

2023

Understanding Korean Unification



National Institute for
Unification Education

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The National Institute for Unification Education (NIU) publishes *Understanding Korean Unification and Understanding North Korea* to promote better understanding of Korean unification as well as the state of affairs surrounding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Korean Peninsula.

NIU sincerely hopes this publication can help educational institutions and organizations impart the required knowledge and build an appropriate public perspective on Korean unification issues and North Korea.



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I

How Should We View Korean Unification?

Section 1. The Significance of Unification

Section 2. The Need for Unification

Section 3. Lessons from German Reunification

Section 1

The Significance of Unification

Spending more than 70 years as a divided nation, most Koreans live their lives accepting that the current division of the Korean Peninsula is natural and unchanged. Although unification is intertwined with the very survival of the people constituting a divided nation, the prolonged division of the Korean Peninsula is pushing unification farther into the back of our minds. Facing such a stern reality, we need to think about what unification means to us and why it is imperative.

We all wish a freer and more peaceful life, a safer life, a more prosperous life, and a happier life. Unifying the Korean Peninsula is what could enable our people to lead such a life. A myriad of historical precedents both at home and abroad have taught us valuable lessons - mainly that a divided nation is prone to antagonism and conflict, which hinders progress toward prosperity and development of the nation; and that division must be overcome and peaceful unification be achieved to solve such problems. In this respect, unification means

overcoming the antagonism, conflict, wounds, and harm caused by division and enjoying peace and prosperity in our daily lives.

Unifying the Korean Peninsula does not mean a mere return to the state prior to its division. It rather means a rebuilding of Korea as a new singular community. In other words, it is a process of building a new national community by integrating two different systems into one based upon the foundations of a free democratic basic order and market economy system. Thus, unification is not a simple heel-turn to the past, but a leap forward to create new history toward our collective future. We, as a nation, attach such significance to securing peace on the Korean Peninsula and strive for inter-Korean cooperation to ensure that all people in the South and the North can live safely and happily on the Korean Peninsula.

Unifying the Korean Peninsula has multiple implications.

First, from a geographical perspective, unification signifies a physical integration of South and North Korea into a unified state. Unifying our national territory can help create a physical and spatial foundation for building a unified nation. For long, the Korean people have lived and occupied the Korean Peninsula, forming a distinct sphere of living. Thus, unifying our territory means giving all Korean people a chance to access any part of the Peninsula freely and choose to live anywhere peacefully. Unification goes beyond simply increasing the total land area of South Korea. It means incorporating previously inaccessible parts of the Korean Peninsula into our lives, and furthermore, connecting Korea with the rest of the Eurasian continent by land.

Second, in political and legal terms, unification would entail

an integration of two different political systems into one political entity. Politically and legally, unification means establishing a single constitution, a single government, and a single nation-state by integrating the political systems of the two Koreas. In this respect, unification is significant in that it could help overcome systemic and ideological differences, and eliminate the threat of war stemming from the division of Korea. Unification is also meaningful in that it can give Korea an opportunity to expand universal values and human rights. Securing peace in both South and North Korea will help democracy in the Korean Peninsula take the next step in its evolution.

Third, from an economic standpoint, unification means integrating two different economic systems. The division of Korea led to a division in economic policies. South Korea developed a free market economy system, whereas North Korea chose a socialist planned economy system. Considering how economies around the world are increasingly becoming interdependent and intertwined, integrating the two different economic systems on the Korean Peninsula through peaceful exchanges and cooperation could engineer significant progress in the economic situation and development of Korea going forward. Furthermore, integrating the South and North Korean economic systems could lay the groundwork for greater economic development as well. It can expand the scope of our economic sphere not only to the entire Korean Peninsula, but also to the Northeast Asian economic bloc and the Trans-Pacific economic bloc.

Fourth, from a social and cultural perspective, unification means forming a single social and cultural community. The long-term division of territories and systems between the South and the North has led to

the division of the minds of the people constituting the two Koreas. Even the memories of the two Koreas being one nation are fading. Unification in the true sense is a state in which all those living on the Korean Peninsula share a sense of belonging within one national border with a broad meeting of mind on the sense of who we are as one nation. In other words, unification means overcoming the division of minds between North and South Koreans who have lived separated for decades, and building the foundation to create a new culture and future together guided by a sense of community within a peaceful and unified country.

For a genuine unification of the divided Korean Peninsula, we must consider the following in the process of bridging the gap between South and North Korea.

Firstly, the ideal unification should be one based on the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Article 4 of South Korean Constitution clearly states, “The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” The unification we aim for should be rooted in the values and institutions of liberal democracy, such as fundamental freedoms and human rights, and representative government, the rule of law, pluralism, and a system of checks and balances. In particular, as we pursue unification, we must guarantee the free will of choice.

Secondly, unification on the Korean Peninsula must be achieved in a peaceful manner and through a peaceful process. Although we, as a nation, seek unification, the way we achieve unification is just as important. Our idea of unification dreams of a future in which

genuine peace on the Korean Peninsula and common prosperity of its people are guaranteed. Moreover, the entire process of unification on the Korean Peninsula should be executed in a peaceful manner. The Preamble to the Constitution stipulates the “mission of democratic reform and peaceful unification of our homeland” and take note of the need to “contribute to lasting world peace and the common prosperity of mankind.” Meanwhile, Article 5 clearly states, “The Republic of Korea shall endeavor to maintain international peace and shall renounce all aggressive wars.” Therefore, the unification we seek should aim for a future in which true peace is secured on the Korean Peninsula and common prosperity of not only the Korean Peninsula, but also Northeast Asia is guaranteed. To this end, the South and the North must work to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula based upon mutual trust between the two Koreas prior to unification. A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is an important prerequisite for unification in that it could guarantee lasting peace both from a practical standpoint and an institutional standpoint.

Thirdly, unification must be backed up by robust security. Peace, in and of itself, is the best state of security. However, until lasting peace becomes a reality on the Korean Peninsula, maintaining a firm security posture is the foundation for keeping the Korean Peninsula safe and peaceful. In today's reality where North Korea's nuclear and missile threats are growing more serious and sophisticated than ever, ensuring our security is of the utmost priority. Thus, we must maintain a robust security posture based on a strong ROK-U.S. alliance and national defensive capabilities to establish and sustain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Fourthly, the entire unification process must follow democratic procedures under a national consensus. Unification is perhaps the greatest challenge of our time that will inevitably affect both our national and personal interests. In other words, unification is not a matter of a specific group or part of society, but a matter directly related to the lives of all Koreans living on the divided Korean Peninsula.

Fifthly, we must understand that unification is not only a national issue, but also a critical international issue. The end of World War II marked the beginning of a divided Korea as the U.S. and the Soviet Union respectively occupied the southern and northern parts of the Peninsula to disarm the Japanese imperial army. Thereafter, the Korean War, which started when from the North's invasion on the South in 1950, led to a steep escalation of confrontation between the two Koreas, further entrenching each party in its position. Even after the Korean War, the division of the Korean Peninsula has continued under strong influence of neighboring countries out of their own national interests. Thus, Korea remains a relic of the Cold War.

Unification of the Korean Peninsula is both a national issue and an international one in that unifying Korea will depend on the two Koreas, of course, but also the neighboring countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly achieving unification require to secure the support and cooperation from our neighboring states along with the cooperation between the two Koreas. To do so, first of all, unification must be achieved under the unswerving will of the Korean people from both the South and the North. At the same time, the issue of unification is an international issue where the interests of neighboring countries are closely intertwined. Therefore, the support

and cooperation from those countries play a crucial role in successfully unifying the Korean Peninsula. That is why we must make strenuous efforts not only for the reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas, but also to promote the necessity of building a peaceful Korean Peninsula to neighboring countries by justifying the reasons behind unification, and to seek their support and cooperation. The progress in inter-Korean relations can secure peace on the Korean Peninsula, which in turn, can enhance peace and stability in Northeast Asia. In other words, it is our obligation to raise awareness and understanding among neighboring countries that a peaceful unification and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula can deliver peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia as a whole.

Section 2

The Need for Unification

There are a myriad of reasons why we should seek unification - not only is it imperative in terms of our nation's history, but it also has pragmatic and utilitarian implications. Addressing the issue of unification in today's context, however, we need to think beyond past discussions around unification focused on national history and sentiment. Unification is not only a long-cherished wish or a necessity for the nation, but also a matter of how we live. It is necessary for both South and North Koreans to enjoy a life of common prosperity, and to guarantee a humane life in a more peaceful and prosperous environment than we live in today.

With every passing decade, however, the people have grown numb to the pain and hurt of division and are increasingly indifferent to the issue of unification. Moreover, a significant part of our population is concerned about the potential economic burden and social chaos brought on by unification rather than anticipating its benefits. Some

have even grown skeptical about unification.

Given these circumstances, the reason why unification is a necessity can be summarized as follows.

Firstly, from a personal and micro perspective, unification will provide a wider variety of choices - it can help ease the pain of separated families in South and North Korea, and give people a chance to live freely anywhere in the Korean Peninsula. Unification will allow all people of the South and the North to enjoy a free and peaceful life safe from the threat of war; and enjoy greater benefits of freedom and welfare, human dignity and value, and respect for human rights at the same time. The division of the Korean Peninsula has been costly, exhausting resources and emptying the coffers. It has forced South and North Koreans to pay an immense amount of opportunity costs. As the two Koreas are divided by the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and in a state of constant confrontation, the development of the border area and the rights of our citizens have been severely restricted at different points in our modern history. However, once the confrontation between the two Koreas is resolved and peace settles, everyone on the Korean Peninsula will be able to enjoy more opportunities and benefits.

Secondly, from a historical and cultural perspective, unification is necessary in terms of restoring the history and culture shared by the two Koreas, and also passing on our shared legacy and heritage to future generations. The South and the North have lived as a single ethnic community as Koreans throughout the long period of over one millenium. Our nation has shared the same language, culture, and lineage, and has a common history of developing a unified nation with a strong sense of community despite countless outside invasions and

national crises throughout history. Unfortunately, the confrontation and conflict between our people, a product of the division over the past 70 years, severely damaged the common national identity that Koreans had passed on for a very long time. Therefore, we must unify our nation if we want to rectify this uncharacteristic period of division, and build a new national community that maximizes the innate capacities of Korea as one nation.

Thirdly, from a geographical and spatial perspective, unification is necessary in that it gives people more places to live and grants greater freedom as well as more opportunities on the Korean Peninsula. The division has so far severely restricted the movement and interaction between South and North Koreans. It greatly limited our living space, and placed harsh restrictions on the way we think, feel, and behave. Thus, peace and unification of Korea will enable people to spread out across the entire Peninsula and build a life wherever they want in the south or north. With geopolitical conditions improved, Korea will once again have full access to the Eurasian continent and surrounding regions by land and sea.

Fourthly, from a social and economic perspective, unification will enable our society to mature, support the growth of our nation, and raise our profile on the international stage. The division of the Korean Peninsula and the ensuing Korean War resulted in countless casualties and a severe loss of asset. To this day, some people still live with the wounds and scars left behind by the War. Division has also put a ceiling over the way we behave and think. Thus, in a way, internal conflict from national division is inhibiting the growth and maturity of our society.

Division not only wastes precious resources due to wasteful competition, needless confrontation, and an enormous military budget, but also causes considerable social costs, mostly in the form of pain and devastating loss of people. As such, peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula are absolutely necessary to overcome instability stemming from division, prevent the wasting of consumptive resources, and reduce social costs to enable sustainable growth. Furthermore, unification can resolve security threats. This, in turn, can boost our national credit rating and brand value, turning today's "Korea Discount"¹ into a "Korea Premium"².

Peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula can bring forth new growth engines and present new markets, allowing Korea greater economic growth. Combining the two economies of South and North Korea will open new opportunities for common prosperity that the two Koreas can enjoy together, and this can generate forward momentum for not only the Korean Peninsula, but also Northeast Asia at large. In addition, peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula are essential for it to emerge as a logistics and transportation hub linking the Pacific and Eurasian regions.

Fifthly, from a macro perspective that looks at the bigger picture,

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- 1** "Korea discount" refers to a phenomenon in which foreign investors are reluctant to make financial or economic investments in Korea due in large part to the uncertainty and murkiness surrounding its economy. It refers to a phenomenon in which the instability and liquidity caused by the division of the two Koreas are linked to the uncertainty of the economic situation of Korea, setting the value of investment in Korea lower than it actually is. It reflects the distrust and tendency to underestimate the quality of Korean products and brands.
 - 2** "Korea premium" refers to a phenomenon in which foreign investors prefer Korea for economic reasons. It can prompt a sharp uptick in foreign investment in Korea and an increase in trust in Korean products as the brand value of Korea as a nation improves.

unification on the Korean Peninsula is necessary for a peaceful world without the threat of war. Unification is necessary in that it releases the two Koreas from the horror of war and eliminates the threat of military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This can help us build peaceful lives and a shared community. Also, dissolving the remnants of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula could thaw the frosty walls between Northeast Asian countries. In a fundamental sense, unification will deliver the freedom to live for both South and North Koreans. In order to end the war on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately create peace, we must overcome our current state of division and achieve unification.

Section 3

Lessons from German Reunification

The unification we seek should be attained peacefully according to free and democratic processes and methods. As Koreans, we are aiming for a future in which all people of the two Koreas can lead free and prosperous lives. To that end, we will look at the peaceful unification process and commitment toward social integration during Germany's reunification in 1990, and find lessons for the Korean Peninsula.

In 1945, Germany, a defeated aggressor of World War II, was divided and governed by the four powers: the U.S., the United Kingdom(UK), France, and the Soviet Union. Within a decade East and West Germany saw most of their sovereign rights restored, except that reunification was an entirely different issue. Germany was responsible for the War, and its borders, should the two Germanies succeed in reunifying, had to be ironed out, which meant all four powers had to agree to its reunification. Naturally, this meant the reunification of Germany entailed both an international issue and a national issue. At



Fall of the Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989)

the time, the neighboring countries, especially the UK and France, continued to insist on the problems a reunified Germany could bring about even after the Berlin Wall came down. For this very reason the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

played a relatively more important role in Germany's reunification process than the Federal Ministry of Intra-German Relations. Due to this peculiar situation, Germany's reunification process required the so-called "2+4" (East and West Germany + U.S., UK, France, and the Soviet Union) treaty signed by the four powers in addition to the reunification treaty between East and West Germany.

Another factor that triggered Germany's reunification was the widespread protests in East Germany. At the time, along with Gorbachev's "Perestroika" (reform) and "Glasnost" (opening) policies, protests led by East German residents demanding reforms, including freedom of travel, began to spread in East Germany in the early summer of 1989. Then, when the Hungarian-Austrian border was reopened, hordes of East Germans fled the country as well. In October 1989, Monday demonstrations in Leipzig slowly started to spread across all of East Germany, including East Berlin and Dresden. Eventually, on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had been a symbol of division between the East and the West, fell down and became a decisive moment in Germany's reunification.

In March 1990, East Germany's Alliance for Germany, led by Lothar de Maizière, was elected in a historic free general election, and it quickly negotiated reunification with West Germany's Helmut Kohl administration. During the negotiations, a decision was made on the early integration of the East and West German Mark as well as the integration of five East German states as new federal states of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany). On May 18, 1990, another decision was reached to unify the currencies of East and West Germany, and in September 1990, the reunification of East and West Germany was approved by the Four Powers (U.S., UK, France, and the Soviet Union). The unification treaty between East and West Germany stipulated that, in principle, West Germany's legal system will newly apply to East Germany, and East Germany agreed to abide by West Germany's "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany." The two Germanies officially announced their reunification on October 3, 1990. East German states decided to join West Germany as federal states following a resolution by the East German parliament, and West Germany accepted this resolution to ensure a peaceful reunification.

The reunification of Germany was made possible through an interplay of complex changes in the environment surrounding its reunification. It was predicated upon the consistent and steady efforts of the West German government for reunification, changes in East Germany brought about by the exchange and cooperation between the two Germanies, elimination of security threats thanks to the collective security system in the region, and the collapse of the Cold War system worldwide.

In particular, exchange and cooperation played an important role in

Germany's reunification. People were relatively free to move between East and West Germany from the moment Germany was divided up by the four powers to the moment the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. Even after the Wall was built, between 7,000 and 30,000 people emigrated legally from East Germany to West Germany each year. In 1969, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt promoted exchange and cooperation with East Germany as part of his "Ostpolitik"³ policy. Thanks to the Ostpolitik, East and West Germany signed the "Basic Treaty" in 1972, which promoted the movement of people and cooperation between East and West Germany.

What made Ostpolitik a viable policy for West Germany was its impressive economic development, an improving security environment, and active diplomatic endeavors. West Germany was confident in its robust economy, and with the establishment of a collective regional security system, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), security concerns had subsided markedly. This meant West Germany was able to continue its Ostpolitik toward East Germany. In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopted the "Helsinki Accords," and participating countries agreed to respect the sovereignty and territory of other participating countries; to work together on economic, scientific, technological, and environmental issues; and to protect human rights. Moreover, all while continuing

3 Ostpolitik is a policy promoted by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt after taking office in 1969. It refers to a policy of reconciliation with the socialist countries in what was then considered Central Europe. Chancellor Brandt pursued a policy of exchange with East Germany from the standpoint that a hardline policy and refusal to sustain dialogue with East Germany would rather deepen the divide.

exchange and cooperation with East Germany, West Germany worked diplomatic channels diligently to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union and thereby improve relations with Eastern Europe.

What ultimately opened up a pathway for Germany's reunification was the fact that Germany was able to get the U.S., Soviet Union, the UK, and France to agree to the reunification. Even as the Berlin Wall was falling down, the powers, except the U.S., opposed German reunification, wary of its potential to reinforce become a dominant power in Europe again. Yet, West Germany strengthened its ties with the U.S., which was in favor of reunification, and slowly managed to persuade the other countries along with the U.S. Based on these efforts, East and West Germany along with the four powers signed the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany" at the "2+4 Talks" in September 1990, clearing out a path toward Germany's reunification.

Also, the contributions of West German education on politics of German reunification cannot be overlooked. West Germany raised awareness of the excellence of a democratic system through political education, and expanded the public's interest from Germany to a more international perspective - the peace and security of Europe. Furthermore, political education in West Germany was designed to deepen people's understanding of East Germany, thereby building a domestic consensus on reunification. Ultimately, political education in West Germany played a crucial role in achieving reunification at a critical moment in contemporary history where the international environment was shifting rapidly.

Germany did go through its fair share of trials and tribulations upon achieving its reunification. Problems that emerged in the process

of integrating the two Germanies included the liquidation of illegal enterprises, property rights issues, the cost to rebuild East Germany's economy, and conflicts between East and West Germans. However, the relentless drive at the federal government level helped allay the burden from these issues, and soon, the East German economy started registering a real GDP growth rate of 7~9% every year. In the early days of reunification, East Germany's economic development was achieved mainly through financial transfers from West Germany. But as East Germany's economy gradually returned to self-sufficient levels, financial transfers from West Germany tapered off, and the cost of reunification was less of a problem. Today, a reunified Germany plays a leading role in the European Union as its economy continues to grow along with its profile high in the region.

The reunification of Germany proved that social integration is crucial. In the early days of reunification, Germans shared a sense of community as "One Germany." As time passed, however, prejudice and discrimination between East and West Germans surfaced and conflicts resulted. The walls were built up in people's hearts slowly but started coming down with sustained political and economic stability. East Germany's economy started to thrive and politicians from East Germany rose to national prominence - even reaching the heights of the Chancellor's office. Also, various institutions and social organizations that championed the value of human respect and social bonds played an important role in the integration of East and West Germany. In particular, the education on politics led by the Federal Agency for Civic Education with focus on the complexity of Germany's division, unification and history, played a significant role in alleviating

conflicts between East and West Germans.

Looking at the experience of Germany's reunification, there are things to consider in preparing for our own unification in Korea. Germany's reunification was rather unexpected and sudden. East Germans exercising their right to self-determination were crucial, and there was strong support as well as leadership from an ally (the U.S.). Although Germany's reunification process and experience are important, a simple, two-dimensional comparison between Germany and Korea would be virtually impossible. This is because there are various differences between the reunification of East and West Germany and the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, East and West Germany did not fight against each other in a bitter war unlike South and North Korea. The Korean Peninsula was the theater of a devastating war. Secondly, there are huge differences between Germany and Korea in terms of the degree of exchange and cooperation. Exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas pale in comparison to what East and West Germany had done up to their reunification. Thirdly, since the division of East and West Germany was due to a forced partition following Germany's defeat in World War II, its reunification was, in essence, a diplomatic matter that required international approval from the four powers. Meanwhile, the degree of international restriction is relatively lower on the Korean Peninsula. This makes it particularly important to be circumspect in concluding that Korean unification requires significant input from the international community as this could be seen as acknowledging outside jurisdiction and stakes over our own decision. Fourthly, nuclear weapons were never an issue in East and West German relations whereas the North's

nuclear issue persistently hangs over on the Korean Peninsula. On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are a key security issue and have become a formidable problem that must be resolved before unification. Fifthly, the inflow of outside information into East Germany took place in a variety of ways, which played a significant role in the democratization of East Germany and, ultimately German reunification. In North Korea's case, however, the flow of information into the self-isolated hermit kingdom is much more restricted. As such, it is important to prudently analyze the various aspects and experiences of Germany's reunification process when deriving insights for the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Although its reunification may have progressed differently from the situation in Korea, the following lessons and implications can be gleaned from Germany's case.

Firstly, we must actively induce change in North Korea while maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula relying on robust deterrence against North Korea's threat of armed provocation. In Germany's case, West Germany was able to actively promote exchanges and cooperation with East Germany because security concerns in the region had subsided significantly thanks to NATO and CSCE.

Secondly, we need to pursue unification in a consistent and sustained manner and seek North Korea policies based on a strong national consensus. West Germany continued to interact and communicate with East Germany as part of its "change through exchange" policy, which first emerged when the Social Democratic Party, led by Willy Brandt, came to power. This continued during the coalition government led by Chancellor Kohl of the Christian

Democratic Union, which put universal values such as freedom, human rights, and democracy as the top priority in inter-German relations, and functioned as a stabilizing policy for Germany's reunification.

Thirdly, we must raise awareness on the issue of unification and strengthen the public's capacity for unification. Just as West Germany was able to solve the "German Question" or reunification with forward-looking education on political issues, it is important for South Korea to resolve prejudice, distrust, and hostility stemming from division while revitalizing and strengthening its education on unification. Also, given that social integration emerged as a key issue in Germany's reunification, we must understand that the process and efforts to successfully integrate South and North Koreans upon unification are as important as reaching unification. Thus, by teaching the public about unification, we must strengthen our internal capacity to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula in order to facilitate the social integration of Korea during and after unification.

