horticulture, livestock and fisheries.

## Sustainable development goals

### *North Korea: SDG13 CLIMATE*

- The effect of climate change to the DPRK is very negative, resulting reduction in agricultural production, destruction of infrastructure, degradation of soil and water resources
- Committed to implement the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement
- Implement the National Disaster Reduction Strategy (NDRS), National Environmental protection Strategy (NEPS), national GHG emission reduction plan, National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy
- Build capacity to adapt climate change
- Update the National Communications on Climate Change (NCCC) to the UNFCCC

## Sustainable development goals

### *North Korea: SDG6 WATER*

- Ensure safe drinking water for all
- By 2030, ensure 100% sewage disposal in line with the national environmental protection criteria
- Strengthen the international cooperation for protection and sustainable development of water resources

KEY ISSUE: Virtual water

If we measure a share of food products in Russian export to Northern Korea, in 2019 it was 27,4% while in 2015 it used to be 10,2%.

We should also mention that food occupies the second position in the structure of Russian export to North Korea, right after mineral resources, whose share is 60% (2019).

Russian food export to North Korea, mln USD				
2000	2005	2010	2015	2019
0,08	0,09	0,61	8,00	12,31

## 토론 2

**Alina SHARAFETDINOVA**

---

러시아, 동방학연구소 연구원

Russia, Institute of Oriental Studies, Researcher

**Topic: North Korean's Participation in the International Society and International Cooperation**  
**Alina SHARAFETDINOVA Russia, Institute of Oriental Studies, Researcher**

The DPRK is a member of the UN (1991) and UN specialized bodies: Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, International Maritime Organization, International Telecommunication Union, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, World Health Organization, WMO. The **DPRK has established diplomatic relations** with 162 current UN member states.

The DPRK is a member of more than 250 international organizations, for example, the ASEAN Regional Forum, Group of 77, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Red Cross Organization, International Hydrological Organization, International Olympic Committee, International Organization for Standardization, Non-Aligned Movement, International Postal Union, World Federation of Trade Unions.

**In Pyongyang**, there are 27 diplomatic missions. **Diplomatic missions of the DPRK** operate on the territory of 47 countries. The number of states with which diplomatic relations have been established, in fact, is higher, since some Korean embassies serve several states. Thus, the DPRK embassy in Moscow is the embassy in the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine (although there is also a DPRK trade and economic representation in Minsk). The Ambassador to Sweden is also the Ambassador to Latvia.

In the second half of the 1990s, the political leadership of **the Russian Federation** embarked on a course of building equal friendly relations with both the ROK and the DPRK. The need to reconsider the nature of bilateral relations raised the issue of revising the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. In February 2000, a new Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation was signed in Pyongyang. The work of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation has been resumed.

In 2018, there was a noticeable intensification in foreign policy in the Korean direction, including inter-Korean relations. Three inter-Korean summits took place during the year, and development of **trilateral projects with the participation of the DPRK, Republic of Korea and Russia** was discussed among priority issues.

The inter-Korean summit held in Panmunjom on April 27, 2018, during which the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Moon Jae-in, invited the Chairman of the DPRK State Council, Kim Jong-un, to intensify economic cooperation in this direction, played a key role in attempts to revive the work on them. This initiative was continued during Moon Jae-in's visit to Russia and his talks with President Vladimir Putin in June of the same year. The leaders of both states emphasized the importance of promoting trilateral cooperation projects and conducting joint research for this purpose.

All the planned steps with the participation of the Russian Federation and the DPRK were agreed upon during the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) held in Vladivostok in September 2019, in which Moon Jae-in took part. Then it was decided to intensify preparations for the possible implementation of three large economic projects: the connection of the Trans-Korean Railway with the Trans-Siberian Railway, as well as large-scale supplies of gas and electricity from Russia through the DPRK to South Korea. ("New Economic Concept" by Moon Jae-in).

The main essence of **the current project** is the creation of a single railway track from Primorsky Krai (Russia) to Rajin (DPRK) and the construction of an integrated RasonCon Trans terminal in the port for cargo transportation and transshipment of coal for the Asia-Pacific countries. The decision to create the Hasan-Rajin project was made as a result of the agreements during the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang, DPRK, in 2001 at the personal invitation of Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the DPRK State Defense Committee.

As for the direct conditions for the implementation of trilateral cooperation, here, of course, everything depends on the direction in which the military-political situation on the Korean Peninsula will develop and the prospects for easing the international sanctions regime against the DPRK as a key condition for starting practical work on projects.

Unprecedented measures were taken by the ROK and the DPRK in **the fight against coronavirus infection**. In our opinion, it would be advisable to involve Russia in a Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative for Infectious Disease Control and Public Health with its participants the Republic of Korea, North Korea, China, Japan and Mongolia, which was proposed by the President Moon Jae-in in his video message to the participants of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly.

The Republic of Korea could assist the North Korea to improve its Healthcare sector. Russia's participation is logical, since Moscow plays an active mediating role in the Peace process. The geographical proximity of the two Korean states located on the Korean Peninsula, with which Russia seeks to maintain balanced good-neighborly relations, is a determining factor in establishing cooperation in protection of life and safety of our peoples.

Key words: the ROK, North Korea, Russia, diplomatic relations, trilateral cooperation, Trans-Korean Railway, cooperation, health

## 토론 3

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# North Korea's Participation in the International Society and International Cooperation

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## Content

- Historical background
- Two different views on Korea's participation in the Int. Society
- Is North Korea willing to participate in the international society?
- Do Major powers supports the North Korean participation in the Int. Society?
- Conclusion

### Historical background:

- It is a long time that North Korea has created a problem for Int. society
- Since Korean war in 1950s, the Int. Society has been engaged in dealing how to bring peace in Korean peninsula
- However, during cold war the international rivalry between US and USSR did not allow North Korean to fully participate
- North Korean regime has been a big challenge and barrier for its participation since 1990s.

### Tow different views on North Korea's participation

- There are tow major point of view regarding North Korea's participation in the international society;  
-First, some people say that the International community should impose sanction on North Korea and isolate it more in order to denuclearize North Korea. They believe more pressure will bring the regime on negotiation table and eventually the regime will give up its nuke program

### Continue...

- Second, some people believe that North Korea should be engaged in the international community through six party talks.

This engagement will finally persuade the North Korean regime to give up its nuke policy.

### Is North Korea willing to participate in the international society?

- North Korea has attempted to increase its engagement with the international community through International Organizations since 1970s.
- North Korea's participation in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) shows how the North Korean regime tries to find a suitable venue to interact with other states and international community as a whole.
- The regime survival in the long run depends on how to manage the state economy. Its normal engagement with international community is vital in this regard.

## Do Major powers support the North Korean participation in the Int. Society?

- United State sanctions on North Korea
- United Nations Sanctions on North Korea
- What is the position of neighboring countries on North Korean participation in the international society?
  - China
  - Japan
  - Republic of Korea
  - Russia

## Conclusion

- Historically North Korea has been a problem and challenge for the international society
- To fully engage the North Korea to the international society we have to consider the policy of major powers as well as the North Korean policy.
- There has been a strong point of view that North Korean isolation will push the regime to give up its nuke program, however, it is proved to be not working. We have some other cases such as Iranian case in the Middle East.
- Isolation will not work, the international community should encourage the North Korean regime to participate like a normal state in the international society.





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