Fourthly, we need to recognize the importance of earning the support of neighboring countries toward the unification of the Korean Peninsula. We should also bolster friendly ties with neighboring countries to create a favorable environment for unification. Germany was able to unify its country precisely, because it succeeded in persuading that a unified Germany would promote peace and prosperity throughout Europe rather than pose a security threat to its neighbors. Therefore we should also strengthen our diplomatic activities to create a favorable international environment to the unification of the two Koreas.



II

Division of the Korean Peninsula and Development of Inter-Korean Relations

Section 1. Division and Founding of South and North Korean Governments

Section 2. Inter-Korean Relations: Conflict and Tension

Section 3. Inter-Korean Relations: Dialogue and Cooperation

Section 1

Division and Founding of South and North Korean Governments

1 Background and Timeline of Division

1) Background of Division

The dawn of inter-Korean relations traces back to the division of the two Koreas. The division of South and North Korea was a historical phenomenon that has left a lasting and powerful effect on the Korean people living on the peninsula. What led to the division of Korea was the U.S. and Soviet Military occupation of the Korean Peninsula which started between August and September of 1945, and the rift among the Korean people regarding the issue of introducing of a trusteeship in early 1946. Also, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union plunging deeper into conflict on a global level and the breakdown of the Joint Committee between the two superpowers in 1946 and 1947 led to the division.



Potsdam Conference(July 17 ~ August 2, 1945)



Liberation(August 15, 1945)

On August 15, 1945, Japan declared its unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers, and the Korean Peninsula was liberated from the Japanese colonial rule. The issue of Korean independence, however, had been discussed among the world powers prior to 1945. In 1943, at the height of World War II, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China held talks in Cairo, Egypt, and agreed to reinstate Korea's independence in due course. Then, in 1945, after Germany surrendered, Korea's independence was reaffirmed at the Potsdam Conference. Unfortunately, immediately upon liberation, the conflicting interests of the Allied Powers pushed the Korea issue in a different direction that was not quite toward independence.

Immediately after the end of World War II, the U.S. and Soviet Union stationed troops in the south and north of the Korean Peninsula, respectively, and this dashed the hopes of Koreans eager to create an independent and liberated government. The situation was shifting rapidly. It was clear that the American and Soviet presence in the Peninsula would have a decisive impact, in whatever form that may be, on the nature of the dominant social and political system in Korea.

After the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Army occupied the northern half of the Korean Peninsula on August 9, 1945. Soon after, the U.S. Army followed suit, occupying the southern half on September 8, 1945. In disarming the remaining Japanese imperial forces the U.S. proposed the division of the Korean Peninsula at the 38th parallel to prevent the Soviet Union from taking control of the entire Korean Peninsula. The Soviet Union agreed to this proposal, and thus, the Korean Peninsula fell under the influence of the U.S. and Soviet Union almost immediately upon regaining its independence. The military presence of the U.S. and Soviet Union turned the Korean Peninsula into one of the world's most intense political battlegrounds in the mid-20th century. Thus, the division of the Korean Peninsula upon liberation was in part due to its geopolitical importance, as well as the colonial rule it suffered under imperial Japan.

[Table 2-1] International Conferences Discussing the Independence of Korea

Sort	Cairo Conference	Yalta Conference	Potsdam Conference
Dates	November 22 ~ 26, 1943	February 4 ~ 11, 1945	July 17 ~ August 2, 1945
Location	Cairo, Egypt	Yalta, Livadiya	Potsdam, Germany
Participating Countries	U.S., UK, Republic of China	U.S., UK, Soviet Union	U.S., UK, Soviet Union, Republic of China
Agenda	Announced the Cairo Declaration, which details the basic policy of the Allied Powers on cooperation in the war against Japan and decisions on Japan's colonies upon defeat. "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."	Agreed that a provisional government would be formed with representatives of all democratic forces in the region (a defeated country or a nation that had been liberated), and then a responsible government aligned with the will of the people would be established through free elections as soon as possible.	Advised Japan's unconditional surrender, declared post-war policy for Japan after World War II, and urged the implementation of the Cairo Declaration which stipulated Korea's freedom and independence.

The U.S. forces stationed in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula declared its military occupation and placed the area under its direct control. The U.S. Army Military supported the establishment of a liberal and democratic government of the Republic of Korea, supporting influential domestic figures mostly in the Korea Democratic Party. Meanwhile, the Soviet Army stationed in the north supported Kim Il Sung's forces through its own military occupation, carried out measures devised by the Soviet Union, such as land reform and nationalization of industries, and also supported the founding of a socialist government in the northern half of Korea closely aligned with the Soviet Union's agenda on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the stationing of the U.S. and Soviet forces and the ensuing military government played a decisive role in the division of the two Koreas, where regimes friendly to the U.S. and the Soviet Union were created in the south and north, respectively.

2) Timeline of Division

The Cold War meant the Soviet Union and the U.S. were in a battle to restructure the international power balance in their favor after World War II. The term "Cold War" was used to describe the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Europe after World War II (once the so-called "Yalta system" was in place). While the Cold War was essentially confined to Europe until the summer of 1948, it gradually took on wider global implications. In particular, the communization of China in 1949 dragged the world deeper into the Cold War, and ultimately, a miniature version of this global Cold

War was created on the Korean Peninsula. The division of the Korean Peninsula picked up more speed as the Cold War began in earnest. The advancement of the Cold War together with ideological conflicts in Korea brought about division on the peninsula, which further consolidated when North Korea invaded the South on June 25.

From right after liberation to just before the Korean War, the division of the Korean Peninsula progressed in three sequential stages. The first phase can be called a regional or geographical division. Immediately upon liberation in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The second phase would be an ideological division. The U.S. and Soviet military governments each promoted different policies in South and North Korea, respectively. In North Korea, policies on land reforms and the nationalization of industries backed by a Soviet-style socialist system were being installed, whereas a capitalist system backed by a liberal democracy was being established in South Korea. As a result, the two Koreas were divided into different systems with the 38th parallel serving as a de facto border.

The third phase is a division of government. The failure to establish a unified government on the Korean Peninsula upon liberation led to two separate governments erected in Korea - one in the South and another in the North - by 1948.

What further deepened the division between South and North Korea was the Korean War, which North Korea meticulously prepared for and invaded the South. The Korean War ending with an armistice entrenched each side as the decades went on, and it had a disastrous impact on all areas of inter-Korean relations thereafter.

2 Founding of South and North Korean Governments

Upon liberation on August 15, 1945, foreign ministers of the U.S., UK, and the Soviet Union, who wielded great influence over the political order on the Korean Peninsula, met in Moscow on December 1945. All three parties agreed to establish a provisional government and begin a trusteeship on the Korean Peninsula.¹ However, as the Korean issue remained unresolved despite two joint U.S.-Soviet Committee sessions, the U.S. brought the matter to the United Nations in September 1947. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted to grant Korea its independence without going through a trusteeship. To that end, the UN was to supervise a general election across South and North Korea with the number of representatives from each voting area or zone proportionate to the population, and help establish a unified government.

However, at the time, the Soviet Union and North Korea rejected the UN's resolution (to hold a free general election). Accordingly, the national general election was held in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula for the first time in its history on May 10, 1948. Members of the Constitutional Assembly, elected through the May 10 general election, ratified "the Republic of Korea" as the official name of South Korea. Later, on July 17, the Constitution was adopted based upon a democratic republic system, which carried on the legacy and heritage

1 In December 1945, the foreign ministers of the three countries - U.S., UK, Soviet Union - agreed to establish a joint U.S.-Soviet Committee and decided that the four countries - U.S., UK, China, and Soviet Union - would govern the Korean Peninsula under a trusteeship arrangement for up to five years.

of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. According to the Constitution, the Republic of Korea was founded on August 15, 1948. In December of the same year, the UN General Assembly declared through its Resolution 195 that the government of the Republic of Korea was now legally established.² Accordingly, the Republic of Korea was recognized as the sole legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula established through a democratic process with the approval of the UN General Assembly. Meanwhile, in the north, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, backed by the Soviet Union, was established on September 9, 1948, completely disregarding the UN resolution to establish a unified government through a general election on the Korean Peninsula.³

2 UN General Assembly resolution 195, paragraph 2, stipulates: “[The General Assembly] Declares that there has been established a lawful government [the Government of the Republic of Korea] having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea.”

3 In North Korea, following the instructions from the Soviet Union on October 10, 1945, the “North Korea Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea” was founded, followed by the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea in February 1946. At that time, the North Korea Bureau was established in the form of a branch office of the Communist Party of Korea, which had already been organized in South Korea according to the principle of one country-one party system, and symbolized the de facto division of the Peninsula.

[Table 2-2] Founding of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea


Year	South	North
Aug. 15, 1945	Liberation	
Dec. 16–25, 1945	Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers - Agrees to establish a Provisional Government of the Korean Peninsula and start a 5-year trusteeship	
Mar. 20, 1946 (1st session)	U.S.-USSR Joint Commission - Discusses creating a provisional government in Korea (no resolution reached)	
May 21, 1947 (2nd session)		
Sep. 17, 1947	UN General Assembly - Forms the UN Temporary Commission on Korea	
Nov. 14, 1947	UN General Assembly - Agrees to hold a general election in South and North Korea with the number of representatives from each voting area or zone proportionate to the population	
Dec. 20, 1947		People’s Assembly of North Korea - Completes its draft constitution
Jan. 9, 1948		Soviet Union - Denies the UN Temporary Commission on Korea access to North Korea above the 38th parallel
Feb. 26, 1948	UN Interim Committee - Agrees to hold a general election in South Korea only, which is ready for a general election	
Apr. 29, 1948		Democratic People’s Republic of Korea - Approves first draft of its Socialist Constitution
May 10, 1948	General election	
Jul. 17, 1948	Enactment/promulgation of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea	
Aug. 15, 1948	Establishment of the Republic of Korea government	
Aug. 25, 1948		Election of Delegates to the Supreme People’s Assembly
Sep. 8, 1948		Supreme People’s Assembly - Ratifies the “Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”
Sep. 9, 1948		Establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea government

Section 2

Inter-Korean Relations: Conflict and Tension

The Korean War, which began with North Korea's invasion of the South, brought indescribable pain and devastation to the people of both South and North Korea. The Korean Peninsula has seen a string of conflicts and confrontations since the Korean War, including the armed communist guerrilla infiltration in the 1960s, the Panmunjeom axe murder incident in the 1970s, and the Rangoon bombing and bombing of KAL 858 in the 1980s. Things did not change in the 1990s and beyond with continued North Korean provocations in the waters of the West Sea, the sinking of the ROK navy ship Cheonan, and the Yeonpyeong-do Shelling. Furthermore, to this very day, North Korea has continued to test nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Although the two Koreas adopted the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in 1991 and agreed to establish peace on the peninsula through summit talks in 2000, 2007 and 2018, conflict and tension still remains between the South and the North.

1 The Korean War and Korean Armistice Agreement



Soviet document authorizing North Korea's invasion of South Korea (January 30, 1950)

The most fundamental source of conflict between the two Koreas was the Korean War of June 25, 1950, when North Korean forces invaded the South.

At dawn on June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and poured into the South.⁴ South Korean forces were pushed back by the superior firepower of its Northern counterpart, and retreated all the way down to the Nakdonggang River. The U.S.

immediately convened a UN Security Council meeting to declare North Korea's invasion of the South as an act of illegal aggression, and to set up the United Nations Command composed of 16 countries, including the U.S.. Together, the South Korean and UN forces succeeded in landing at Incheon on September 15, 1950, turning the tables on North Korea, and soon recaptured Seoul on September 28. Buoyed by the newfound success, South Korean and UN forces crossed the

⁴ The Korean War was an act of unprovoked aggression by North Korea against South Korea prompted by Stalin's ambitions to globalize communism, Mao's ambitions to turn the entire Korean Peninsula into a communist state, and Kim Il Sung's ambitions to unify the two Koreas by force. From 1949 to May 1950, Kim Il Sung persuaded Stalin and Mao, secretly visited the Soviet Union and China, signed secret military agreements, and prepared for his invasion into the South.

38th parallel and advanced northward. They captured Pyeongyang and advanced as far as the Amnokgang River toward the end of October.

On October 25, 1950⁵, however, the Chinese forces entered the War, turning the tables once again. On January 4, 1951, Seoul fell into the hands of North Korean forces yet again. From the early summer of 1951 onwards, the War reached a stalemate with both fronts refusing to give ground along the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union proposed an armistice through the UN, to which the UN was willing to listen. In July 1951, armistice talks commenced between the U.S. forces representing Korea and the UN forces, the North Korean People's Army, and the Chinese forces. After two years of negotiations, an armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953.



[Figure 2-1] Timeline of the Korean War

⁵ The People's Volunteer Army of China crossed the Amnokgang River on October 19, 1950. To mark this occasion, North Korea declared October 25, 1950, the day of the first battle, as "Chinese Intervention Memorial Day," whereas China declared the day the "Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea Memorial Day."

The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjeom on July 27, 1953, between General Mark Wayne Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command, Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the North Korean People's Army, and Peng Dehuai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. The formal title of the Korean Armistice Agreement is the Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea. The Agreement, written in English, Korean, and Chinese, is in the interest of "stopping the Korean conflict," and "with the objective of establishing an armistice which will ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved."

Thereafter, according to the Agreement, a demilitarized zone was established 2 kilometers north and south of the Military Demarcation Line, and the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, composed of officers of the UN and Communist forces as well as



Signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement (At Panmunjeom July 27, 1953)

the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (Switzerland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) was located at Panmunjeom.

The Korean War not only devastated major population centers across the country, but also caused untold human suffering and material losses. By the end of the War, 621,479 South Korean soldiers were killed or missing in action, with a further 154,881 UN troops meeting the same fate. As for civilians, 990,968 people were killed or missing, 3.2 million were rendered refugees, 300,000 were left war widows, and 100,000 became war orphans. Total human casualties were estimated at 3 million. Meanwhile, 1,646,000 North Korean soldiers were dead and wounded, and 127,600 were taken prisoners of war, bringing the total military loss to 1,773,600. Civilian casualties were estimated at 1.5 million.⁶ The Korean War had a significant impact on inter-Korean relations thereafter.

2 North Korea's Provocations and the South Korean Response

1) 1960s

In the 1960s, North Korea held an aggressive posture against South Korea driven by aspirations to communize the South. Pursuant to this strategy, North Korea led several localized military forays into South Korea along with attempts to build an underground Communist Party south of the Armistice line. These incidents were directed by the

⁶ 2010 Defense White Paper, Ministry of National Defense, 2010, p.249.

North Korean leadership, which had its South Korea policies oriented to what is best described as “military adventurism,” in order to start a Communist revolution in South Korea itself.

First, in the 1960s, a group of armed North Korean guerrillas infiltrated South Korea to assassinate South Korean political figures, including President Park Chung-hee, a raid now known as the “Blue House raid.” On January 21, 1968, 31 armed Communists belonging to Unit 124 crossed the armistice line and attempted to raid the Blue House, the presidential residence of South Korea. On their way to the Blue House, the armed contingent of North Korean soldiers killed seven members of the South’s military, police, and civilians. This incident sent shock waves through South Korea, and pushed the South Korean government to reinforce its national defense and create the new homeland reserve forces. Furthermore, to prepare against future provocations of North Korean agents infiltrating the South, a special unit dedicated to armed Communist guerrillas was organized in the Army, and also a barbed wire fence was built across the entire length of the 155-mile armistice line. This barbed wire fence is still a symbol of the Cold War, a vivid reminder of the tragedy brought on by the division of the Korean Peninsula.

In the same year, on January 23, 1968, North Korea captured the U.S. Navy intelligence vessel (AGER-2 USS) Pueblo on the high seas off the coast of Wonsan Port in North Korea, and detained 83 crew members (one sailor was killed in action during the capture). Also, from October 30 to November 2 of the same year, North Korea organized a total of 120 armed North Korean commandos (15 per group) to infiltrate Uljin and Samcheok on three different occasions. More than 60 South

Koreans, including members of the armed forces and civilians, were killed during these infiltrations. Then, on April 15, 1969, North Korea shot down the U.S. Navy electronic reconnaissance aircraft EC-121 over the East Sea, killing all 31 of its crew.

2) 1970s

A more conciliatory mood across the globe combined with the new Nixon Doctrine in the early 1970s helped ease tensions in Korea too. This was not to say North Korea did not intermittently provoke the South to cause significant conflict in inter-Korean relations.

One infamous example was the Panmunjeom axe murder incident on August 18, 1976. On that fateful day, North Korean soldiers killed two U.S. officers belonging to the UN forces who had been pruning trees in the Joint Security Area of Panmunjeom with an axe and also wounded nine other South Korean and U.S. soldiers. The North Koreans also destroyed all three UN trucks sent to help prune the trees and a nearby outpost.

Immediately after the incident, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) command reacted decisively, setting combat readiness level to DEFCON 3, calling up fighter-bomber squadrons and marines from Okinawa to Korea, and dispatching carriers Ranger and Midway to Korean waters. In response to such a strong stance of South Korea and the U.S., North Korean leader Kim Il Sung express his regret over the incident to the UN commander on August 21.

3) 1980s

Entering the 1980s, unlike the previous guerrilla attacks, North Korea carried out a series of terrorist bombings, escalating the tension between the two Koreas. The 1983 Rangoon bombing in Myanmar and the 1987 bombing of South Korean airliner KAL 858 were two examples of North Korea's state-sponsored terrorism.

On October 9, 1983, North Korean agents detonated a bomb at the Aung San Martyrs' Mausoleum to assassinate then-President Chun Doo-hwan and his entourage, who were on a goodwill visit to Myanmar. This killed 17, including the Deputy Prime Minister and other ministers, and wounded 14 others. Subsequent investigations revealed that the bombing was executed by soldiers belonging to the North Korean Army's Reconnaissance General Bureau, two of whom was captured. Immediately after this incident, the Myanmar government severed its diplomatic ties with North Korea and expelled all staff at the North Korean embassy. As a result of this incident, three countries - Costa Rica, the Comoros Islands, and Western Samoa - also severed their diplomatic relations with North Korea, and 69 countries around the world, including the U.S. and Japan, issued statements condemning North Korea.

The bombing of South Korean airliner KAL 858 occurred on November 29, 1987, just ten days before the 13th presidential election in South Korea. Korean Air flight KAL 858 departing from Baghdad, Iraq on the evening of November 28 exploded in mid-air on November 29. KAL 858 had a total of 115 people on board, including 93 South Koreans, two foreigners, and 20 crew members, including

South Korean workers returning from the Middle East. There were no survivors. Investigations discovered that the bombing was carried out by a North Korean agent Kim Hyon-hui and others under the order of North Korean leadership to blow up a Korean Air flight to disrupt the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics. In response, the U.S. designated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism on January 20, 1988.

4) 1990s

The socialist system, which had been propping up one part of the world throughout the 20th century, collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Remaining socialist states, such as China and Vietnam, were embarking on major reforms to modernize and open their economies. North Korea, however, remained reclusive, staying away from any reform and opening even in the post-Cold War era. It continued to deal with crises the same way it did during the height of the Cold War to maintain its regime. This had a negative impact on inter-Korean relations. In fact, it held the Korean Peninsula back, keeping Koreans from healing the pain and scars inflicted during the Cold War. The Peninsula, in effect, became a “lonely island” of the Cold War.

In 1991 and 1992, the two Koreas attempted to thaw their icy relations through the signing of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and their simultaneous admission to the UN. Unfortunately, the very next year, tensions re-escalated with the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis. In October 1994, the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework was

signed in Geneva which provided an agreed procedure to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Accordingly, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was set up to provide North Korea with to build a two light-water reactor nuclear power plants in Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province in North Korea in return for dismantling the nuclear weapons facilities.

But in April 1996, just 20 days before the general elections for the National Assembly of South Korea, North Korea announced that it was giving up its obligations to protect and maintain the demilitarized zone, and deployed North Korean troops into Panmunjeom. The incident rapidly spread fears of another war in South Korea. Then, in September of the same year, a small North Korean submarine was found stranded on the coast of Gangneung in South Korea. The military police and reserve forces swept nearby areas, and discovered the bodies of 11 North Korean soldiers who appeared to have been killed. After chasing down the fleeing North Korean soldiers, South Korean forces managed to kill 13 of them in a skirmish. In the process, 11 soldiers, one policeman, one reservist, and four civilians were also killed on the South Korean side. In June 1998, a North Korean Yugo-class submarine drifted in the waters of Sokcho-si, Gangwon-do, and was towed to the East Sea by a South Korean naval vessel. In the submarine were nine bodies believed to be members of the crew and operatives.

5) 2000s and beyond

In the 2000s, North Korea changed its strategy once again to stoke fear and conflict on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea crossed the

Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea, resulting in maritime battles between the navies of the two Koreas. It also provoked tensions on and beyond the Korean Peninsula by launching missiles and conducting nuclear tests.

The First Battle of Yeonpyeong occurred on June 15, 1999, when six North Korean patrol vessels crossed the NLL into South Korean waters 10 kilometers west of Yeonpyeong Island. The North Korean vessels, disregarding warnings to leave South Korean waters, launched a preemptive attack on South Korean vessels. The incident quickly developed into a fierce artillery battle. North Korea's trespassing of the NLL was a direct violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement of 1992, which agreed to recognize the "areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time." This was the first naval battle between South and North Korean forces since the Korean War.

The Second Battle of Yeonpyeong on June 29, 2002, was the second naval battle fought between the navies of the two Koreas near the NLL off the coast of Yeonpyeong Island. North Korea, which had been defeated in the First Battle of Yeonpyeong in 1999, invaded the Northern Limit Line and deliberately attacked the South Korean navy. In this naval battle, six South Korean soldiers were killed and 18 were wounded. North Korea also suffered more than 30 casualties.

The third skirmish in the West Sea was the Daecheong Incident, which took place on November 10, 2009, roughly 9 kilometers east of Daecheong Island, near the NLL. Again, North Korea crossed the NLL without permission and moved southward. Although there were no casualties in the South Korean navy, North Korea once again threw a

wrench into inter-Korean relations.

On July 11, 2008, a North Korean sentry shot and killed a South Korean tourist at Mount Geumgang. The South Korean government suspended all tours to the Mountain the next day. Subsequently, North Korea closed border crossing between the two Koreas on December 1, 2008, then detained South Korean workers who were working at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex for 136 days from March to August 2009.

On March 26, 2010, North Korea also led a surprise torpedo attack with one of its submarines and sank the ROKS Cheonan, a South Korean navy patrol vessel. The attack killed 46 South Korean soldiers. The sinking of the Cheonan by North Korea was an obvious military provocation against South Korea, and was in direct violation of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of threats or force; Article 2, Paragraph 12 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, which guarantees the cessation of all hostile acts; and Article 9, Chapter 2 of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, which prohibits the use of force against the other side. However, North Korea, which had previously denied responsibility for the Korean War, the Rangoon bombing, and the bombing of KAL 858, once again insisted that it was not to blame for the attack on the Cheonan. On May 24, the South Korean government announced the May 24 Measures through a public address by the President, which included a complete suspension of inter-Korean trade and exchange and a complete ban on North Korean vessels from sailing in South Korean waters.

On November 23, 2010, North Korea opened fire on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong Island, with artillery shells. The South

Korean military immediately returned fire. North Korea's bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island was carried out indiscriminately - it targeted civilian facilities on the island as well as military bases. The attack killed two South Korean marines and severely



ROKS Cheonan salvaged after being torpedoed by North Korea (April 15, 2010)

wounded 16 other soldiers. Two civilians were also killed with dozens more injured. Aside from human casualties, the attack destroyed 133 buildings. Local residents lost homes and businesses overnight. The South Korean government clearly stated that North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was a "clear armed provocation against the Republic of Korea" and that "indiscriminate shelling against civilians is intolerable." It also strongly demanded that "responsible measures be taken" in response.

In addition, on August 4, 2015, when North Korea planted mines to provoke a military incident in the DMZ along the western front, the South Korean government issued a warning and resumed loudspeaker broadcasts against North Korea for the first time in eleven years. In response, on August 20, North Korea launched an artillery attack on the western front, near Yeoncheon-gun, Gyeonggi-do, to which the South Korean military returned fire. In order to resolve the military confrontation triggered by North Korean mines and artillery bombardment, a three-day inter-Korean meeting between high-ranking officials took place on August 22. The three-day meeting



Houses damaged by North Korea's bombing of Yeonpyeong-do Island (November 23, 2010)

resulted in the August 25 Inter-Korean Agreement, and the crisis was brought to a close. The meetings not only resulted in measures to ease military tensions, but also reached agreements to improve inter-Korean relations and promote exchanges, such as holding

inter-Korean government talks and resuming reunions of separated families.

Afterward, the leaders of South and North Korea met in 2018 to adopt the Panmunjom Declaration and the Pyeongyang Joint Declaration. However, when the 2nd U.S.-North Korea Summit (Hanoi) in February 2019 failed to produce any tangible results, talks stalled. Then, in June 2020, North Korea blew up the South-North Joint Liaison Office in Gaeseong, accusing South Korea of distributing leaflets to North Korea.

3 North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Development

When North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006, it shocked the Korean Peninsula and the world. The North Korean nuclear crisis, in fact, dates back to the 1990s - specifically in 1993 - despite the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula, which was agreed upon in 1992. Soon after, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requested special inspections on two undeclared facilities in the Yeongbyeon nuclear complex in 1992 to resolve the discrepancies in its report on the amount of weapons-grade plutonium refined by North Korea. North Korea, however, rejected IAEA's request and declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, then officially withdrew from the IAEA in 1994. Consequently, a consensus was formed in the international community that sanctions against North Korea should be imposed in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula intensified as North Korea threatened that if UN sanctions were imposed, it would take it as a declaration of war. The groundwork for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue was laid with the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which included replacing North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors, supporting 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually until the nuclear power plant was completed, and normalizing relations between the U.S. and North Korea. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula slowly eased.

The second North Korean nuclear crisis, first began with suspicions raised in October 2002 that North Korea was attempting to extract weapons-grade nuclear material with an undisclosed uranium enrichment program. To resolve this second North Korean nuclear crisis, a framework for multilateral consultations called the Six-Party Talks was created, and the first meeting was convened in August 2003. In September 2005, the Six-Party Talks adopted the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement, which included North Korea abandoning its nuclear program in return for the means to bolster its regime security

as well as economic support. Despite the progress, North Korea carried out its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, in protest against the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue, which related to North Korean slush funds frozen due to U.S. restrictions on illegal funds. Accordingly, the international community condemned North Korea's first nuclear test and unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1718. Six-Party Talks on February 13, 2007, agreed on initial measures to help implement the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement, then agreed on additional measures on October 3. This brought North Korea back to the negotiating table, but no further progress was made due to North Korea's refusal to verify its nuclear program.

North Korea carried out its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, raising alarm bells across the world once again. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a string of missiles, raising tensions internationally. North Korea's second nuclear test and the nuclear crisis pushed the hermit state into further isolation. The international community condemned North Korea's nuclear testing, and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 to impose sanctions against North Korea.

On February 12, 2013, North Korea carried out its third nuclear test in spite of repeated warnings from the UN Security Council and the international community. North Korea's nuclear test was a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874, and was not only a threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, but also a direct challenge to the international community. Stronger sanctions were placed on North Korea through Security Council Resolution 2094, and most countries, including

China, condemned North Korea's nuclear test and joined the sanctions against North Korea.

In March 2013, through the 23rd plenary meeting of the 6th Central Committee of the Workers' Party, North Korea adopted policy of simultaneously developing the economy and nuclear weapons (*Byungjin* Policy). North Korea declared that it would "expand and strengthen nuclear weapons capability in quality," calling nuclear armament the "life of the nation" and the "national treasure of a unified Korea." North Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons and conducted its fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016. Then, within a month or so, it launched a long-range missile, and the international community adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2270 to impose strong sanctions to control imports and exports across major civilian sectors in North Korea. When North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test on September 9, just eight months after its previous test, the international community unanimously adopted Resolution 2321.

Thereafter, on September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test and immediately announced through its state-run Central Television that the hydrogen bomb test was a resounding success. Aside from agreeing to be more thorough in executing existing resolutions, the international community sought to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis by promptly announcing UN Security Council Resolution 2375, which contained additional sanctions against North Korea, eight days after the nuclear test.

Meanwhile, North Korea has also been developing intermediate and long-range missiles as a means of delivering nuclear weapons. Its missile program gained momentum in the 2000s, and the international

community has responded with diplomatic strategies condemning North Korea's actions and urging it to stop its provocations and resume peace talks. In particular, when North Korea launched a long-range missile on July 5, 2006, the UN Security Council condemned the launch and unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1695, which prohibits the transfer of missile-related materials to North Korea.

Moreover, the international community declared North Korea's long-range missile launch on December 12, 2012, as a serious provocation and adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2087.

Yet, North Korea continued to launch ballistic missiles, and the international community, including the UN, adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2356 on June 2, 2017. On July 4 and 28 of the same year, North Korea launched intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-14, which led to UN Security Council Resolution 2371. In response to North Korea's sixth nuclear test in September 2017, followed by the launching of long-range ballistic missile Hwasong-15 on November 29, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2397.

More recently, South and North Korea adopted the Panmunjom Declaration (April 27), Pyeongyang Joint Declaration (September 19), and September 19 Military Agreement in 2018, easing military tensions and building anticipation for exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas. Then, North Korea went on to resume its launching of short-range ballistic missiles in May 2019 after the collapse of the second U.S.-North Korea Summit (Hanoi, February 2019). Since then, North Korea has continued to "enhance its nuclear and

missile capabilities” within the scope of its “five-year national defense development plan” announced at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021.

In 2022, the North resumed ICBM launches (March 24), by breaking the short-lived moratorium, and declared its intentions to “abandon nuclear disarmament” internally and externally by promulgating the “law on the state policy on nuclear forces” (September 8). Today, North Korea remains persistent in its various strategic and tactical provocations - it is launching ballistic missiles with the highest frequency ever. It continues to violate the “September 19 Military Agreement,” and is sending unmanned aerial vehicles south of the demarcation line.

Section 3

Inter-Korean Relations: Dialogue and Cooperation

Despite the undeniable fact that the Korean Peninsula has endured severe confrontation throughout its decades-long division, efforts were indeed made to address the tragedies and conflicts through reconciliation and cooperation built on mutual trust between the two Koreas.

Inter-Korean dialogue first began in the 1970s, leading to discussions with a little more substance in the 1990s. Since 2000, talks between the two Koreas have resulted in Summit meetings as well as other prime ministerial and ministerial level meetings.

1 Inter-Korean Dialogue

Inter-Korean dialogue first began on August 20, 1971, when contact was made between delegations to the Red Cross talks to resolve the issue of separated families in the South and the North. On August 12,

1971, the Korean Red Cross proposed Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks to resolve the issue of separated families, to which North Korea agreed. Taking this as an opportunity, five tasks were put on the agenda: confirming the address and fate (life or death) of separated families, realizing the reunion and visitation of separated families, exchanging of letters, permanently reuniting separated families and resolving other humanitarian issues. To discuss these five tasks, a total of seven rounds of Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks were held between August 1972 and July 1973.

Meanwhile, for four days from May 2, 1972, representatives from South and North Korea held talks in Pyongyang and Seoul. As a result, the two parties announced the “July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué” (see Appendix 1), and launched the South-North Coordination Committee. Joint Chairs of the Committee met three times, and the Committee also held three general meetings and three working-level meetings. However, in August 1973, North Korea unilaterally halted talks in protest against the “June 23 Declaration,” which included provisions on the non-interference in South Korea’s internal affairs, simultaneous accession to the UN, and opening Korea’s doors to all countries. Starting on February 17, 1979, representatives of the South-North Coordination Committee did meet three times, but failed to facilitate the reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas as they were unable to overcome fundamental constraints i.e. hostilities rooted in the Cold War system.

By the mid-1980s, inter-Korean talks expanded to include the fields of economy and sports. In May 1985, the 8th Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks was held. The meeting was the first of its kind since July 1973.

At the meeting, delegates agreed to hold the first reunion of separated families, 40 years since the division of the peninsula. From September 20 to 23, separated families and a select group of art troupes were given a chance to visit Seoul and Pyongyang.

Thereafter, inter-Korean dialogue flourished in the 1990s. South and North Korea held High-Level Talks, led by the Prime Ministers of both sides, to discuss the overall progress of inter-Korean relations and adopted the “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement” (see Appendix 2) and the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (see Appendix 3). Since 2000, five inter-Korean Summits have been held and inter-Korean dialogue has ventured into a variety of fields.

1) Inter-Korean Summits

The first inter-Korean Summit dates back to 1994, during the Kim Young-sam administration in South Korea. After several preliminary meetings in 1994, the two Koreas agreed to host their first inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang from July 25 to 27. When North Korean President Kim Il Sung died (July 8, 1994), however, plans for the inter-Korean Summit were shelved.

Since the turn of the century, a total of five inter-Korean Summits have got under way. The first Summit was held in 2000 between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il, and the second Summit was held in 2007 between President Roh Moo-hyun and Chairman Kim Jong Il.

In 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean President Kim Jong Un met on three different occasions. Then, on

June 30, 2019, leaders of the two Koreas also hosted a trilateral meeting between South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S. at Panmunjeom.

2000: “June 15 Joint Declaration”

In his inaugural address in February 1998, President Kim Dae-jung declared, “I am willing to accept a Summit if North Korea desires.” Accordingly, the South Korean government proposed inter-Korean Summits and exchanges of special envoys on multiple occasions. North Korea agreed to talks, and President Kim Dae-jung met with Kim Jong Il for their first inter-Korean Summit in June 2000.

From June 13 to 15, 2000, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung met with then Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang, and both parties signed the “June 15 Joint Declaration” (see Appendix 5) to work toward resolving the issue of separated families and promoting economic and social/cultural exchanges together.

2007: “October 4 Joint Declaration”

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun sought to ease tensions and foster peace on the Korean Peninsula by promoting broader economic cooperation with North Korea based on his “Peace and Prosperity Policy.” President Roh held an inter-Korean Summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang from October 2 to 4, 2007. At the Summit, the two leaders agreed on the need to end the current armistice and establish permanent peace. Both parties agreed to pursue the means of officially declaring an end to the Korean War with either three-party or four-party talks featuring stakeholders with direct

interest in the future of the Korean Peninsula. The two parties also decided to execute a variety of joint projects in the fields of politics, military, economy, society, and culture. Discussions from the summit culminated in the adoption of the “Declaration on the Development of South-North Korean Relations and Peace and Prosperity (i.e. October 4 South-North Joint Declaration of 2007)” (see Appendix 6).

2018: “Panmunjom Declaration” and “Pyeongyang Joint Declaration”

At the inter-Korean summit on April 27, 2018, leaders of the two Koreas announced the “Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (i.e. Panmunjom Declaration)” (see Appendix 7). Through the Panmunjom Declaration, South and North Korea agreed to usher in a new era of peace on the Korean Peninsula free from the threat of war, and agreed on measures to advance inter-Korean relations and foster reconciliation, peace, and prosperity.

A month later, on May 26, at the second inter-Korean Summit at Tongilgak in Panmunjeom, South and North Korea celebrated the hoding of the U.S.-North Korea Summit and agreed to implement the provisions of the Panmunjom Declaration as soon as possible. Subsequently, at the Pyeongyang Summit, which were held for three days between September 18 and 20, the leaders of the two Koreas evaluated the success of the Panmunjom Declaration and signed the “Pyeongyang Joint Declaration” (see Appendix 8) to continue moving inter-Korean relations forward in the future.

2) Inter-Korean High-Level Talks

Talks Since the 1980s


High-level talks between the two Koreas were mostly held at the premier and ministerial level. As for talks between Prime Ministers, the South Korean government proposed the first meeting in 1988. On December 28, 1988, Prime Minister Kang Young-hoon sent a letter to North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, proposing inter-Korean Prime Ministerial talks to build mutual trust and ease tensions between the two Koreas. In response, North Korea proposed high-level political and military talks preceded by a preliminary meeting on February 8, 1989.

The two sides met for preliminary talks on eight separate occasions and held two working-level meetings at Panmunjeom between February 1989 and July 1990, eventually agreeing to hold the first-ever Inter-Korean High-Level Talks in the near future. Accordingly, a total of eight Inter-Korean High-Level Talks were held in Seoul and Pyongyang from September 1990 to September 1992. At the 4th meeting (October 22~25, 1991, in Pyongyang), the two sides drafted and agreed to adopt the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchange and Cooperation between the South and the North (i.e. Inter-Korean Basic Agreement)” going forward. Based on this decision, at the 5th meeting (December 10~13, 1991, in Seoul), the two Koreas negotiated previous points of contention, and adopted the new “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement,” featuring a Preamble and 25 Articles.

At the fifth round of talks, South and North Korea also adopted a joint statement with three key points, including an agreement authorizing representatives to discuss the nuclear issue on the

Korean Peninsula as early as December of that year. According to this agreement, South and North Korean representatives met three times at Panmunjeom from December 26 to 31, 1991, and agreed on the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”

[Table 2-3] Structure and Implementation of the “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement”



(see Appendix 3), which was then signed by the Prime Ministers of South and North Korea (January 20, 1992). The “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement” and “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” were formally adopted at the 6th round of Inter-Korean High-Level Talks on February 19, 1992.

During the seventh round of High-Level Talks (May 5~8, 1992 in Seoul), the two sides adopted three agreements - “Agreement on the Establishment and Operation of South-North Liaison Offices,” “Agreement on the Establishment and Operation of a South-North Joint Military Commission,” and “Agreement on the Establishment and Operation of a Joint Commission for Exchanges and Cooperation.”

During the eighth round of High-level Talks (September 15~18, 1992, in Pyongyang), the two sides adopted three subsequent agreements - the “Protocol on the Implementation and Observance of Reconciliation,” the “Protocol on the Implementation and Observance of Non-aggression,” and the “Protocol on the Implementation and Observance of Exchanges and Cooperation.” The two sides also ratified the “Agreement on the Establishment and Operation of the Joint South-North Reconciliation Commission.”

However, North Korea refused to participate in the ninth round of talks finding fault with South Korea’s decision to go ahead with its annual Hwarang exercises on October 31, which combined ROK-U.S. Foal Eagle and Team Spirit training. That stopped the Inter-Korean High-Level Talks dead on its tracks.

Talks since 2000

Meanwhile, since the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, Inter-Korean

High-Level Talks have mostly been led at the ministerial level. In total, 21 round of Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks were held between July 2000 and February 2008. Early on in these Ministerial Talks, the focus was mainly placed on implementing the agreements reached at the Inter-Korean Summit. But in 2002, when suspicions of North Korea's nuclear development were raised, a new round of Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks were convened to simultaneously resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and develop inter-Korean relations.

Following the 2007 Inter-Korean Summit, Inter-Korean High-Level Talks began with a meeting between the Prime Ministers from both sides. That means, in 2007, the Prime Ministers, Ministers, and working-level staff all had a chance to meet their counterparts. The Inter-Korean Prime Minister-Level Talks were held in Seoul from November 14 to 16, 2007, and an agreement was adopted for the overall implementation of the "October 4 South-North Summit Declaration." Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks coordinated schedules for a number of issues on inter-Korean relations, and discussed various pending issues. Working-Level Talks, such as the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee, saw discussions on implementing the agreements reached between the two Koreas to date.

As inter-Korean dialogue resumed in earnest in 2018, five Inter-Korean High-Level Talks were held between the South Korean Minister of Unification and the North Korean Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Country serving as chief representatives. At the High-Level Talks held in January, an agreement was reached on issues related to easing military tensions, including North Korea's participation in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and Paralympics.

Then, at the High-Level Talks held in June, both sides agreed to open a South-North Joint Liaison Office in the Gaeseong Industrial Zone, and also to hold follow-up talks in areas such as military, sports, railways, roads, forestry, and Red Cross issues. Meanwhile, High-Level Talks held in October after the Pyeongyang Summit in September discussed detailed implementation plans for the “Pyeongyang Joint Declaration,” such as holding follow-up talks in each sector and planning for a joint railway survey.

3) Sectoral Meetings

While most sectoral meetings held in the 1970s and 1980s were largely focused on social, cultural, and humanitarian issues, those held after 2000 became broader in scope.

Military

Following the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the two Koreas not only held military talks at the ministerial level, but also established contact at the working-level. Between 2000 to the end of December 2022, a total of 53 rounds of such military talks were held.

At the second Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks held from June 3 to 4, 2004, both parties agreed to adopt and enforce the “Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Clashes in the West Sea, Suspension of Propaganda Activities in the Military Demarcation Line Area, and Removal of Means of Propaganda.” At the meeting, the two sides agreed to take measures such as the use of the International Merchant Ship Common Network and the exchange of information on

illegal fishing vessels to prevent accidental clashes in the West Sea; to suspend propaganda activities near the Military Demarcation Line; and to remove means used for propaganda purposes.

In 2006, South Korea raised the issue of preventing maritime conflict in the West Sea and setting up a joint fishing zone through the 3rd and 4th working-level Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks. However, no agreement was reached as North Korea insisted on a new maritime boundary in the West Sea. Thereafter, in December 2007, at the 7th Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks (December 12-14), both parties adopted the “Agreement for Military Guarantees of Traffic, Communication, and Customs Clearance in the Inter-Korean Administrative Areas in East and West Seas.” In total, since 2000, South and North Korea adopted 11 agreements and four joint press releases as a result of inter-Korean military talks. At the 39th Inter-Korean Military Working-Level Talks in February 2011, an attempt was made to discuss procedures for holding high-level military talks to discuss the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. These attempts, unfortunately, failed due to stark differences of positions from both sides. On August 4, 2015, military tension between South and North Korea escalated due to the North’s planting of land mines in southern parts of the Demilitarized Zone. To resolve this issue, high-ranking officials from both the South and the North met at Panmunjeom from August 22 to 24, 2015.

Talks between the South and North Korean military authorities resumed after the Inter-Korean Summit on April 27, 2018. Here, the two sides agreed on joint efforts to ease military tensions and substantially reduce the risk of war. At the 8th Inter-Korean General-

Level Military Talks held on June 14 at Tongilgak, Panmunjeom, both sides agreed to restore the June 4 Agreement (signed on June 4, 2004) to prevent accidental clashes in the West Sea and restore military communication lines across the East and



The 40th Inter-Korean Military Working-Level Talks
(September 13-14, 2018; Panmunjeom)

West Sea borders. Then, at the 9th Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks held on July 31, both parties discussed specific means to cease hostile actions on land, sea, and air, including the demilitarization of the Joint Security Area in Panmunjeom, joint excavation of remains in the DMZ, and mutual withdrawal of GPs on a trial basis. At the Pyeongyang Summit in September, the “Military Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration” (see Appendix 9) was adopted on September 19, 2018. At the 10th Inter-Korean General-Level Military Talks held on October 26, 2018, an agreement was reached on the mutual withdrawal of GPs, and subsequently the two sides removed 10 out of 11 GPs within 1km of each other in the South and North by November of that year.

Economy

South and North Korea agreed to create the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee to oversee the economic cooperation between the two Koreas pursuant to the agreement

reached at the 4th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks (December 16, 2000). The first Committee meeting was held in Pyongyang in December 2000. At the meeting, South and North Korea agreed to actively pursue initiatives that could promote economic cooperation between the two Koreas. The Committee convened 13 times until April 2007 to discuss various economic issues at hand. The Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee was elevated from being led by the Vice Ministers to being led by the Deputy Prime Ministers. The new Committee convened its first meeting in Seoul on December 2007.

In the 2000s, working-level talks flourished across a variety of different fronts, including those concerning railways, roads, Mount Geumgang tourism, construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, embankment works along the Imjingang River, and the development of light industries and underground resources. In particular, since 2000, Inter-Korean Working-Level Talks on economic cooperation adopted agreements on investment guarantees, preventing double taxation, procedures to resolve commercial disputes between the South and North, means to settle liquidation processes, and access to and stay in the Gaeseong Industrial Zone as well as the Mount Geumgang Tourist Zone.

In the 2010s, inter-Korean economic talks focused on the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. When the Gaeseong Industrial Complex was temporarily shut down in 2013, seven rounds of working-level talks were held between officials from both sides to help reopen the Industrial Complex. Consequently, the two Koreas agreed to establish a South-North Joint Committee for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, an institution to prevent any disruptions and conflicts. The South-North

Joint Committee for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex convened six times until 2015, but inter-Korean dialogue on economic cooperation came to a halt when the Complex was completely shut down in 2016.

Pursuant to the terms agreed in the 2018 “Panmunjom Declaration” and “Pyeongyang Joint Declaration,” the two Koreas agreed on forming a joint railway and road research team, as well as finding means to regenerate forests together. Also, on-site surveys were commissioned to help connect and modernize inter-Korean railways and roads, and to control forest diseases and pests.

In 2019, Inter-Korean Working-Level Talks on road connection (January 31) and the exchange of data for railroad and road cooperation purposes (February 25) were held at the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office in Gaeseong. Meanwhile, on October 25, 2019, North Korea unilaterally demanded South Korea to pull out of the Mount Geumgang Tourist Zone, under the pretext that tourism to the revered Mountain had not resumed. In response, the South Korean side proposed holding working-level talks, but the North Korean side rejected the offer.

Humanitarian Support

Best-known among the humanitarian talks between South and North Korea were the Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks. Red Cross Talks began in August 1971 when Red Cross officials from both sides met for the first time. After 25 preliminary sessions, the first-ever official Red Cross talks were held in August 1972. Both sides agreed on five items to put on the agenda: confirming the address and fate of separated families, allowing separated families to meet and visit lost kin,

exchanging of letters, reuniting separated families according to their free will, and resolving other humanitarian issues. Unfortunately, seven rounds of Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks failed to yield any significant results until 1973.

In 1984, Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks resumed when North Korea sent supplies to help South Koreans recover from flood. At the 8th Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks in May 1985, South and North Korea agreed on exchanging visits for separated families and art performance troupes. In September, 65 separated families (total 92 persons) reunited in Seoul and Pyeongyang.

Since the “June 15 Joint Declaration” of 2000, Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks and working-level discussions focused more on separated families, which led to a total of 16 reunions until 2007. At the 9th Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks in 2007, various exchanges between separated families were agreed upon between the South and North, including regular reunions, video reunions, and the exchange of personal videos to other family members. In 2008, the Red Cross Talks helped open the Mount Geumgang Reunion Center for separated families.

However, on March 29, after President Lee Myung-bak took office, North Korea unilaterally declared the suspension of dialogue and contact between South and North Korean officials, effectively cutting off inter-Korean dialogue altogether. Then, working-level talks between officials to resolve the Gaeseong Industrial Complex issue in 2009 also helped revive working-level Red Cross talks. This resulted in two additional reunions at Mount Geumgang. However, further dialogue was suspended due to armed provocations, most notably the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korea in

2010. Inter-Korean dialogue remained virtually holted throughout the entirety of the Lee Myung-bak administration.

In 2013, President Park Geun-hye proposed another reunion of separated families during her National Liberation Day address. North Korea accepted the proposal, and on August 23, working-level Red Cross talks convened at the Peace House in Panmunjeom to iron out the details. At this meeting, an agreement was reached on holding in-person reunion and video reunion of separated families on the occasion of Chuseok holidays. Things, however, fell through when North Korea unilaterally postponed the reunion. Families had to wait until the Lunar new years holidays the following year to meet at Mount Geumgang.

From August 22 to 24, 2015, high-ranking officials from the two Koreas met at Panmunjeom to solve the crisis caused by North Korea's provocations planting land mines in the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone on August 4, 2015. South and North Korea agreed to hold another family reunion and High-Level Talks with the "August 25 Agreement," and also agreed to facilitate exchange and cooperation at the civilian level.

On September 8, 2015, a surprise agreement was reached on holding a reunion of separated families, and a select group of separated families were given a chance to meet from October 20 to 26. On November 26, a working-level meeting was held to explore the possibility of holding an inter-Korean government meeting. Both sides managed to agree upon various issues, such as the format and agenda of the proposed government meeting, and in December, they actually convened for talks in Gaeseong. However, talks fell through as both sides failed to bridge the gap in their expectations.

In the "Panmunjom Declaration" jointly announced by the leaders of the two Koreas on April 27, 2018, the South and the North agreed to prioritize the humanitarian issues caused by the division of the Korean Peninsula, and to bring separated families together for another round of reunions on the occasion of National Liberation Day. Accordingly, separated families were invited for a reunion at Mount Geumgang from August 20 to 26. The leaders of South and North Korea agreed in the "Pyeongyang Joint Declaration" to strengthen humanitarian cooperation to fundamentally resolve the issue of separated families. On October 15, Inter-Korean High-Level Talks were held at Panmunjeom, and the two sides agreed to hold inter-Korean Red-Cross talks at Mount Geumgang in November, following negotiation in the form of document exchange regarding such practical issues as restoring the Reunion Center for the Separated Families in the Mount Geumgang area, holding video meetings, and exchanging video messages. However, nothing specific materialized due to delays in negotiations.

Meanwhile, talks on health and medicine between the two Koreas led to new initiatives aimed at improving health, medical care, and quarantine across the entirety of the Korean Peninsula. In 2007, the first Inter-Korean Prime Ministerial Talks (November 16) and the Subcommittee on Health, Medical and Environmental Protection and Cooperation (December 21) agreed on modernizing hospitals in North Korea, supplying raw medicinal ingredients, and exchanging data from fact-finding surveys. Later, talks continued at the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office in Gaeseong on November 7, 2018. At this meeting, specific and practical implementation plans were discussed for inter-Korean cooperation in terms of health and medical care, and


especially to prevent the influx and spread of infectious diseases across the Demarcation Line. South and North Korean officials agreed to exchange information on infectious diseases on a pilot basis in 2018, and also to address practical matters in diagnosing, preventing, and treating infectious diseases, including tuberculosis and malaria.

Society, Culture, Art, and Sports

The two Koreas have held a total of 62 rounds of social and cultural talks since 1970, of which 52 (84%) focused on sports. Inter-Korean Sports Talks mostly revolved around the matter of having athletes from both Koreas make a joint entrance at the opening or closing ceremonies of international sporting events or forming a unified team to compete in international events. South and North Korea walked together as “Korea” for the first time at the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney, and did so a dozen times until the 2018 Asian Para Games in Jakarta-Palembang. In terms of organizing a unified team, South and North Korea have agreed to compete under the same flag on 13 different occasions. Table tennis was the first, and also the most, to do so - since 1991, the two Koreas have competed as one team in table tennis 10 times. As for multi-sport events, South and North Korea competed together three times. In the Jakarta-Palembang Asian Games, the two sides combined forces in basketball, canoeing, and rowing, whereas for the Para Games, they worked together for swimming, table tennis, and more. Meanwhile, South and North Korea have agreed to work together on bidding for the 2032 Summer Olympics with two Sports Subcommittee sessions in 2018.

Other talks on social and cultural issues have involved working-level discussions on the joint excavation and return of the remains

[Table 2-4] Inter-Korean Talks by Field



* Source: Office of the Inter-Korean Dialogue official website

of historical figure An Jung-geun (four sessions from 2005 to 2007), disease and pest control in forests, weather cooperation, avian influenza, and foot-and-mouth disease (one session each). In 2018, two working-level conferences were held to help exchange art troupes between the two Koreas as well.

2 Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation

Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation have helped build mutual trust and contributed to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, any exchange and cooperation must proceed in an orderly and mutually beneficial manner based upon the agreements between the two Koreas.

1) Establishing a Foundation for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation

On July 7, 1988, the Roh Tae-woo administration announced through the “Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-esteem, Unification and Prosperity (i.e. July 7 Declaration)” that “the two Koreas tear down the wall of division and carry out exchanges in all areas.” In October of the same year, the South Korean government announced its “Measures to Open the Economy toward North Korea,” then followed it up with the “Basic Guidelines on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation” in June 1989. In order to establish and institutionalize inter-Korean exchange and cooperation in a more organized way, the South Korean government passed the “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act” (August 1, 1990). With this new Act, South Korea was able to lay the foundation for much more stable inter-Korean exchange and cooperation within the framework and scope of its law.

With the “Agreed Framework” between the U.S. and North Korea in October 1994 paving the way out of the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Kim Young-sam administration laid the groundwork for inter-Korean economic cooperation through its “Measures to Revitalize Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation” (first round of measures) in November 1994. This gave the two Koreas a chance to work on their economies together on a trial basis. Meanwhile, the Kim Dae-jung administration made the “active pursuit of inter-Korean economic cooperation under the principle of separation of politics and business” a national priority, and in April 1998, the South Korean government announced its own “Measures to Revitalize Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation” (second round of measures), with the main goal being to allow the

heads of conglomerates in the South to visit North Korea, and to abolish restrictions on investment to North Korea. In October 1999, the “Guidelines to Support the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for Inter-Korean Economic Exchange and Cooperation” were enacted to establish objective criteria for funding and investment in North Korea.

Meanwhile, the Roh Moo-hyun administration amended the “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act” (on May 31, 2005) to reflect changes since the “June 15 Joint Declaration,” and also to ease the reporting requirements in acquiring approval to contact North Korean citizens. In December 2005, the “Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act” passed the National Assembly and came into force in June 2006. The “October 4 South-North Joint Declaration,” which came after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2007, listed details that could help execute the provisions of the “June 15 South-North Joint Declaration.” Here, a long-term plan to promote inter-Korean economic cooperation was announced as well. Thus, driven by its strategy aimed at ultimately easing military tension and denuclearizing North Korea through inter-Korean exchanges, South Korea reaffirmed its principle of establishing peace and economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula by way of encouraging North Korea to reform and open itself up voluntarily.

Meanwhile, the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations focused on establishing better order in the exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas, leveraging the results of exchange and cooperation during the past administrations - the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations - and laying the groundwork for injecting added substance to inter-Korean cooperation. In order to streamline and organize protocols for exchange and cooperation,

the “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act,” among other legislations, was revised (July 2009), and the “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation System” was established (February 2010) to strengthen the transparency of goods transported in and out of North Korea. However, a string of incidents instigated by North Korea - shooting and killing a tourist at Mount Geumgang in July 2008, sinking the Cheonan in March 2010, and shelling Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 - threw a wrench in inter-Korean relations.

To mark the 30th anniversary of the “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act,” the Moon Jae-in administration submitted a bill to amend the Act to improve the stability and predictability of exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas to the National Assembly in January 2021. The objective was to create a foundation for decentralized and cooperative exchanges as well as cooperation across all levels of the central government, local governments, and the private sector. Moreover, earnest efforts were made to promote orderly exchange and cooperation through consultative bodies between central and local government stakeholders, such as working-level councils on local government exchange and cooperation policies, and official councils between metropolitan and basic local governments.

2) Connecting Railway and Road Networks

The Trans-Korean Railway and Road Project, which had been a point of focus since the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, was officially launched with a groundbreaking ceremony held on September 18, 2002. As for roads, the Gyeongui Line and the Donghae Line were

completed in October 2004 to connect South and North Korea. Both roads were then used for inter-Korean travel, including commutes to the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and visits to the Mount Geumgang Tourist Zone.

As for railways, a test run using the Trans-Korean Train got under way on May 17, 2007. Thereafter, in accordance with the agreement reached at the 2007 Inter-Korean Summit and Inter-Korean Prime Ministerial Talks, from December 11, 2007, regular Trans-Korean Freight Trains serviced the route between Dorasan Station on the South Korean side and Panmun Station on the North Korean side. However, due to the North's new overland traffic restrictions, the Trans-Korean Freight Train was suspended from December 1, marking November 28, 2008 the last day of train operations.

In 2015, the South Korean government began restoring a previously disconnected section of the Gyeongwon Line. But the following year, all works were suspended when North Korea carried out its fourth nuclear test (January 2016). In 2018, South and North Korea agreed to connect and modernize the Donghae and Gyeongui railways and roads with the "Panmunjom Declaration." At subcommittee meetings to follow up on the Declaration, both parties agreed to inspect the section that connects the Trans-Korean Railway to the North and South together, and perform joint on-site inspections of railway and road sections in the North. Afterward, in 2018, in order to execute the terms of this agreement, on-site inspections and joint field investigations were conducted on the Donghae Line and Gyeongui Line railways and roads.

Moreover, in the 2018 "Pyeongyang Joint Declaration," both sides

agreed to host a groundbreaking ceremony to start their work on reconnecting railways and roads between South and North Korea. Upon discussions at an Inter-Korean High-Level Talks on October 15, the two Koreas indeed hosted a groundbreaking ceremony for the Gyeongui and Donghae Lines (railways and roads) at Panmun Station on the North Korean side on December 26. On February 25, 2019, South and North Korea exchanged data related to their railway and road cooperation to date, including a report on the results of a joint on-site survey of the Gyeongui Line and Donghae Line railways, and comprehensive sets of data related to railroads via the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office. In 2020, the South Korean government promoted the restoration of the Donghae Bukbu Line (between Gangneung and Jejin), the only disconnected section of the Donghae Line, as a show of its commitment to connecting and modernizing the Trans-Korean Railway, and held a groundbreaking ceremony on January 5, 2022.

3) Tourism to Mount Geumgang and Gaeseong

Tourism to Mount Geumgang began on November 18, 1998, when the Geumgang set sail from Donghae Port in South Korea for Jangjeon Port in North Korea. Overland tours began in September 2003. Tourism to Mount Geumgang continued to grow, and in 2007, tourists were allowed into Naegeumgang as well. As of July 11, 2008, the aggregate number of tourists to Mount Geumgang stood at 1.93 million.

However, on July 11, 2008, a tragedy struck when a North Korean soldier shot and killed a South Korean tourist. The very next day,

all trips to Mount Geumgang were suspended. Thereafter, North Korea confiscated and froze South Korean assets in and around the Mount Geumgang area in 2010, enacted its own “Mount Geumgang International Tourism Special Zone Act” in 2011, and summarily expelled all South Korean staffs in the areas.

Meanwhile, tourism to Gaeseong began on December 5, 2007, after three pilot tours in 2005. The cumulative number of tourists reached 110,000 by November 28, 2008. However, North Korea unilaterally stopped all trips to Gaeseong on November 29, 2008.

In the years after all suspensions, the South Korean government has tried to resume tourism to North Korea. It hosted working-level talks in February 2010 and further government-level talks between South and North Korea in December 2015. Then, through the “Pyeongyang Joint Declaration” of September 2018, both parties agreed to resume operations at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and tourism to Mount Geumgang as soon as conditions are met.

Meanwhile, on October 25, 2019, North Korea demanded South Korea to remove all of its facilities built near Mount Geumgang. In response, the South Korean government proposed inter-Korean talks to find rational solutions to protecting the property rights of businesses involved with tourism to Mount Geumgang, while also proposing a plan for visits each to South and North Korea as a creative solution for the Mount Geumgang issue. While discussions were held between the two Koreas, on January 30, 2020, North Korea announced that it would stop all discussions due to COVID-19. Talks have yet to be resumed. North Korea has been unilaterally taking down facilities in the Mount Geumgang area built by South Korean stakeholders since



Mount Geumgang Tourism



Gaeseong Tourism

March 2022. The South Korean government has been demanding North Korea to stop infringing on its property rights and resolve the problem through dialogue. However, North Korea remains disengaged, and has continued demolishing South Korean assets.

4) Gaeseong Industrial Complex

The Gaeseong Industrial Complex project began in August 2000 when Hyundai Asan Co., Ltd. from South Korea signed a development agreement with the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee the North. However, in order to develop an industrial complex in North Korea, cooperation between the competent authorities on both sides was essential. Thus, the nature of the project evolved into a government-led initiative.

In November 2002, North Korea enacted the “Gaeseong Industrial Zone Act of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (hereafter referred to as the “Gaeseong Industrial Zone Act”), and continued to draft sub-regulations such as the “Gaeseong Industrial Zone Development Regulations.” The two Koreas also signed agreements on developing the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and pursuing economic

cooperation with regard to traffic, customs clearance, quarantine, communication, and investment guarantees. On June 30, 2003, a groundbreaking ceremony marked the first phase of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (factory zone: 3.3km²), and in October 2007, the first phase of infrastructure construction was completed.

With the legal, institutional, and material foundations now in place, companies willing to establish production bases within the Complex moved in, starting with the pilot zone inside the Complex in June 2004. In December 2004, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex produced its first batch of goods, and the success led to the first and second sales of factory lots in the main zone of the Complex in 2005 and 2007. As of February 2016, when the Gaeseong Industrial Complex was shut down, a total of 125 companies had moved into the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, of which 123 were still running their production lines. Most companies that had moved into the Gaeseong Industrial Complex were in labor-intensive industries such as textiles, shoes, machinery, metal works, electricity, and electronics. As of February



[Figure 2-2] Locational Advantages of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex

2016, the Complex had more than 55,000 North Korean employees and roughly 820 South Korean residing workers. Companies in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex recorded an annual output of USD 560 million in total, and the cumulative production value reached USD 3.23 billion since the opening of the Complex.

When the South Korean government filed a formal complaint against North Korea’s decision to engage in a long-range missile test in December 2012 and its third nuclear test in February 2013, North Korea blocked all access to and from the Gaeseong Industrial Complex at the end of March 2013, and cut off inter-Korean military communication. Then, on April 9, North Korea withdrew all North Korean workers from the Complex, halting production activities. South and North Korea adopted the “Agreement to Reopen the Gaeseong Industrial Complex” on August 14, and the Complex resumed production as of September 16.

[Table 2-5] Number of North Korean Workers at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex

Sort	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15
No. of workers (persons)	6,013	11,160	22,538	38,931	42,561	46,284	49,866	53,448	52,329	53,947	54,988

* Source: [Analysis of key annual statistics of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex], Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation, 2017, p. 21.

[Table 2-6] Gaeseong Industrial Complex Total Production Value

Sort	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	Total
Production (USD '0,000)	1,491	7,373	18,478	25,142	25,647	32,332	40,185	46,950	22,378	46,997	56,330	323,304

* Source: [Analysis of key annual statistics of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex], Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation, 2017, p. 35.



View of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex

Even so, North Korea did not stop its nuclear weapons and missile programs. On January 6 and February 7, 2016, it conducted its 4th nuclear test and another long-range missile test, respectively. To cope with the ongoing threat from North Korea, the South Korean National Security Council convened a Standing Committee meeting on February 10, and decided to suspend South Korean activities at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. This resulted in North Korea unilaterally expelling South Korean personnel on February 11.

The South Korean government offered its support to companies in the Complex that had suffered from the ordeal in order to minimize the damage and help them recover as quickly as possible. A fact-finding survey tallied the damage, and the economic cooperation insurance as well as trade insurance, both of which had been set up to mitigate the risk of investing in North Korea, were used to compensate affected companies. Also, officials from related agencies discussed possible means in terms of financial support, taxation, finding alternative production bases, procuring materials through the government, and creating a stable environment for workers to help corporations resume their regular business activities.

In September 2018, South and North Korean leaders agreed “as

conditions mature, to first normalize the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and the Mount Geumgang Tourism Project” (Article 2 Paragraph 2). However, since then, North Korea has continued to strain inter-Korean relations, demolishing the South-North Joint Liaison Office in Gaeseong (2020), and using South Korean production facilities in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex without permission.

5) Exchange and Cooperation in Social and Cultural Fields

Social and cultural exchanges began in 1985 when South and North Korean art troupes performed on the occasion of reunions for separated families.

In terms of broadcasting, the KBS Symphony Orchestra performed in Pyongyang (September 2002), KBS co-produced and aired the National Singing Contest in Pyongyang (August 2003), MBC reporters visited Pyongyang to produce and broadcast “Living Goguryeo” (June 2004), SBS and South Korean singer Cho Yong-pil hosted a concert in Pyongyang (August 2005), and KBS serial “Six Martyred Ministers” co-produced with the Korean Central Television network aired on television (2007).

In the field of academics and cultural assets, a joint academic debate on the return of cultural heritage plundered during the Japanese colonial rule was held in Pyongyang in February 2004. This debate helped create the “Inter-Korea Historian Association,” promoting exchanges on cultural assets, such as a joint fact-finding survey of ancient Goguryeo tombs in Pyongyang. Thereafter, in 2006, the “Agreement on Joint Excavation and Investigation of Historic Sites in



Traveling exhibit of relics from Manwoldae in Gaeseong (August 16–October 22, 2022; Daejeon)




Metal type excavated from Manwoldae in Gaeseong (2015)

Gaeseong” was adopted and the joint excavation project at Manwoldae in Gaeseong got under way as well. The excavation, however, stopped when inter-Korean relations took a turn for the worse in 2019. The inter-Korean joint excavation project, which started in 2007, worked on a number of building sites across eight rounds of excavation and discovered more than 17,900 artifacts. These artifacts went on display in Seoul and Gaeseong (October 2015) and during the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. From 2020 onwards, artifacts went on a domestic tour (two exhibits in 2020, four exhibits in 2021, and five exhibits in 2022), and a digital archive was created to list 120,000 out of the 600,000 artifacts and items discovered over the years. Moreover, the South Korean government is leading a digital restoration project to produce VR content using 3D data of the ruins of Manwoldae in Gaeseong, which served as a royal palace of Goryeo.

In addition, South and North Korea conducted joint research and excavation work (June 2006~April 2008) at the Lüshun Prison Cemetery in China for the “An Jung-geun Exhumation and Repatriation Project.” In April and June 2008, then in December 2009, historians



“Gyeoremal Keunsajeon” Inter-Korean Joint Compilation Conference (October 12–19, 2015; Mount Geumgang)



Dummy of the “Gyeoremal Keunsajeon” (total 10 volumes)

from the South and North co-hosted joint academic conferences in Gaeseong. To re-establish a common baseline between the two Koreas from a linguistic standpoint, the “Gyeoremal Keunsajeon (Grand Dictionary of the Korean People’s Language) Joint Compilation Project” was launched as well. The Gyeoremal Keunsajeon Committee convened a total of 25 inter-Korean joint compilation meetings since 2005, and as of the end of 2015, the South and North had co-selected more than 307,000 words for the grand dictionary. In 2021, with the Gyeoremal Keunsajeon Committee set to resume its meetings, a temporary binding of the “Gyeoremal Keunsajeon” was made to consolidate the achievements to date (approximately 17,000 pages, 10 volumes). Meanwhile, the Gyeoremal Keunsajeon Committee has been hosting its annual international academic forum since 2021 together with UNESCO to build a consensus over the need for the dictionary and secure support for the project both domestically and internationally.

In the field of religion, Yeongtongsa Temple of the Cheontae order in Gaeseong was restored in October 2005. Restoration works had

previously begun back in 2003. The restoration project of Singye Temple in Mount Geumgang, which had started in 2004 by the Jogye order of Korean Buddhism, also finished in October 2007 with an inauguration ceremony. In May 2007, the Korean Conference of Religions for Peace and the Korean Council of Religionists co-hosted an event in Pyongyang to celebrate a full decade of successful collaboration between the two organizations. Good Tidings and the Korean Christian Federation worked together to rebuild the Bongsu Church, and held a dedication service to celebrate the successful completion of the project in July 2008. In 2008, the National Council of Churches in Korea co-hosted the “2008 Inter-Korean Church Prayer Meeting for Peaceful unification” with North Korea’s Korean Christian Federation at Bongsu Church in Pyongyang. The Catholic Church also held a mass for peaceful unification when a delegation traveled to North Korea to inspect the restoration of the Jangchung Catholic Church in Pyongyang.

Meanwhile, religious exchanges, which had been suspended due to the May 24 measures, have gradually resumed by each religious sect since the second half of 2011. Accordingly, the joint Buddhist service between South and North Korea to pray for unification in commemoration of the 1,000th anniversary of the engraving of the Tripitaka Koreana by the Jogye Order (September 3~7, 2011), and a visit to North Korea by the co-chairs of the Korean Conference of Religions for Peace (September 21~24, 2011) were all part of a concerted effort to resume religious exchanges. In 2015, using the “August 25 Agreement” as an opportunity, the “Inter-Korean Religious People’s Council,” featuring members from both the South’s Korean

Conference of Religions for Peace and the North's Korean Council of Religionists, met at Mount Geumgang for a conference (November 9~10, 2015).

In sports, the South and North Korean football teams competed against each other in 1990 (Pyeongyang and Seoul), and the two Koreas participated in the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships and FIFA U20 World Cup as a unified team. North Korean athletes and cheering squad also participated in the 2002 Asian Games in Busan and the 2003 Daegu Universiade. Since the opening ceremony for the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games (2000), the two Koreas have participated in 12 international sporting events as "Team Korea" - opening and closing ceremonies of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, 2007 Changchun Asian Winter Games, 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games, 2018 Jakarta-Palembang Asian Games and Jakarta-Palembang Asian Para Games.

In March 2007, the North Korean youth football team traveled to Jeju Island for training, and the North Korean senior wrestling team joined the Asian Wrestling Championships and the Asian Judo Championships also held on Jeju Island in March and April 2008. Then, South and North Korean national football teams met in Seoul for the third and final rounds of the regional qualifiers for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. In September 2013, South Korean athletes participated in the Asian Cup and Interclub Weightlifting Championships in Pyongyang. North Korea participated in the Incheon Asian Games held from September 19 to October 4, 2014, and at the closing ceremony on October 4, high-ranking North Korean officials made a surprise visit, which led to further inter-Korean

dialogue. The North Korean team also participated in the Incheon Asian Para Games from October 18 to 24, 2014. From October 28 to 31, 2015, a civilian-led inter-Korean workers' football tournament to promote reconciliation, unity, peace, and unification was held in Pyeongyang.

Then, on April 6, 2017, a South-North women's ice hockey match was held at the Gangneung Hockey Center, and on April 7, an Asian Cup preliminary women's football match was held at the Kim Il-sung Stadium in Pyeongyang. The North Korean Taekwondo Demonstration Team participated in the World Taekwondo Championships held in Muju between June 24 and 30, 2017, to showcase North Korean Taekwondo techniques and routines across four different sessions.

At the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in February 2018, the two Koreas walked in together for the opening ceremony and formed a unified inter-Korean team for the first time at an international multi-sport event (women's ice hockey team). In July, South and North Korean national basketball teams played against each other at the Ryugyong Chung Ju-yung Gymnasium, Pyeongyang, and a unified team featuring athletes from the two Koreas participated in the 2018 Korea Open International Table Tennis Tournament in Daejeon as well. In August, a unified women's basketball team participated in the 2018 Jakarta-Palembang Asian Games. In April 2019, South and North Korean Taekwondo Demonstration Teams performed in Europe (Vienna, Lausanne, Geneva) together, then on October 15 of the same year, South and North Korean football teams met in Pyeongyang during the qualifying rounds for the 2022 Qatar FIFA World Cup. Also, the South Korean national weightlifting team participated in the 2019

Asian Youth and Junior Weightlifting Championships in Pyeongyang from October 19 to 27.

Thus, the two Koreas have a long and complex history when it comes to socio-cultural exchange and cooperation. At present, however, the exchange of any substance has ground to a halt due in large part to the strained inter-Korean relations and the ongoing threat of COVID-19.



South and North Korea walk in together for the Opening Ceremony of the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games (February 9, 2018)

6) Exchange and Cooperation in Forestry and Environment Fields

Recently, environmental issues are rising in importance across the globe. Given the geography of the Korean Peninsula, environmental problems in North Korea are more than likely to spill over into South Korea. The South Korean government has been dealing with North Korean environmental problems amid economic difficulties in North Korea. The goal is to help North Korea develop its economy in a more sustainable way, and establish a community that could lay the foundation for unification going forward.

According to the National Institute of Forest Science in 2018, 76% of North Korea's total land area, or 9.39 million hectares (1.5 times that of South Korea), is forest, of which 2.62 million hectares, or 28%, had reportedly suggested devastating damage. Deforestation in North

Korea is exacerbating social and economic damage, and deteriorating the quality of life for the North Korean people. Thus, restoration is an urgent priority. Accordingly, the government and private organizations have recently shown keen interest in North Korea's environmental problems, and have been seeking and promoting various ways to improve the issues they have identified. At the non-governmental level, beginning with a project to provide seeds and seedlings for the Forest of Peace in 1999, various NGOs have participated in projects for pest control and tree nurseries in North Korea.

At the first session of the South-North Joint Economic Commission in December 2007, the two sides pledged to cooperate in the areas of public health and environmental protection. The two sides also agreed to establish tree nurseries, reforest mountains, and implement pest control operations starting in 2008. On December 20~21 of 2008, the Subcommittee for Public Health and Environmental Protection convened in Gaeseong and reached an agreement across ten key initiatives, including three environmental initiatives (joint research on the volcanic activity of Baekdusan Mountain, joint cooperation to reduce damage from air pollution, a biosite project on the Korean Peninsula) and two forestry initiatives (building a test nursery, joint control of forest diseases and pest). Due to growing tension in South-North relations in 2008, however, the agreement fizzled out.

As an extension of these initiatives, continued efforts were made to implement reforestation projects, joint pest control initiatives, other collaborative projects on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and ecosystem conservation in the DMZ. The Lee Myung-bak administration set creating a "Green Korean Peninsula" one of its

priorities in 2010, and made a concerted effort to restore the devastated forests in North Korea. But yet again, these efforts hit a wall when the South Korean government enforced its May 4 Measures in response to North Korea's sinking of the Cheonan. Despite the setback, South Korea has continued to work on the environmental problems in the North with plans to transform the DMZ, which had been a symbol of painful division, into a landmark of the new Green Korean Peninsula. In 2011, North Korea proposed an inter-Korean expert meeting for joint research on Baekdusan Mountain and its volcanic activities. South Korea accepted the offer, and both sides met twice on March 29 and April 12. At the second meeting, they agreed to host an academic forum and field trip to Baekdusan Mountain. Unfortunately, the scheduled expert forum was canceled when North Korea failed to respond further to overtures sent by South Korea.

In May 2013, the Park Geun-hye administration proposed the DMZ World Peace Park concept to bring both Koreas and the international community together and develop the DMZ into a venue that blends the values of ecology, cooperation, and peace. During the Moon Jae-in administration, the South Korean government proposed a plan to register the DMZ as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, which then led to multiple fact-finding surveys.

Meanwhile, in 2018, inter-Korean sectoral meetings for forestry cooperation were held twice (July 4 and October 22), and given the importance of restoring forests in North Korea and forest pest control near the DMZ, plans were made to visit Mount Geumgang (August 8) and control forest diseases and pests together between the South and North (November 29). Officials and experts also visited tree

nurseries and forest equipment factories in Pyeongyang (December 11-13) for practical consultations on forestry works, but talks were later suspended due to the deteriorating inter-Korean relations.

7) Exchange and Cooperation Between Local Governments

Exchange initiatives with North Korea at the local government level began when Jeju Island sent mandarins to the North in 1999. Efforts have focused on humanitarian support such as relief supplies and health care supplies, forest pest control, and other socio-cultural cooperation projects, including sports. Local governments continue to promote inter-Korean exchange projects by enacting new municipal ordinances, raising funds, and forming dedicated organizations.

Since 2006, the government created the “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Working Council for Local Governments” to share information on inter-Korean exchanges between local governments and collate feedback and suggestions over the course of executing inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects. This Council worked to prevent any redundancy between local governments in efforts to promote exchange and cooperation by sharing information and coordinating exchange projects. It also worked to establish an efficient cooperative system between the central and local governments. In the meantime, exchanges between local governments have not been able to get off the ground due to the strained inter-Korean relations. Yet, they are prepared to resume activities when tensions ease between the South and North. Since September 2017, the South Korean Vice Minister of Unification has been hosting regular meetings for the “Inter-Korean

Exchange and Cooperation Policy Council for Local Governments” to share the future direction of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation among local governments, and to strengthen the communication between central and local governments.

In March 2021, the “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act” was amended to list local governments as the subject of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation in the law, and also the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Policy Council for Local Governments was elevated to a legal organization. With these legislative reforms aimed at facilitating exchange and cooperation, local governments have been able to identify potential projects across various fields that reflect each of their distinct regional characteristics, which could allow for mutually complementary development and cooperation with the North. More recently, the “Regulation on Handling Humanitarian Aid Projects and Cooperation Projects in North Korea” has been amended, and from September 14, 2021, 243 local governments across South Korea (17 metropolitan municipalities, 226 basic municipal governments) were collectively designated as potential operators that can support North Korea, and are now able to apply for the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund if necessary.

3

Resolving Inter-Korean Humanitarian Issues

1) Separated Families

The issue of separated families is a humanitarian issue that transcends political ideology and systems. Particularly, due to the natural


aging of separated families, the number of survivors is dwindling fast without their loved ones by their side. This makes the issue of separated families an urgent priority that needs solving in the near term.

Between 2000 and 2022, the two Koreas hosted a total of 21 reunions for separated families. Since 2005, considering the urgency of resolving the problems caused by the aging of separated families, video reunions have offered a more expedient alternative (seven video reunions). From 2000 to 2018, a total of 20,604 people from 4,290 families had in-person reunions and 3,748 people from 557 families were able to meet via video calls.

In March 2009, South Korea enacted the “Act On Confirmation Of The Life Or Death Of Inter-Korean Separated Families And Promotion Of Exchange” (Separated Families Act), and efforts are being made to establish an institutional foundation in anticipation of more exchanges between separated families. Pursuant to the “Separated Families Act,” plans to promote exchanges between separated families between South and North Korea are laid out and implemented every three years. A fact-finding survey of separated families between the two Koreas is commissioned every five years for all survivors among applicants for the “Finding Separated Families” program in order to gain more insight into the current situation and policy needs of separated families.


Furthermore, the South Korean government began DNA testing to store the genetic information of separated families in a dedicated database in 2014. This will help confirm family ties and lineage even after the passing of a separated family member. By 2022, 26,682 applicants were genetically tested, and test results were stored in a family genetic information database established in 2015.

[Table 2-7] Survivors of Separated Families by Age Registered in the “Integrated Information System for Separated Families” (As of December 2022)



Sort	90~	80~89	70~79	60~69	~59	Total
No. of people (persons)	12,132	15,817	8,186	3,951	2,538	42,624
Share (%)	28.5	37.1	19.2	9.3	6.0	100

* Source: Ministry of Unification official website



[Figure 2-3] Official Reunions for Separated Families (In-Person and Video Reunions)

* Source: Ministry of Unification official website

Meanwhile, the government produced a total of 25,078 video letters from 2005 to 2022 to preserve records of aged separated families to prepare for future inter-Korean exchanges. These video letters are currently stored in the “Integrated Information System for Separated Families,” and video letters that the parties have agreed to disclose on the Internet are listed on the official “Finding Separated Families” website.

Along with exchanges at the government level, South Korea has made efforts to promote exchanges between separated families at the civilian level as well, including efforts to confirm the health and well-being of separated families via third countries. Since 1998, the “Guidelines on the Financial Support for Separated Families Exchanges” were established to help lay the groundwork for financially supporting the exchanges between separated families at the civilian level. Since then, the South Korean government has revised the guidelines four times (as of 2017) to help promote private exchanges. Currently, separated families can apply for up to KRW 3 million in expenses to confirm the health and well-being of family members, up to KRW 6 million for family reunions, and up to KRW 800,000 for the continued exchange of letters.

The South Korean government has also been consistently promoting projects to provide comfort for separated families, and build a consensus on the issue of separated families. In particular, since 2008, the government has been hosting an invitational conference every year to explain its policies on separated families and alleviate the pain of separation for elderly members of separated families residing in Korea.

In 2020 and 2021, due to COVID-19, a special KBS Open Concert



Mount Geumgang Reunion Center for separated families



Video letter to separated families

program for separated families commemorating the 20th anniversary of the first official reunion event was produced and broadcast on television. “Untact” programs also got under way, including online videos showing the home towns and villages of separated families and online/offline photo exhibitions featuring pictures of various North Korean cities. In 2022, in-person invitational events were resumed, and separated families from four regions, including Seoul and Daejeon, were invited to hear what policies the South Korean government has prepared and offer their feedback.

2) Prisoners of war and abductees

UN forces and communist forces that fought in the Korean War exchanged prisoners of war (POW) on three occasions from April 1953 to January 1954, before and after the signing of the Armistice Agreement. At the time, the UN forces estimated the number of South Korean soldiers missing in action at more than 82,000. Unfortunately, only 8,343 South Korean prisoners of war made their way back from captivity. It is estimated that a large contingent of the missing South

Korean soldiers were forcibly detained in North Korea without getting a chance to return. Since the return of Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho in October 1994, a total of 80 POWs have escaped from North Korea, and the Ministry of National Defense estimates that more than 500 POWs are still alive as of the end of 2015 based on the depositions made by returning POWs and North Korean defectors.

Abductees are largely divided into those abducted during the Korean War (wartime abductees) and those abducted after the Armistice Agreement (post-war abductees). The number of wartime abductees varies greatly depending on the time and subject of investigation. According to the “Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea” in 1952, when the entire list was discovered, the number reached 82,959. In addition, the “Committee for Truth Investigation of Abductees in the Korean War and Restoration of Honor of Abductees,” which reported directly to the office of the Prime Minister of South Korea (2010-2016), reviewed 5,505 abduction cases and reported over a 5-year period from 2011 to 2015, and determined the total number of wartime abductees at 4,777. Meanwhile, a total of 3,835 persons were abducted after the Armistice Agreement of which 3,310 (87%) were repatriated within one year, and nine returned voluntarily, bringing the total number of returnees to 3,319. As of December 2021, it is estimated that 516 abductees still remain detained in North Korea.

The South Korean government understands that resolving humanitarian issues brought on by the division of South and North Korea is a fundamental responsibility of the state, which is why it continues to work on bringing POWs and abductees back home safely. To that end, the Red Cross plays an important role. Whenever Red

Cross talks are held, South Korea makes it clear to North Korea that POW and abductee issues need solving quickly as a priority. Reunion events for separated families are also used as an opportunity to check up on the health and well-being of POWs as well as abductees. So far, the South Korean government has confirmed the status of 133 POWs and abductees through these reunion events, which then led to the reunion of 60 more families.

As for things that can be done internally without input from North Korea, the South Korean government continues to do independently. In accordance with the “Act on Compensation and Support for Abductees since the Conclusion of the Military Armistice Agreement,” which came into effect on October 28, 2007, the “Deliberation Committee to Compensate and Support Abductees” was established. The Deliberation Committee has hosted 55 plenary meetings as of December 2022, and paid KRW 15.245 billion, including damage compensation, to abductees.

The South Korean government established the “National Memorial for Abductees during the Korean War” in Imjingak, Paju, Gyeonggi-

[Table 2-8] Post-War Abductees (Estimate)

Sort	Crew	Hijacking of Korean Air flight	Armed Forces, Police	Other		Total
				Domestic	Overseas	
Abductees	3,729	50	30	6	20	3,835
Returnees	Repatriation	3,263	39	-	8	3,310
	Escape, return	9	-	-	-	9
non-returnee	457	11	30	6	12	516

* Source: “2021 Unification White Paper,” Ministry of Unification, 2021, p. 117.

do in November 2017 as part of a project to celebrate the honor and patriotism of Korean War abductees. The “National Memorial for Abductees during the Korean War” has welcomed a total of 159,000 visitors in five years since its opening. It has helped share the truth on North Korean abductions and offer a chance to ponder the true value of a peaceful unification with various special exhibits, by purchasing historical artifacts, and publishing brochures. In addition, a variety of “untact” programs, including an online VR exhibition hall and online educational videos, were developed and promoted when access to the Memorial was limited due to COVID-19.

The government is also continuing its efforts to secure the release and repatriation of South Koreans detained in North Korea. The issue of detainees was put on the agenda for the Inter-Korean Summit in Panmunjeom on April 27, 2018. North Korea responded to overtures at a high-level meeting on June 1, 2018, saying, “Relevant agencies are reviewing it.” However, no progress has been made in terms of follow-up measures. In October 2022, the Minister of Unification met with family members of detainees for the first time to express the government’s commitment to bringing detainees in North Korea home. The South Korean government is also employing diplomatic strategies, including its cooperation with international organizations and other related countries. The UN resolution on human rights in North Korea reflected the issue of abductees and detainees in North Korea. At the Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit held in November 2022, the U.S. and Japan declared their support for the immediate release of South Korean nationals detained in North Korea.

3) Humanitarian Aid to North Korea

In order to improve the poor humanitarian situation of the North Korean people, the South Korean government has maintained that humanitarian aid is a wholly independent issue, regardless of the prevailing political calculus. Accordingly, humanitarian aid has enjoyed a nice run since 1995, which was when the South Korean government launched a food aid program for North Korea.

To date, South Korea's aid to North Korea has continued at both the government level (in the form of support from competent authorities, funding to civilian organizations, support through international organizations, food loans, etc.) and the private level (see [Table 2-9]).


A total of 255,000 tons of rice was sent free of charge, including 150,000 tons of rice produced domestically (Korea) in 1995, followed by 100,000 tons in 2006, and 5,000 tons in 2010. In 2000, 300,000 tons of rice from Thailand and 200,000 tons of corn from China were sent to North in the form of food loans. South Korea followed this up with another 2.4 million tons of rice and 200,000 tons of corn in food loans again all the way up to 2007 (see [Table 2-10]).

Fertilizer aid to North Korea started with the provision of 155,000 tons of fertilizers in 1999. Thereafter, the South Korean government sent anywhere between 200,000 and 300,000 tons of fertilizer every year until 2007 (total of 2,555,000 tons) (see [Table 2-11]).

Since 2000, the South has made contributions to the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for humanitarian aid to North Korea via civilian organizations. The Fund has extended its support to a variety of projects, including individual projects where funds are offered in

proportion to the civilian organization's own financial resources, joint projects promoted by two or more civilian organizations in the same field such as agriculture or health care, and policy projects for

[Table 2-9] Humanitarian Aid to North Korea by Administration



Administration	Kim Young-sam	Kim Dae-jung	Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Myung-bak	Park Geun-hye	Moon Jae-in	Yoon Suk-yeol	Total
Incl. government-level *food loans	1,854	5,366	12,570	183	-	12	-	19,986
Support through private organizations	-	161	696	300	24	11	4	1,196
Support through international organizations, etc.	264	626	960	503	391	225	-	2,969
Civilian-level	196	2,406	4,609	1,507	252	305	1	9,277
Total	2,314	8,558	18,835	2,494	667	553	5	33,426

* Source: Ministry of Unification (as of December 2022)

* Total support offered by the Yoon Suk Yeol administration (after May 10, 2022) is not yet complete, subject to change upon further review.

which the government bears all of the financial expenses given the significance or importance of the project. In 2007, the government and the civilian sector jointly planned a project to support North Korean infants and children, and provided a total of KRW 10.5 billion to five consortiums formed by South Korean civilian organizations, such as JTS Korea and Okedongmu Children.

Funding for civilian organizations was discontinued after the May 24 Measures in 2010, but resumed in 2014. In 2014, civilian projects involving health clinics and greenhouse/dairy farming earned support from the Fund, whereas in 2015, projects supporting the disabled and forest environment received its support. On September 24, 2021, the

[Table 2-10] Food Aid to North Korea

Total 2,855,000 tons			
Year	Volume	Value	Sort
1995	Rice, 150,000 tons (domestic)	KRW 185.4 billion	Free
2000	Rice, 300,000 tons (imported); Corn, 200,000 tons (China)	KRW 105.7 billion	Loan
2002	Rice, 400,000 tons (domestic)	KRW 151.0 billion	Loan
2003	Rice, 400,000 tons (domestic)	KRW 151.0 billion	Loan
2004	Rice, 100,000 tons (domestic); Rice, 200,000 tons (imported)	KRW 135.9 billion	Loan
2005	Rice, 400,000 tons (domestic); Rice, 100,000 tons (imported)	KRW 178.7 billion	Loan
2006	Rice, 100,000 tons (domestic)	KRW 39.4 billion	Free
2007	Rice, 150,000 tons (domestic); Rice, 250,000 tons (imported)	KRW 150.5 billion	Loan
2010	Rice, 5,000 tons (domestic)	KRW 4.0 billion	Free
Total	Rice, 2,655,000 tons (domestic, imported); Corn, 200,000 tons (China)	KRW 1.1016 trillion	Free, KRW 228.8 billion Loan, KRW 872.8 billion

* Source: Ministry of Unification



Fertilizer Support to North Korea


322nd “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Council” decided to offer a total of KRW 10 billion from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for a new “North Korea Nutrition and Health Cooperation Project.”

The project spent up to KRW 500 million from the Fund per project on organizations that met its requirements and promoted better nutrition and health in North Korea. The South Korean government is has been trying to improve the humanitarian situation of North Koreans who are struggling amid the ongoing crisis brought on by COVID-19 with financial aid directed toward private organizations armed with the capacity and commitment to help those suffering in the North. Although the project was scheduled to end on June 30, 2022, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration extended its deadline to December 10.

The South Korean government has been promoting humanitarian aid to North Korea in cooperation with major UN organizations such as the WFP, UNICEF, and WHO. From 1996 to December 2021, a total of KRW 296.9 billion from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund was provided to aid projects to North Korea through some of these international organizations.

Between 1996 and 2007, South Korea sent food aid eight times via the WFP to improve the dire food situation in North Korea. North Korea has received food aid in the form of super cereals and biscuits produced specifically for infants and pregnant women in North

[Table 2-11] Fertilizer support



Year	Volume	Value
1999	115,000 tons (civilian-level 40,000 tons)	KRW 33.9 billion (KRW 46.2 billion including 40,000 tons from civilian sector)
2000		KRW 94.4 billion
2001		KRW 63.8 billion
2002	300,000 tons	KRW 83.2 billion
2003	300,000 tons	KRW 81.1 billion
2004	300,000 tons	KRW 94.0 billion
2005	350,000 tons	KRW 1.207 trillion
2006	350,000 tons	KRW 1.200 trillion
2007	300,000 tons	KRW 96.1 billion
Total	2.515 million tons (2.555 million tons including 40,000 tons from civilian sector)	KRW 7.872 trillion (KRW 7.995 trillion including 40,000 tons from civilian sector)

* Source: Ministry of Unification

Korea. USD 7 million worth of fortified foods was sent North in 2014, followed by USD 2.1 million worth of super cereals and biscuits in 2015, USD 4.5 million worth in 2019, and USD 10 million worth in August 2020. A UNICEF initiative offering vaccines and medicines

for newborns to reduce the mortality rate of North Korean children started with USD 1 million in funding back in 1996. By 2013, the initiative had spent USD 32.64 million in total for such medical supplies. In 2015 and 2019, USD 4 million and USD 3.5 million were spent, respectively on the initiative as well. In addition to preventing malaria and treating diseases such as measles, the WHO has helped improve North Korea's health care system and train medical personnel for infants and pregnant women. From 1997 to 2019, it received USD 66.28 million from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.

Meanwhile, the South Korean government has tried to promote humanitarian aid to North Korea through local and municipal governments in the South. In September 2021, the “Rules on Humanitarian Assistance and Cooperation Programs for North Korea” (promulgated by the Ministry of Unification) was amended to authorize all metropolitan and basic local governments as aid operators to North Korea, and also an institutional system was established for local governments to carry out their own humanitarian aid projects in the North.

In December 2007, the Inter-Korean Subcommittee on Health, Medical and Environmental Protection and Cooperation agreed to modernize provincial-level hospitals in North Korea. Then, on November 7, 2018, the Inter-Korean Subcommittee on Health and Medical Cooperation agreed to exchange infectious disease data (pilot basis) and establish a response system against infectious diseases. The subcommittee also built a consensus on technical cooperation, cooperation in the diagnosis and preventive treatment of infectious diseases, cooperation in mid- to long-term quarantine and health

care, and it adopted the “Joint Press Release for the Inter-Korean Subcommittee on Health and Medical Cooperation Meeting.” On December 12, 2018, a working-level meeting on health and medicine was held to exchange influenza information on a trial basis, and discussed future plans to further exchange data on infectious diseases.

When North Korea reported its first cases of COVID-19 in May 2022, the South Korean government proposed to offer vaccines, medicines, face masks, diagnostic tools, and health experts to prevent COVID-19 together with North Korea. North Korea, however, remains unresponsive. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration also included a longer-term agenda for inter-Korean health and medical cooperation, including the modernization of hospitals and medical infrastructure in North Korea, as part of its “Audacious Initiative.”

4) Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors

The South Korean government wants to create a foundation to expand the support system available for North Korean defectors. To this end, the government is exploring new ways to improve the quality of employment opportunities and living standards of North Korean defectors. Thus, it is building a stronger social safety net to make sure defectors can settle down and settle in better in their new lives.

As of December 31, 2022, a total of 33,882 North Korean defectors have come to South Korea. The number of North Korean defectors continued to grow since the 2000s, reaching 2,000 to 3,000 per year between 2006 and 2011. From 2012 to 2019, however, the number of defectors from the North slowly started dropping to just 1,300 or

so per year. The drop-off has been even steeper in recent years. North Korean defectors entering South Korea have gone from 229 in 2020, 63 in 2021, and 67 in 2022 (as of the end of December 2022). This seems to be due to tighter border control and stronger movement restrictions in third countries brought on by the pandemic. Defectors flee the North for a variety of reasons : economic hardships, grievances with the system and reality, or a desire for better living conditions.

The support process for North Korean defectors can be largely divided into three steps: supporting them during their initial entry, caring them at settlement support centers, and supporting their relocation and adaptation to new places of residence. When North Korean defectors abroad express their desire to come to South Korea, South Korean diplomatic missions stationed in that particular country deploy means to safeguard the defectors, support their entry into South Korea, and carry out negotiations on behalf of the defectors with their current country of transit.


Once North Korean defectors enter South Korea, they get the support they need to get back on their feet, including education and training that can help them adapt to their new environment, subsidies to help them settle down in South Korea, and agency services to find a place of residence. Social education and training programs are designed to help North Korean defectors acquire the basic knowledge they need to adapt to South Korean society and life. The “Settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugees” (opened in July 1999, hereinafter “Hanawon”), a resettlement support facility, offers intensive and organized training over a 12-week period. Programs available at Hanawon feature courses on improving emotional stability and health,

career guidance and vocational training, understanding South Korean society, and systems to help defectors settle into their new lives. The South Korean government also offers basic settlement benefits, financial incentives, and housing subsidies so that those who find a place to stay upon completing their adjustment training at Hanawon become more self-sufficient and self-reliant.

In 2009, new Hana Centers were created to provide personalized support services, including intensive education on employment, learning, medical care, and living in South Korea, for defectors who have just completed their Hanawon training and are ready to move into their new residence. After some initial pilot testing across six regions in 2009, 30 Hana Centers opened in 16 cities and provinces nationwide the following year. As of the end of December 2022, 25 Hana Centers remain in operation.

In order to improve the quality of life of North Korean defectors and to help them truly set their roots down, better organized support

[Table 2-12] Number of North Korean Defectors Entering South Korea




Sort	'98	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	'22	Total
Male	831	565	510	474	626	424	515	573	608	662	591	795	404	369	305	251	302	188	168	202	72	40	35	9,510
Female	116	478	632	811	1,272	960	1,513	1,981	2,195	2,252	1,811	1,911	1,098	1,145	1,092	1,024	1,116	939	969	845	157	23	32	24,372
Total	947	1,043	1,142	1,285	1,898	1,384	2,028	2,554	2,803	2,914	2,402	2,706	1,502	1,514	1,397	1,275	1,418	1,127	1,137	1,047	229	63	67	33,882

* Source: Ministry of Unification (as of December 2022)

from local governments is a must. Accordingly, efforts are being made to improve the settlement support system available for defectors with closer collaboration between the central and local governments.

In 1997, the government enacted the “North Korean Defectors Protection And Settlement Support Act” to help North Korean defectors become part of the South Korean society. Currently, 20 government ministries and three local governments are working together on major policies for North Korean defectors through the “North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Council” (formerly, the “North Korean Refugees Countermeasure Council”). Every three years, the Council establishes its “Master Plan for Supporting the Settlement of North Korean Refugees,” accompanied by an annual implementation plan based on the Master Plan. In 2021, the Council announced the “3rd Master Plan for Supporting the Settlement of North Korean Refugees (2021~2023),” and a detailed implementation plan was established accordingly to improve the quality of life of North Korean defectors

[Table 2-13] Changes to North Korean Defector Policies



and to create an inclusive environment in South Korean society.

North Korean defectors who have set foot in South Korean society receive support in the form of vocational training, potential employment opportunities, and further education possibilities. The

[Table 2-14] Resettlement System for North Korean Defectors in South Korea

	<p>Request for Protection and Transfer to South Korea</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · North Korean defectors residing abroad apply for protection to South Korean diplomatic missions abroad · Defectors are protected inside local South Korean diplomatic missions or facilities · Local South Korean diplomats negotiate the transit of defectors to South Korea
<p>Entry into South Korea</p>	<p>Investigation and Interim Protective Measures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Once North Korean defectors arrive in South Korea, the National Intelligence Service uses temporary protection measures, including investigations to determine whether the defectors indeed require protection or medical treatment · If the defectors pass the investigation stage, they are admitted to Hanawon to get the education and training they need to live in South Korea <p>Protection Decision</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Decisions on whether to protect defectors are made on a household by household basis based on deliberations made by the "North Korean Defectors Protection and Settlement Support Council." <p>Settlement Training at Hanawon</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Social education and training (12 weeks, 400 hours) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - On mental stability, understanding South Korean society, career guidance counseling, basic vocational training · Initial resettlement support: Establishing family dynamics, housing arrangements, settlement subsidies, etc.
<p>Relocation</p>	<p>Residential Protection (5 years)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Transfer into the local social safety net (livelihood and medical benefits) · Employment support: free vocational training, recognition of qualifications, new bank accounts, etc. · Education support: Special transfer into schools and tuition support · Designated protection officer: Monitors places of residence, employment status, personal safety and well being <p>Private Sector Engagement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Comprehensive services through the North Korean Refugees Foundation · Designation and operation of local Hana Centers (25 nationwide) · "Helper" system: Partnerships with civilian volunteers · Professional counselors for North Korean defectors (up to 86 counselors available) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - On-site counseling services, including general counseling and grievance counseling

South Korean government offers short-term intensive vocational training by job type to make sure North Korean defectors can find viable workplaces as soon as they finish their training. Meanwhile, in order to encourage the employment of North Korean defectors, as of December 2022, the South Korean government has appointed “employment protection officers” at 70 employment support centers across the country to provide career guidance, useful tips on vocational training, employment counseling, and job placement services. North Korean defectors who participate in vocational training are also eligible for tuition support and training allowances. Furthermore, to encourage the long-term employment of North Korean defectors, employment incentives are extended to those who keep their jobs for at least six months.

In order to respond to the growing demand for defector policies, the Korea Hana Foundation was created on September 27, 2010. The Foundation is a civilian organization that offers various services that North Korean defectors need to settle down in South Korean society after completing their Hanawon program.

Since 2010, the Foundation has helped create new social enterprises, startups, and farms in order to create jobs tailored to North Korean defectors. The Foundation refers North Korean defectors to government agencies, public institutions, and other leading private corporations through one-on-one job counseling services by professional counselors assigned to the Hana Center.

In May 2015, the government established the “Future Happiness Bank Account” backed by commercial financial institutions to help North Korean defectors in building up larger asset bases. These Future

Happiness Bank Accounts are available for North Korean defectors who have entered Korea after November 29, 2014, and have been deemed eligible for protection in South Korea. The South Korean government matches deposits made by North Korean defectors. Defectors can deposit up to 30% of their income (KRW 100,000~500,000) in their Future Happiness Bank Account. In particular, both the “Enforcement Degree of the North Korean Refugees Protection And Settlement Support Act” and “Guidelines for the Future Happiness Bank Book” have been amended to improve the system. Since February 2022, the system is now available for income earners as well as business income earners, etc. The South Korean government continues to improve the system to help North Korean defectors become self-sufficient. Thanks to recent amendments, defectors can extend the maturity of their Future Happiness Bank Accounts on the grounds of not only childbirth and military service, but for disabilities and academic studies as well.

Efforts are also being made to foster an environment in South Korean society that embraces North Korean defectors, and to promote practical policies that meet their needs in real-life. In May 2020, the Ministry of Unification opened the Inter-Korean Cultural Integration Center, and various programs are being developed at the Ministry to expand the scope of communication and exchange as well as understanding between North Korean defectors and the general public in South Korea. Furthermore, its endeavors to improve the quality of life of North Korean defectors through job and education policies tailored to their needs, and to improve the resettlement support system by strengthening cooperation between the central government agencies, local governments, and the private sector. In order to address blind

spots in the available support services, it is also carrying out surveys on vulnerable individuals on a regular basis. If survey results find an individual in distress, assistance is provided promptly to avert crises.

5) Human Rights in North Korea

Current State of Human Rights in North Korea

The human rights of North Koreans emerged as a major point of interest in the international community in the mid-1990s, when the horrendous conditions in the North became widely known around the world after mass starvation from severe famine and food shortage. Since then, United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and other NGOs focusing on international human rights have made concerted efforts to improve the miserable situation in North Korea. In South Korea, the issue of human rights in North Korea has emerged as an important talking point as well.

In the meantime, North Korea, along with China, has focused on highlighting its extraordinary situation and cultural relativism rather than acknowledging that human rights is a universal value to respect. As for the international community's demand for improvements to human rights, the North Korean government has justified its own concept of human rights. It champions the sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, all the while undermining calls for human rights in North Korea a “political plot to overthrow the North Korean regime” and a “hostile policy toward North Korea.” At times, however, it does respond to the demands of the international community. Some laws such as the Constitution and criminal law were

amended, laws and systems related to the human rights of vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the disabled were improved, and while some parts of its health and education sectors saw upgrades at the policy level.

Unfortunately, North Korea remains strongly opposed to UN resolutions and the activities of the Special Rapporteur on human rights. It has, however, responded somewhat better to activities led by specific treaties or regular reviews on universal human rights. Currently, North Korea is a signatory to a total of six international human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and Conventions on the Rights of the Children, Women, and Disabled Persons.

However, the human rights situation in North Korea still remains grave. Fundamental freedoms such as ideology, religion, conscience, expression, etc., as well as freedom of relocation, movement, and occupation are not protected. Many cases of illegal arrests, imprisonment, torture and forced labor, as well as some public executions, remain under investigation. In addition, in the field of social rights, such as the ration system and free medical treatment, the gap between the system that North Korea claims and what the reality is continues to widen.

In particular, North Korea has long been subject to economic sanctions from the international community for its nuclear and missile programs. Due to the aftermath of these sanctions against North Korea, recent border control due to COVID-19, and frequent natural disasters, the more vulnerable parts of its society, including the elderly, infants, and the disabled, face even more severe difficulties.

[Table 2-15] North Korea’s Accession to International Human Rights Treaties

Treaty	Status	Accession/ Ratification Date	Enforcement Date	Deferment
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)	Signed	September 14, 1981	December 14, 1981	
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)	Signed	September 14, 1981	December 14, 1981	
Convention on the Rights of the Child	Ratified	September 21, 1990	October 21, 1990	
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography	Signed	November 10, 2014	December 10, 2014	
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women	Signed	February 27, 2001	March 29, 2001	Article 29 Paragraph 1
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	Ratified	December 6, 2016	January 15, 2017	

What North Korea is extremely concerned about are changes in the lives and perceptions of North Koreans due to the recent influx of cultural content from overseas. In 2020, the “DPRK Law on Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection” was enacted, greatly tightening the control over public access to external information. This Law is an anti-human rights law that clearly violates the essential concept of freedom of thought and expression.

Efforts by the International Community to Improve Human Rights in North Korea

Over the past few decades, the international community, led by the UN, has made sustained diverse efforts to improve human rights in North Korea. The UN Human Rights Commission (currently, the Human Rights Council) adopted a resolution on North Korean

human rights for the first time in 2003, and from 2005 and onwards, a steady stream of resolutions on North Korean human rights have been adopted at the both UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. The UN Human Rights Commission introduced the Special Rapporteur system tasked with supervising North Korean human rights through the resolution at its 60th meeting in 2004. The UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights reports to the UN every year with facts on the human rights situation in North Korea, and makes recommendations to the UN system and related countries based on its findings.

In March 2013, the UN Human Rights Council decided to establish the Commission of Inquiry (COI) on human rights in North Korea. The UN COI chaired by Michael Kirby from Australia, conducted through investigation for an entire year and submitted the “UN COI Report” to the UN General Assembly in February 2014. The Report stated, “UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea found that the government committed gross, systematic, and widespread rights abuses. In many cases, human rights violations amount to crimes against humanity based on the policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”⁷ The Report recommended that the UN Security Council bring the North Korean human rights issue to the International Criminal Court. The activities of the UN COI marked a turning point that reminded the international community of the horrible state of human rights violations

7 “V. Conclusions and recommendations. ... 80. Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its institutions and officials.” Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 2014. 2.7, p.15.

in North Korea.

Later, in March 2015, the UN Human Rights Council decided to create a field office for systematic investigation and accountability of the North Korean human rights situation with another resolution. This led to the opening of the new UN Seoul Office on North Korean Human Rights on June 23, 2015. The Office carries out missions to ensure accountability by monitoring and documenting the human rights situation in North Korea, by strengthening its cooperation with relevant government agencies, civil society, and other stakeholders, and by raising international awareness of North Korean human rights issues.

Through a resolution in March 2016, the UN Human Rights Council appointed two independent experts by decree of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. These two experts were mandated with the mission to investigate human rights violations in North Korea, especially focusing on accountability for human rights violations that the COI on Human Rights in North Korea deemed crimes against humanity. The Group of Independent Experts on Accountability (GIE) submitted a report to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2017, with various accountability measures, including proposals for a new central evidence repository to preserve information and evidence related to the human rights situation in North Korea, strategies on evaluating evidence and prosecuting crimes by experts on international criminal law, and bringing North Korean human rights violations to the International Criminal Court and setting up an ad hoc court.

In addition to these efforts by the international community, interest in North Korean human rights issues and policy efforts have continued at the individual country level too. The U.S. enacted the North Korean

Human Rights Act of 2004 to stimulate and institutionalize public discussion on the international stage for North Korean human rights issues. The Act stipulates the flow of information into North Korea, the appointment of special envoys for North Korean human rights, protection of North Korean defectors, and humanitarian aid to North Koreans. It is, however, a temporary legislation extended every five years. To date, the Act has been extended with bipartisan support three times. The U.S. is pushing for stronger international cooperation to improve human rights in North Korea, including a recent decision to appoint a new special envoy for North Korean human rights, which had remained vacant for the past six years, in January 2023. In 2006, Japan enacted the “Act on Handling of Abduction Issues and Other Human Right Issues Related to North Korean Authorities,” focusing on the issue of Japanese abductees. Japan also plays a certain role in raising the North Korean human rights issue in the international community, such as being involved in the drafting of the UN resolution on human rights in North Korea.

The EU mandates that human rights issues are taken into account in its external relations, and has adopted the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues since 2000. Regarding the issue of human rights in North Korea, the EU has been leading the adoption of resolutions as penholder, such as drafting and submitting drafts of UN resolutions on human rights in North Korea, and intervenes actively to improve human rights in North Korea, promote human rights dialogue with North Korea, and provide humanitarian aid. Dialogue on politics and human rights between the EU and North Korea has gotten under way six times since 1998. Talks were suspended in 2004 when North Korea

protested against the UN resolutions on North Korean human rights submitted by the EU.

Efforts by the South Korean Government to Improve Human Rights in North Korea

It was not until the Kim Young-sam administration that the South Korean government took more interest in North Korean human rights issues from a policy standpoint. On September 28, 1995, in a speech at the United Nations General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea urged, “North Koreans should enjoy universal human rights, which everyone has the right to enjoy as Koreans. The North Korean authorities shall respond to the international community’s call for human rights protection through reform and opening.” This was the first-ever instance after the Korean War, the human rights issue in North Korea was brought up in an official capacity on the international stage.


Domestically, in North Korea, after the great famine in the mid-to-late 1990s, the number of defectors coming to South Korea skyrocketed. Once North Korean defectors arrived safely in South Korea, they testified against the horrors of human rights violations in North Korea. As for the Ministry of Unification, in May 1999, during the Kim Dae-jung administration, the North Korean Human Rights Environment Team was established within the Office of Humanitarian Affairs. The Team was given the task of monitoring North Korean human rights. This was a sign the South Korean government had taken an earnest interest in dealing with North Korean human rights policies.

At the National Assembly level, since the first North Korean Human

Rights Act was proposed in 2005, various discussions on improving North Korean human rights got under way at the institutional level by members of the ruling and opposition parties as well. Then, in March 2016, after 11 years, the North Korean Human Rights Act was enacted (236 present, 212 in favor, 0 against, and 24 abstentions) by the National Assembly. According to the Act, on September 28, 2016, the North Korea Human Rights Record Center was created under the Ministry of Unification, and was commissioned to conduct investigations and record of the human rights situation in North Korea. However, as for the North Korean Human Rights Foundation, an institution stipulated in the North Korean Human Rights Act, it has not yet been launched due to delays in recommending directors by the liberal camp at the National Assembly despite the fact that six years have passed since the law was enacted.

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration, which took office in May 2022, has presented freedom, human rights, and solidarity as the core values of its state administration, and has been promoting North Korean human rights issues as the top priority of its North Korea policy, which includes launching the North Korean Human Rights Foundation. Thereafter, on July 19, 2022, a new Ambassador for International Cooperation on North Korean Human Rights, which had been vacant for the past five years, was appointed, and South Korea resumed its activities as a co-sponsor of the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on human rights in North Korea. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration has adopted the human rights improvement strategy at the UN and the international community centered on accountability and engagement, and continues its efforts to widely and accurately inform

the international community of the reality of human rights in North Korea. To improve human rights in North Korea, the South Korean government will continue its cooperation with the international community as well as civil societies both at home and abroad. By doing so, it hopes to generate a change in North Korea's attitude toward human rights issues and promote better human rights in North Korea with stronger cooperation. The South Korean government also hopes to respect the various views on North Korean human rights issues, and plans to redouble its efforts to raise awareness and form a stronger solidarity on protecting human rights in North Korea.





International Order and Environment for Unification of the Korean Peninsula

Section 1. Overview of International Affairs and the Situation in Northeast Asia

Section 2. Neighboring Countries' Korean Peninsula Policy

Section 3. International Cooperation for Korean Unification

Section 1

Overview of International Affairs and the Situation in Northeast Asia

1 Overview of the International Situation

In 2022, new trends have emerged, including an increase in the volatility of the international order, the return of geopolitics and the role of national identity, intense global competition between national development models, the reshaping of global supply chains, and a massive decoupling caused by the pandemic.

Firstly, there is an increasing possibility that the U.S.-led international order will see some drastic changes for the first time since the end of the Cold War. With emerging powers such as China and India achieving remarkable economic growth and narrowing their gaps with the U.S., fundamental change in the international order appears to be a distinct possibility. In particular, China is intent on strengthening its military might based on its vast economic capabilities, and is actively promoting a new world order with China at the helm by promoting its

own economic model to developing countries around the world.

In response, the U.S. is reinforcing its ties with allies and friends, promoting the virtues of democracy, while keeping China in check. However, the competition between the U.S. and China is going in a direction that blends conflict and cooperation in accordance with prevailing national interests. Both sides seem rather unwilling to dig their heels into a position firmly rooted in ideology, like the U.S. and Soviet Union did during the Cold War.

Secondly, geopolitical factors¹ and national identity² are gradually exerting their influence on how countries act and behave as they shape a new global order. For example, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was both an extension of the geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West, including the U.S., and a confrontation on the identity each country is aiming for. The Taiwan issue, which is emerging as a core issue in Northeast Asian geopolitics, is also in sharp conflict with the geopolitical interests of China, and all neighboring powers led by the U.S. are playing an active part in the confrontation. Türkiye and India are also trying to form a sphere of influence centered on their own countries, and Japan is trying to restore its full military powers by amending the pacifist constitution that it has maintained since its defeat in World War II.

1 A geopolitical phenomenon means that the policies promoted by major powers such as the U.S. and China are distinctly geopolitical in character. The policies of these countries show the characteristics of being based on geopolitical logic, such as territorial expansion, control and security of maritime transportation routes, and formation of spheres of influence.

2 The U.S. is implementing its global strategy rooted on liberalism and democracy as its basic identities, while China is implementing its global strategy and national strategy based on socialism. This phenomenon is called "identity politics."

Thus, while the influence of geopolitical factors on the strategic calculus of countries in international politics is gradually growing, the identity of each country is also being reflected in their strategic considerations much more prominently. On one hand, the U.S., a champion of liberalism and democracy, pursues what it calls the “America First” policy, and it relies on its alliances and policies for multilateralism to realize its national interests. On the other hand, China is looking to bring back nationalism by advocating Sinocentrism, which China brands the “Chinese Dream.” Similarly, Russia is pulling its weight behind Slavism. In Europe, nationalism and identity, which had declined as Europe turned toward greater integration, are emerging once again, threatening the progress Europe had made over the past 70 years or so. As a result, the international community, as it stands today, tends to prioritize its own interests over international cooperation, which is why the international order is slowly sinking into a sea of uncertainty.

Thirdly, the competition and confrontation surrounding different national development models among the great powers are also pushing the world into greater factionalism. The U.S. continues to build an international community based on a development model driven mostly by liberalism and democracy. According to the U.S. National Security Strategy announced in October 2022, Americans see the success of its national development model as a key factor in determining the battle between liberal and authoritarian countries. Meanwhile, China describes its development model as a “socialist market economy with uniquely Chinese characteristics,” which is a product of reform and the opening up of its economy in the late 1970s. Thus, China offers its own

model to developing countries as an alternative to achieve growth and stability. As for Russia, its National Security Strategy announced in July 2021 says that it must overcome various threats such as the violation of Russian traditional values, negative image of Russia, and foreign intervention in Russian internal affairs in order to protect its own development model. Given the competition over national development models, liberal democracies such as the U.S. and Japan and socialist states such as China and Russia are now pitted against each other not only for economic supremacy, but also leadership in a burgeoning new international order.

Fourthly, supply chains are experiencing some drastic changes at the international level as well. In the past, the international community managed to grow their economies at a rapid rate by promoting stronger interdependence among countries with global supply chains closely connected thanks to globalization. Today, however, there appears to be an intensifying trend for countries to weaponize their interdependence and manipulate global supply chains for political purposes. As such, today, some countries are looking to decouple their own supply chains that were previously connected to the international market from a strategic standpoint, while others are looking to realign themselves with global supply chains. One notable aspect of this process is that liberal and authoritarian countries tend to coalesce and reorganize separately in the global supply chain, and this evolution in international dynamics is actually progressing in a way that emphasizes economic security, which reflects a combination of military security and economic prosperity.

Fifthly, perhaps the most notable phenomenon in today's

international order is the pandemic. Due to COVID-19, countries have closed down their borders and nationalism has made a strong comeback. Meanwhile, international and multilateral cooperation has taken a step back, causing the Global Value Chain (GVC)³ to collapse. COVID-19 has also been a factor leading to changes in the international order, such as the decoupling between countries and forming of blocs in the global economy.

Instability and uncertainty are gradually increasing in today's international order, with the five tendencies mentioned above much more prominent. However, due to the proliferation of global agendas and non-conventional security issues such as the pandemic, climate change, carbon neutrality, and refugee issues, voices stressing the importance of international cooperation also remain.

2 Strategic Environment in Northeast Asia

Since the dawn of the 21st century, the political and economic importance of the Indo-Pacific region, including Northeast Asia, has increased. In particular, China has grown rapidly in the Northeast Asian region, and thus, the U.S. is reinforcing its cooperation with regional allies and partners by prioritizing the Indo-Pacific region and Northeast Asia from a strategic perspective.

3 The overall process of creating value - from planning, research and development, design, procurement of parts and materials, manufacturing, sales, follow-up management, etc.

1) Strategic Competition between the U.S. and China

The U.S. and China have continued to compete in a variety of fields, including the economy, advanced technology, value systems, and political concepts. And the controversy surrounding COVID-19 has further heightened the conflict. While keeping open the possibility of cooperation with China, the U.S. continues to strengthen its ties with allies and partners on crucial pending issues such as advanced technology, democracy, and human rights, and keep China in check. China is also keeping the pulse of American policies pertaining to China. Although tensions persist, the two powers are showing signs of willingness to cooperate and keep the dialogue channel open on selective issues, such as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation.

The U.S. is actively involved in the Indo-Pacific region to protect the liberal international order led by itself, further strengthen its leadership in the international community, and fortify itself against competition with China. To this end, the U.S. is strengthening alliances with South Korea, Japan, and Australia, and also revitalizing partnerships with India and ASEAN countries. Specifically, the first countries on U.S. President Joe Biden's itinerary abroad upon taking office were Japan and Korea. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III visited Japan and Korea first as well. In addition, in February 2021, the Biden administration hosted the first Quad⁴ meeting between foreign ministers, and pursued means to strengthen the regional cooperation between the U.S., Japan,

⁴ Quad specifically refers to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which features the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan. It is called the "Quad" or "Quad Bloc" for short.

India, and Australia. Another initiative being pursued by the U.S. is a with South Korea and Japan. High-level talks between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan at the ministerial and vice-ministerial levels are ongoing to facilitate this new initiative. In September 2021, AUKUS⁵, a new partnership between the U.S., UK, and Australia, was launched as well. Then, in 2022, the U.S. played a leading role in creating the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which deals with regional economic cooperation, including supply chain in the Indo-Pacific region.

Based on a bipartisan agreement, the U.S. defines China as “the most serious long-term challenge to the international order” and “the most substantial geopolitical challenge to the United States” in its National Security Strategy (NSS). The U.S. has declared its commitment to competing, confronting, or cooperating with China, depending on the issue at hand, with the goal of maintaining the position of strength enjoyed by the U.S. in the international community. While competing with China in areas such as supply chain and cutting-edge technology, America is at odds with China on issues such as democracy and human rights, Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. For example, the U.S. declared a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, citing poor human rights conditions in China. Despite such competition and confrontation, the U.S. and China have maintained their dialogue through a Video Summit in November 2021 and the Bali

5 AUKUS refers to a tri-party alliance officially launched on September 15, 2021, between Australia, the UK, and the U.S.. It was formed to strengthen America’s encirclement of China, grow the UK’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and help Australia preparation for China’s expansion across the region.

Summit in November 2022 based on mutual needs to sustain some level of cooperation on global issues, prevent conflicts, and address climate change.

The goal of China's national strategy in the 21st century is to go beyond creating an environment for sustainable economic growth, to become a modern socialist state by 2049, and to maintain and expand the scope of China's core interests. From China's point of view, Northeast Asia is not only geopolitically near China, but is also in a special position where the interests of major global powers such as the U.S., Japan, and Russia intersect. In other words, it is a region where China's "Great Power" diplomacy and "Good Neighbor" diplomacy can play a complex role.

President Xi Jinping has stressed his idea of a "New Type of Great Power Relations"⁶ out of the fear of a possible clash with the U.S., which is trying to keep China's expansionary policy in check, while insisting on establishing a U.S.-China relationship that promotes coexistence and co-prosperity through peaceful cooperation. After the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, China refocused this policy into a "New Type of Great Power Relationship" policy. Xi Jinping's regime appears ready to cooperate with the U.S. in creating a stable international environment for its sustainable economic growth while advocating aggressive diplomacy for Chinese nationalism.

6 Then Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping, who was visiting the U.S. in February 2012, acknowledged that China is now an emerging power and defined the U.S. as an existing power. In order to avoid confrontation and conflict between emerging and existing powers, which had been a recurring issue in human history, Xi suggested that a new, mutually beneficial relationship based on equality is needed.



[Figure 3-1] China's Belt and Road Initiative

Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the “One Belt, One Road” policy during his 2013 visit to Central and Southeast Asia. The One Belt, One Road policy is China’s new Silk Road strategy devised to create a new economic belt that connects China with Central Asia and Europe by land, and a 21st century maritime belt that connects Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa by sea. To this end, China created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 to spearhead multilateral cooperation funding across the region with focus on building a better infrastructure, and signed individual agreements with 140 countries (as of 2022).

Meanwhile, the trade dispute between the U.S. and China, including a drastic increase in tariffs, began in 2018, then took a turn for the worse in 2019. Although on January 15, 2020, the U.S. and China agreed to a Phase One trade deal, the two countries since then have been engaged in multi-dimensional conflicts. They are now at odds in

terms of the economy, trade, politics, military, security, and technology, as well as the South China Sea issue and the national security law issue in Hong Kong. In 2022, conflicts boiled over to global supply chain issues and Taiwan. The deteriorating conditions between the U.S. and China are expected to become the most substantial and significant change in Northeast Asia going forward.

2) Conflict between Japan and China

In 2022, Japan and China celebrated the 50th anniversary of normalizing diplomatic relations. Chinese President Xi Jinping said he “highly values the growth in China-Japan relations,” to which Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated that “Japan and China share a great responsibility for regional and global change and prosperity,” and urged further efforts to stabilize the bilateral relations between China and Japan. However, the restructuring of global supply chains and changes in the regional order in Northeast Asia are putting the two countries in a precarious situation.

For a long time, Japan’s national strategy has been rooted in its unshakable alliance with the U.S. The Shinzo Abe administration, which took office in December 2012, defined the U.S.-Japan alliance as the “central axis of Japan’s diplomacy and national security.” Accordingly, Japan has focused on enhancing Japan’s international profile with a more robust alliance with the U.S. This policy has lived on with recent administrations. Under a stronger U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan’s main policy is to deter threats and conflicts that could follow once the balance of power in Northeast Asia shifts due to China’s rise.

Japan is wary of China becoming a military powerhouse. In particular, it keeps a watchful eye on China's rapid increase in military spending, growing naval power, increased military activities in the South China Sea, aggressive security policies, and anti-access / area denial (A2AD) strategy, all of which have persisted in recent years.

On the other hand, China is looking to counter the pressures brought on by the possible evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance into a more global alliance; Japan's military build-up inspired by its desire to become a "normal state" again; and a stronger Indo-Pacific strategy with reinforced military and security capabilities as well as broader influence across the region. In the early 2010s, the Japan-China friction in the East China Sea and Japan's decision to nationalize the Senkaku Islands (Chinese name: Diaoyu Islands) caused strains in the Tokyo-Beijing relations.

Renewed efforts to thaw Japan-China relations have found their way onto the table since 2015. In particular, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to China in October 2018, in celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship, sought to restore a foundation for cooperation between the two countries. Both parties agreed on the need to strengthen communication in order to newly develop bilateral relations, to reinforce exchange and cooperation between diplomatic departments, to improve economic cooperation with currency swap deals, and to sign a memorandum of understanding on building better youth exchange programs.

However, in 2020 and 2021, the relationship between the two countries has stalled again. Although Japan and China both understood the need for improved relations, there is a fundamental difference

in their perceptions surrounding strategic competition in the region, particularly in the East China Sea and the South China Sea; history; the Taiwan issue; and defense and security issues. Furthermore, the tension between the two countries built up quite significantly over issues such as the Hong Kong National Security Act in 2020. Even in 2021 and 2022, the relationship between China and Japan has remained largely confrontational across various areas, ranging from territorial and historical issues to economic issues such as semiconductor and electronics industries.

Japan also enacted the “Economic Security Promotion Act” in 2022. The Act consists of four pillars: strengthening supply chains, ensuring the safety of critical infrastructure, supporting advanced technology research and development, and protecting patents. The Japanese government is expected to introduce and enforce the Act step-by-step from 2023, which could potentially result in conflicts between Japan and China.

3) Multi-Dimensional Conflict across Northeast Asia

Since 2020, the situation in Northeast Asia has deteriorated due in large part to the escalating conflict between the U.S. and China, closer alignment between old allies, namely, North Korea, China, and Russia on one side and South Korea, U.S., and Japan on the other side.

In particular, North Korea-China-Russia relations have grown stronger in recent years. North Korea and China both see the growing threat of uncertainty (“massive global change of the century”) brought on by the conflict between the U.S. and China, and therefore have been

renewing traditional alliance and ideological ties with policies aimed at the “succession and development of traditional friendship” sustained for generations (i.e. “friendship forged in blood” and “socialist unity.”) In particular, while commemorating the 61st anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship between North Korea and China in July 2022, the two socialist states further strengthened their bonds and claimed that their mutual relationship is an “unbreakable” one.

China and Russia have also sought a common strategy against the rising pressure from the U.S. in Northeast Asia. China has imported energy from Russia, lent its support to Russia in Ukraine, and has reorganized its global supply chains to build closer ties.

North Korea and Russia have been active in developing bilateral relations since their 2019 Summit as well. In 2020, Kim Jong Un proposed to President Vladimir Putin to further strengthen and develop Russia’s “noble tradition of friendship” with North Korea, which has deep-running roots, to meet the needs of the new era.

On the other hand, with the ties between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan growing much closer than before, the scope of cooperation between the three allies in the region is expanding beyond military and security issues to the economy and future technology. The Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit had been suspended for a while, but under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, the trilateral summit was held on the sideline of the NATO Summit in Madrid, Spain, in June 2022. The three parties agreed to make a concerted effort to protect universal values and to secure peace as well as stability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. In November, the leaders of the three countries met again in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and agreed to further strengthen their cooperation

to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles program, and instill peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Moreover, all three leaders agreed to expand trilateral cooperation in the field of economic security, including cutting-edge technology, supply chain resilience, and energy security, while jointly responding to complex challenges such as climate change and the advent of the digital economy.

In 2021 and 2022, both sides - South Korea-U.S.-Japan and North Korea-China-Russia - appear more entrenched than they have been in years, and with the global supply chain going through some massive restructuring, competition will be growing fierce.

Section 2

Neighboring Countries' Korean Peninsula Policy

1 U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula

The priority of the U.S. policy on the Korean Peninsula is resolving the North Korean nuclear threat and strengthening alliance with South Korea. Since the nuclear proliferation of North Korea emerged as a real issue in the early 1990s, the U.S. has pursued the complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program via a wide variety of policies. Until the early 2000s, both sides engaged in bilateral dialogue, and did make some progress like the 1994 Agreed Framework. When the Six-Party Talks got under way in 2003, the U.S. and North Korea began to engage in different means and strategies, including bilateral and multilateral dialogue and international sanctions, to subdue the latter's nuclear ambitions.

Once the Obama administration took office in 2009, the U.S. attempted to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through direct

bilateral negotiations. However, North Korea's second nuclear test (May 25, 2009) pushed U.S. policy toward the hermit state from dialogue and negotiation to pressure and sanctions driven by the policy of "strategic patience." Despite mounting pressures, North Korea did not give up its nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) programs, and conducted its third nuclear test in 2013, followed by the fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration, which came to power in 2017, announced a new North Korea policy "Maximum Pressure and Engagement" in April 2017. This policy was to squeeze North Korea as much as possible so that it abandons its nuclear weapons and brings it back to the table to negotiate non-proliferation. Unfortunately, on September 3, 2017, North Korea went ahead with its sixth nuclear test, and the U.S. opted to strengthen sanctions through the UN Security Council (Resolution 2375) and levy its own sanctions as well. In 2017, North Korea continued to test its nuclear weapons and missiles. Both sides accused each other of wrongdoing, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula appeared to be moving in the wrong direction. Then, in 2018, things took a turn due in large part to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games.

The Trump administration made an attempt to resolve the North Korean nuclear weapons issue with a top-down diplomacy strategy. On June 12, 2018, the first-ever U.S.-North Korea Summit was held in Singapore, opening up new possibilities for a peace regime and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides reached an agreement on building new U.S.-North Korea relations, establishing a peace regime, denuclearizing North Korea, and returning the remains

of fallen U.S. soldiers still in North Korea. U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo visited North Korea four times in 2018 alone, both before and after the Summit, and high-level dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea continued. Subsequently, the second U.S.-North Korea Summit held in Hanoi, Vietnam on February 27~28, 2019, was met with great fanfare. Talks collapsed when North Korea refused a complete denuclearization and maintained its stance on becoming a nuclear power. Another U.S.-North Korea Summit was at Panmunjeom on June 30, 2019, followed by working-level talks in Stockholm, Sweden, on October 5, 2019. More dialogue, unfortunately, has not resulted in substantial progress in denuclearization and U.S.-North Korea relations. In the 2020s, the U.S. has remained open to dialogue and it has tried to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. Most notably, it offered to help North Korea's response to COVID-19. Yet, there has been no real dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea over the past couple of years.

The Biden administration, which took office with great expectations both domestically and internationally in 2021, embarked on a full review of its North Korea policy. On April 30, just 100 days into his term, President Biden announced, "For the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, we will continue to consult with our allies, including South Korea and Japan, and take a meticulously calibrated practical approach that is open to diplomacy with North Korea" through the White House spokesperson. Then, at the South Korea-U.S. Summit on May 21, 2021, President Biden shed more light on his administration's North Korea policy. Going forward, the U.S. government will support the complete denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula, seek diplomatic solutions with North Korea, respect the Singapore Agreement and the Panmunjom Declaration, and facilitate inter-Korean dialogue, engagement, and cooperation. In the October 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) report, the Biden administration also said that the U.S. will continue to pursue diplomatic efforts with North Korea to make substantial progress toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while at the same time strengthening extended deterrence against North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats.

Meanwhile, the U.S. considers its alliance with South Korea, along with its alliance with Japan, as the main pillar of U.S.-led security and alliance in Northeast Asia. The U.S. deals with the North Korean nuclear threat and other pending issues on the Korean Peninsula through the South Korea-U.S. alliance in Northeast Asia. As with past U.S. administrations, the Biden administration is highlighting the South Korea-U.S. alliance as a “linchpin” in security and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific region. Leaders of the two countries held a summit in Washington on May 21, 2021, and promised full cooperation on



South Korea-U.S. Summit (May 21, 2022; Seoul)

issues surrounding climate change, global health, technology such as 5G and 6G, new technologies such as semiconductors, supply chains, international development and cooperation, and promotion of democratic values and human rights beyond just pursuing security, and agreed to level up the alliance into a new phase.

At the South Korea-U.S Summit between President Yoon Suk Yeol and President Biden on May 21, 2022, the two countries agreed to solidify a global and comprehensive strategic alliance based on the core values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. Regarding the North Korea threat, the two countries are ready to coordinate

[Table 3-1] ROK-U.S. Summit (May 21) Key Takeaways from the Joint Statement

Source: Office of the President	
<p>Military and National Security</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Reaffirmed U.S. commitments toward extended deterrence, including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense, and the timely deployment of strategic assets · Agreed to resume activities with the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) · Widened the scope and scale of ROK-US joint training exercises · Initiated discussions on a defense mutual procurement agreement 	<p>Economic Security</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Launched the Korea-U.S. Economic Security Dialogue · Agreed to exchange core technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum technology, and biotechnology, and to promote cooperation for better resilience of supply chains used for batteries, semiconductors, and energy · Agreed to cooperate over supply chain issues for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) as well as developing and selling advanced reactors and SMRs
<p>North Korean Issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Reaffirmed the commitment toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula · Reaffirmed the commitment to work together toward dismantling North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs · Secured US support for the South Korean government's "Audacious Initiative" for a denuclearized and thriving Korean Peninsula · Promised humanitarian aid to North Korea, including support for quarantine measures against COVID-19 	<p>Comprehensive Global Strategic Alliance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Secured South Korean interest in the Quad, and showcased South Korea's strengths in response to the pandemic and climate change · Ensured close cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) based on the principles of openness, transparency, and inclusiveness · Agreed to host the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSA) ministerial meeting in South Korea and to establish the required facilities in Seoul

their policies, including complete denuclearization of North Korea, which is supported by both the U.S. and South Korea under the latter's "Audacious Initiative" for the future. Both sides also agreed to reinforce extended deterrence measures by the U.S., and strengthen the combined defensive readiness of South Korea and the U.S.. Furthermore, both leaders agreed to strengthen economic security and pursue technological cooperation, and make sure South Korea and the U.S. fulfill their roles and contributions to regional and global stability, peace, and prosperity.

2 Japanese policy toward the Korean Peninsula

Since the launch of the second Shinzo Abe cabinet in December 2012 to the current Fumio Kishida cabinet, Japan has remained committed to securing political and military influence commensurate with the world's third-largest economy. Its policy on the Korean Peninsula is also based on this basic stance.

Japan's objective on the Korean Peninsula can be seen as minimizing its own political and military threats while securing and increasing its influence on Korean Peninsula issues. In line with this goal, Japan has continued to engage in North Korean issues, including its nuclear weapons and missile programs. Pursuant to the "Pyongyang Declaration," which was agreed upon during Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to North Korea in 2002, Japan has maintained its policy of seeking diplomatic ties and economic cooperation with North Korea upon

resolving various pending issues, such as its nuclear weapons and missiles program and the issue of Japanese abductees.

Japan is an active player in the UN resolutions on North Korea as well as sanctions against North Korea's nuclear and missile development. It imposes its own

sanctions, while at the same time making sustained efforts to resolve the issue of Japanese abductees. Relations between Japan and North Korea, which had been in a lull due to the North's provocations and Japan's sanctions, showed some progress thanks to the Stockholm Agreement on North Korea's establishment of a special investigative committee and the agreement to re-investigate the abductions in May 2014. Since then, however, no progress has been made with North Korea testing its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons on multiple occasions. Similar to his predecessors, nominally, Prime Minister Kishida has expressed his willingness to meet with President Kim Jong Un unconditionally. With the North Korea-Japan Pyongyang Declaration, Japan has reaffirmed its existing policy stance for a comprehensive resolution of various pending issues such as abductions, nuclear weapons, and missiles. In response, North Korea maintains its position that the abduction issue has already been resolved.

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1965, South Korea-Japan relations have progressed steadily overall. But since the launch of the second Shinzo Abe cabinet in 2012, Japan's history revisionism,



South Korea-Japan Summit
(November 13, 2022; Phnom Penh)

provocative remarks, and insensitive actions have worked as obstacles to progress in bilateral relations. In particular, amid continuing differences of opinion between South Korea and Japan regarding the 2018 Supreme Court ruling on victims of forced labor, Japan halted comprehensive export permits for three items - hydrogen fluoride, photoresist for EUV (extreme ultraviolet ray), and fluorinated polyimide - in July 2019 as part of economic retaliation. It also removed South Korea from the white list of export-preferred countries without stating rational grounds. As Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide, who took office in September 2020, inherited most of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's foreign policy stance, South Korea-Japan relations remained at an impasse.

Prime Minister Kishida, who took office in October 2021, much like his predecessors, was demanding appropriate responses from South Korea regarding the forced labor ruling and Japanese sexual slavery issue, preventing bilateral relations from making any progress.

However, when President Yoon Suk Yeol took office, an informal summit between South Korea and Japan was held in New York in September 2022, and the two countries agreed to make efforts to address the North Korean nuclear issue, restore and improve bilateral relations, and continue communication between the leaders as “important neighbors” to cooperate with each other. Later, at the South Korea-Japan summit in Phnom Penh on November 13, both parties reaffirmed their decision to seek a prompt resolution of the forced labor issue, respond together to address North Korean nuclear threat, and communicate more closely with one another.

3 Chinese Policy toward the Korean Peninsula

For decades, China has maintained peace and stability in its surrounding regions as its top priority in terms of foreign relations is to make sure its economy can grow in a stable and sustainable manner. Such a policy stance has continued on the Korean Peninsula as well. Although China had tensions with North Korea when it established diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1992, and when North Korea went ahead with its nuclear testing, China has largely maintained and strengthened its traditional friendly alliance with North Korea and has sought to expand its influence in the region.

In 2001, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited North Korea, he announced his 16-letter (Chinese letters) policy focused on the “succession of tradition, future orientation, friendly relationship, and stronger cooperation.” This policy largely constitutes China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping met President Kim Jong Un three times in 2018 (March 25~28, May 7~8, June 19~20) and twice in 2019 (January 7~10, June 20~21). At the 4th North Korea-China Summit (June 20~21, 2019), which was held during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyeongyang, an attempt was made to restore traditional friendly relations between the two countries. Since 2020, the relationship between North Korea and China has grown closer thanks to mutual support for the COVID-19 crisis and the former’s support for the National Security Law issue in Hong Kong. In 2021, North Korea and China took another step to make their relations closer under the slogan of resisting the U.S. and

helping North Korea in a joint response against pressures from the U.S.. China is taking a strategic approach to North Korea, which is seeking economic assistance from China amid worsening economic conditions stemming from sanctions against North Korea, natural disasters, and the pandemic. As a result, the relationship between the two countries is growing stronger.

On November 15, 2022, President Yoon Suk Yeol and President Xi Jinping held their first South Korea-China summit in Bali, Indonesia. At the summit, President Yoon Suk Yeol said that pursuing freedom, peace, and prosperity in the international community based on universal values and norms is the South Korean government's diplomatic objective, and highlighted China's role in promoting freedom, peace, and prosperity in East Asia and the international community. President Xi Jinping said that both the ROK and China have common interests in the Korean Peninsula, and hoped that South Korea would help improve inter-Korean relations.

Meanwhile, with regard to foreign policy, rather than suggesting



South Korea-China Summit (November 16, 2022; Bali)

a new policy direction through the 20th Party Congress (October 16-22, 2022), China remains committed to its existing policy direction guided by President Xi Jinping, which includes promoting world peace, building a community with a shared future for humankind, and strengthening relations with developing countries. Thus, it has been somewhat challenging to find meaningful changes in Korean Peninsula policy. China also continues to maintain its three principles of achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, maintaining peace and stability, and resolving issues through dialogue and negotiation. It insists on finding a political solution to the Korean Peninsula issue and emphasizing China's role as a constructive partner on it. From China's point of view, the overall stability of the Korean Peninsula is necessary for China's national interests. To this end, while pursuing the stability of the North Korean regime, it insists on selectively cooperating with the U.S. on the issues pertaining to the Korean Peninsula, and creating an external environment necessary for ensuring stability across the region.

4 Russian Policy toward the Korean Peninsula

Despite its decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022, Russia's policy on the Korean Peninsula still officially advocates peace and stability. It wants to seek political and diplomatic solutions through cooperation with relevant countries, and reach comprehensive solutions, including resolutions of the North Korean nuclear

issue. Russia's main objective is economic cooperation with North Korea across various fields, which it needs to grow its relatively underdeveloped Far East region. To this end, as a party to the Six-Party Talks and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has taken an active role in the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear threat and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1990, Russia has participated in more than 20 Summit meetings, which has helped promote South Korea-Russia relations. At the South Korea-Russia Summit in September 2008, both parties agreed to take the bilateral relationship from a "comprehensive partnership of mutual trust" to a "partnership of strategic cooperation." Also, at the South Korea-Russia Summit held in November 2013, President Vladimir Putin expressed his understanding for South Korea's efforts to secure peace through trust-building initiatives between the two Koreas. He said that Russia supports South Korea's efforts to build trust on the Korean Peninsula, which is an important condition for restoring normalcy to inter-Korean relations and ensuring the security and stability of the region.

At their Summit in 2013, South Korea and Russia agreed to facilitate joint railway and port projects, including the Najin-Khasan Project. To this end, South Korea and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to participate in the Najin-Khasan Project connecting South Korea, North Korea, and Russia. Three pilot projects were carried out (as of November 2015) to transport Russian-produced bituminous coal by rail from the Kuzbass coal mines in Siberia to Najin in North Korea, and then to ship the coal from Najin to South

Korea. In this process, South Korea and Russia were able to confirm that connecting the Trans-Korean Railway and the Trans-Siberian Railway will indeed contribute to the development of cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and Eurasia. However, due to sanctions against North Korea following North Korea's 4th and 5th nuclear tests in 2016, negotiations between South Korea and Russia ground to a halt.

Then, in September 2017, a South Korea-Russia Summit was held at the 3rd Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. Here, both countries agreed to collaborate over their economies, sign an FTA, and connect gas pipelines, power grids as well as railways. In June 2018, President Moon Jae-in paid a state visit to Russia and held a Summit meeting with President Putin. Both leaders agreed to initiate negotiations on service and investment FTAs as well as science and technology innovation and healthcare cooperation to secure additional future growth engines.

In the context of COVID-19, in September 2020, a phone call between the leaders of South Korea and Russia was held to mark the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties, reaffirming mutual commitment to the development of South Korea-Russia relations and strengthening strategic communication on issues related to the Korean Peninsula.

Despite the fact that it currently works with South Korea across a variety of economic areas, Russia maintains a friendly and cooperative relationship with North Korea.

Russia is ostensibly opposed to the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction carried out by North Korea. Yet it is focusing on creating conditions for ensuring the security of North Korea without

escalating tensions rather than using sanctions against North Korea to apply pressure. Russia hosted the first North Korea-Russia Summit since Kim Jong Un came to power, marking the 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties between North Korea and Russia on April 25, 2019. Then, at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg on June 4, 2021, President Putin also stressed the importance of trilateral cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia as a way to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat.

In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, North Korea recognized Russia's eastern occupation zone and sought means to offer military support to Russia, further strengthening the relationship Russia.

Section 3

International Cooperation for Korean Unification

1 Building Consensus and Pursuing International Cooperation

The unification of the Korean Peninsula is both a national issue and an international issue. In today's 21st-century global order, Northeast Asia is undergoing complex changes in its structure in line with the prevailing interests of related countries. The environment for unification is also changing accordingly. Thus, when planning for the future of inter-Korean relations and executing unification policies, it is necessary to understand and consider the nature and characteristics of the international system on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

The purpose behind international dialogue and public diplomacy for unification is to create a more favorable environment conducive to unification on the Korean Peninsula. It seeks international support and cooperation for Korean unification by highlighting the fact that

a unified Korea will benefit the national interests of neighboring countries and further contribute to peace and prosperity of the world, including Northeast Asia.

In order to work effectively with the international community regarding issues involving the Korean Peninsula, the following points should be considered.

Firstly, the U.S. and China are countries that can exert outside strong influence on the present and future fate of the Korean Peninsula. As such, it is critical to align the strategic interests of the U.S. and China on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. This is because South Korea is a long-time ally of the United States, and an important strategic partner of China. Thus, setting up a relationship with the U.S. and China in a direction favorable to the unification of the Korean Peninsula is crucial. In order to do so, it is necessary to make diplomatic efforts to confirm that the U.S. and China can coordinate their interests on the Korean Peninsula, rather than conflict and confrontation, and to raise awareness of the fact that the U.S. and China benefits from Korean unification.

Secondly, the process through which territorial disputes and historical issues in Northeast Asia are resolved will have a significant impact on the unification of Korea. At present, in Northeast Asia, territorial issues and past historical issues are fueling nationalism among countries, spreading further conflict, and opening old wounds. If conflict escalates, it will eventually become impossible to create an amicable unification environment on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, diplomatic solutions to territorial disputes and historical issues to prevent further aggravation of the situation in the region, and to

resolve these issues through peaceful means and cooperation of related countries are extremely important.

Thirdly, the North Korean nuclear issue has, and will have, a significant impact on the unification environment of the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean nuclear issue has been a formidable obstacle to efforts to unify the Korean Peninsula. Failure to fully resolve the North Korean nuclear threat will likely mean no support from neighboring countries for Korean unification. As such, in order to create an environment favorable to unification with the support of neighboring countries, neutralizing the North Korean nuclear threat is an absolute priority. Currently, the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea, all agree to the necessity for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula - they completely oppose North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. To ensure denuclearization, all parties must work in lock-step, and South Korea should take the lead on the matter. Doing so could immensely improve the environment for unification on the Korean Peninsula.

2 Challenges to International Cooperation

In order to unify the Korean Peninsula, denuclearizing North Korea and establishing a peaceful regime are of paramount importance. Various efforts must be made to bring North Korea onto the path of denuclearization, and at the same time, a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula has to be established. Issues on the Korean Peninsula,

however, are not limited to inter-Korean relations. Support and cooperation from the international community are important as well. When it comes to promoting the Korean unification, although the most important thing is to have the South take the lead with support from its people, driving change in North Korea and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula could be more effective when backed by the international community at large.

To do so, South Korea needs to raise the international community's awareness of the unification issue, and secure support for its "Audacious Initiative" for the denuclearization of North Korea, which could help build a virtuous cycle of trust between the two Koreas. It is also necessary to underscore the fact that North Korea's denuclearization will not only bring sustainable peace to the Peninsula, but also greatly contribute to peace and prosperity around the world by strengthening the NPT regime.

Leveraging the ROK-U.S. alliance, conditions for peaceful unification must be prepared through close policy coordination and cooperation with the international community, including the major powers. International support for the South Korean government's policies toward unification and North Korea, combined with cooperation on eliminating North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, can bring North Korea back to a path of dialogue and diplomacy.

International cooperation for unification calls for cooperation and collaboration with not only major powers, but also the international community at large. From a broader perspective, a more mature and sophisticated alliance based on trust and cooperation with the U.S.; a strategic cooperative partnership between South Korea and China;

and a forward-looking relationship with Japan, which separates the resolution of historical issues and practical cooperation, should be pursued.


Regarding cooperation with the U.S., high-level strategic dialogue should be structured to bring about denuclearization and change in North Korea based on the ROK-U.S. alliance. Moreover, to secure China's support for the "Audacious Initiative" and to assume a more constructive, leadership role, South Korea has to strengthen its strategic communication with China.

In its relationship with Japan, South Korea must address historical issues with a firm response to Japan's challenges on the Dokdo issue and attempts to distort history, while developing Korea-Japan relations into a forward-looking one. Separating historical issues from more pressing matters, including responses to North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs, is crucial in moving forward. In November 2022, the leaders of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan met in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to strengthen their trilateral cooperation for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and to confirm their commitment toward an immediate solution to the Japanese abductees issue.

Furthermore, cooperation with Asia and Europe should be expanded as well. It is important to create a collaborative environment for building peace on the Korean Peninsula amid geopolitical tensions present in East Asia. ASEAN countries continue to pay more attention to the Korean Peninsula issue than any other region. They are very important partners for restoring trust on the Korean Peninsula, building a peace regime, and ultimately achieving unification. Multilateral

cooperation should be strengthened for regional peace and stability with ASEAN and Southeast Asian countries. European countries, including the European Union, can also play diverse roles in bringing North Korea into the international community. South Korea and Europe can work together on resuming dialogue EU-North Korea and cooperate on humanitarian issues, such as providing humanitarian aid and promoting the human rights of North Koreans.

Meanwhile, it is also necessary to actively pursue diplomatic measures for unification targeting overseas Koreans in collaboration with civil society. In particular, considering the improved status enjoyed by overseas Koreans in recent decades, relying on overseas Koreans in building a consensus over peace and unification abroad could prove to be effective. Civic groups can strengthen the ripple effect by cooperating with international networks in various ways depending on the target generation and field. Furthermore, experts on Korean Peninsula issues should bolster research on the international situation surrounding the Peninsula and the role of the international community in resolving current issues, and provide a forum or platform for world-wide public discourse on Korean unification.





IV

Unification Policies and Formulas

Section 1. South Korean Policy on Unification and North Korea

Section 2. South and North Korea's Unification Formula

Section 1

South Korean Policy on Unification and North Korea

Despite a myriad of hardship, including the immense suffering under the Japanese colonial rule and the ensuing Korean War, the Republic of Korea managed to both industrialize its economy and adopt democracy as its governing political system. However, instability stemming from the continued division of the Korean Peninsula has pushed the sustainable development of our nation back. Thus, unification is a critical task we as a nation cannot afford to put off any longer. In order to overcome the issues brought on by division and achieve peace and unification, friendly cooperation with North Korea, our partner in unification, must be encouraged. Yet, the two Koreas have built up a significant cache of animosity and mutual distrust over the past several decades given the bitter division after the Korean War. It could take a considerable amount of time to better understand and trust each other. Sustained dialogue, exchange, and cooperation to narrow the differences between the two Koreas are also essential in the

unification process.

A unification policy represents both the South Korean government's political choice and its determination to manage and improve inter-Korean relations while creating an environment conducive to unification. Meanwhile, a unification formula is a rough draft of the government's position on unification, the principles of unification, and the approach to unification distilled into actionable guidelines. Unification policies and formulas, like other national policies, have evolved, reflecting the circumstances and needs of the time, public demand, and the government's policy directives. Each unification policy devised by South Korea over the years has been supplemented and developed in a direction that is more in line with the reality according to changes in the times and environment while maintaining the core principles for peaceful unification.

The consistent stance of the Korean government's unification policy can be summed up as peaceful unification that guarantees the freedom, human rights, and prosperity of all persons of our collective nation. On this basis, the perception of unification has slowly changed from something justified to something that needs to be determined based on reality. The shift in paradigm started in the 1970s. Prior to 1970, policies promoting UN-supervised general elections in South and North Korea, or the "construction first, unification later" policy were endorsed by the South Korean government. Then, entering the 1970s, a new direction for unification policy was sought based on a realistic perception of North Korea amid changes in the international situation, including the détente between the U.S. and Soviet Union, reconciliation between the U.S. and China, and resuming of diplomatic relations

between Japan and China. This ushered in a new policy stance of “peace first, unification later.” South Korea acknowledged the North Korean system and accepted it as a partner in dialogue to push the unification agenda forward.

1 History of South Korean Policy on Unification and North Korea

1) Unification and North Korea Policy before 1970

Pursuant to a UN General Assembly resolution (November 14, 1947) recommending general elections in entire Korea under UN supervision and promotion of peaceful unification, South Korea proclaimed the establishment of a government following the promulgation of the Constitution upon holding free general elections under the supervision of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea. North Korea’s refusal, however, meant that free general elections could not be held in the North, and the remaining seats in the National Assembly, which had been assigned to North Korea, became vacant. The Syngman Rhee administration, which took power throughout this process, was the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula endorsed by the UN, and the core content of unification was to recover lost sovereign territory temporarily occupied by North Korea, an illegal group. As a result, the First Republic of Korea pursued a non-negotiation principle, insisting that the lost territory of the North be restored. The unification formula it proposed was “general elections between the South and the North in proportion to population under

UN supervision.”

The unification formula through “free general elections between the two Koreas under UN supervision” was inherited by the Second Republic of Korea, and the principle of “construction first, unification later” of the Second Republic lived on as the foundation for the unification policy of the next government. The Park Chung-hee administration of the Third Republic of Korea presented a unification policy based on the principles of liberal democracy through the UN, unification by restoring lost territory, and research and readjustment of posture to prepare for various problems anticipated during the unification process. This theory of capacity building and national unification based on the principle of liberal democracy was promoted under the policy stance of “construction first, unification later.”

2) Unification and North Korea Policy after 1970

In 1969, amid changes in the international situation due to the Nixon Doctrine, thawing U.S.-China relations, and improving Japan-China relations, the South Korean government began to seek a new direction for its unification policy based on a more realistic view of North Korea. The initial springboard of this new approach was given as the “Declaration of Ideas for Peaceful Unification” on August 15, 1970. In this declaration, President Park made it public that North Korea is a political reality and upon admitting North Korea as a de facto Communist regime, the Seoul government would try to make a favorable environment for a peaceful unification through inter-Korean dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation with the North.

This “Declaration of Ideas for Peaceful Unification” soon culminated in the first inter-Korean talks to reunite separated families for the first time in 26 years. Meanwhile, the South Korean government prioritized many issues related to unification into three steps of resolution: starting first humanitarian, then non-political, and finally political issues. Since then, this approach has become the core of unification policies in the subsequent regimes in the South. Also, in parallel with the Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks, the “July 4 South-North Joint Statement” was announced on July 4, 1972, considered the first official communique between the South and North Korean authorities since the division of the Korean Peninsula. The core of this joint statement was the agreement between the two Koreas on the three principles of unification: independence, peace, and great national unity.

After the “July 4 South-North Joint Statement,” inter-Korean relations advanced to a new stage, with the Red Cross Talks for dialogue at the humanitarian level, and the South-North Coordination Committee meeting for dialogue at the political level. However, the “July 4 Inter-Korean Joint Statement” was rendered practically obsolete when North Korea unilaterally stopped participating in the South-North

[Table 4-1] Changes in Government Unification Policy Before and After 1970

Before 1970	After 1970
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Free General Elections in North Korea • Free General Elections between North and South Korea • Capacity Building for National Unification • Constriction First, Unification Later 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Declaration of Ideas for Peaceful Unification • Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification • “Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-esteem, Unification and Prosperity” (July 7 Declaration)” • Korean National Community Unification Formula • National Community Unification Formula

Coordination Committee in protest against the “Special Declaration on Foreign Policy for Peaceful Unification (June 23 Declaration)”¹ in which the South Korean government expressed its determination for peaceful unification in June 1973.

In the wake of the June 23 Declaration, the South proposed a mutual non-aggression agreement to the North on January 18, 1974, and went further to propose the “Three Basic Principles for Peaceful Unification” to the North on August 15 of the same year. These principles for peaceful unification were as follows. First, settlement of peace on the peninsula and the inter-Korean dialogues along with mutual exchanges should be promoted. Second, much effort should be made in trust-building and homogenization for having general elections throughout Korea. Third, such general elections may be held under fair management and supervision, instead of “under the UN supervision.” From then on, the Seoul government shifted its unification policy direction from a focus on “construction first, unification later” to “peace first, unification later.” This proposal has become the backbone of all subsequent governments in Seoul.

The Chun Doo-hwan administration of the Fifth Republic of Korea proposed a Summit of the two sides, and proposed what it called the “Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification.”

1 Key provisions of the “June 23 Declaration”: • Mark the peaceful unification as the top priority for the whole Korean people • Remind the need for maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula, non-aggression and non-intervention in internal affairs of the other side • Continue to pursue inter-Korean dialogue based on the South-North Joint Communiqué • Not to oppose to North Korea’s entry into international organizations • Not to oppose to the simultaneous entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations • Open doors reciprocally to any countries • Reaffirm its foreign policy based on peace and good-relations and stronger ties with friendly nations

The new formula was comprised of two main areas of unification: one functional approach to develop national unity and the other institutional approach to support unification. This policy framework differed from past approaches in that it delineated a detailed set of preparatory procedures from drafting of a unified Constitution to a unified Republic as the final form of integration process through general elections. In the wake of the formula, on February 1, 1982, the South proposed the Twenty Inter-Korean Pilot Projects to the North. These pilot projects were designed to promote an atmosphere for building national harmony and good will.²

In 1987, for the first time in constitutional history, the contents related to unification were stipulated in the Constitution. In its Preamble, the Constitution states “mission of democratic reform and peaceful unification of our homeland,” In Article 4, it stipulates South Korea will “seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” In Article 66 Paragraph 3, the Constitution declares, “The President

2 Key provisions of the Twenty Inter-Korean Pilot Projects: • Connect and open roads between Seoul and Pyeongyang • Exchange letters and hold reunions of separated families • Create a joint free tourism area between the north of Mount Seorak and the south of Mount Geumgang • Free visits to both sides by overseas Korean expatriates • Open Incheon Port in the South and Jinnampo Port in the North • Free access to regular broadcasts of each side • Allow North Korean athletes to pass Panmunjeom for participation in the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games • Free visits to both sides by foreigners • Establish joint fishing areas • Mutual friendly visits by representatives from all walks of life • Guarantee free media activities by journalists in the other’s area • Joint research in national history • Host exchange sports competitions and form a single national team to participate in various international sports events • Trade goods for everyday use • Jointly explore and use natural resources • Exchange technicians in the same industry and host joint exhibitions on goods • Establish a joint sports facility within the DMZ • Joint academic study of the DMZ • Full removal of military facilities in the DMZ • Create a hot line between militaries in both sides

shall have the duty to sincerely pursue the peaceful unification of the homeland.”

Efforts to establish new inter-Korean relations reached a turning point in the Roh Tae-woo administration. The Roh Tae-woo administration promoted a “Northern Policy” in the midst of a post-Cold War era of democratization. Its efforts were well reflected in two new policies: the “Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-esteem, Unification and Prosperity (July 7 Declaration)” on July 7, 1988, and the “Korean National Community Unification Formula” on September 11, 1989.

The “July 7 Declaration” was based on the realization that developing the relationship on a national community level, where South and North Korea achieve prosperity together, is the shortcut to realizing unification. The Declaration focused on the opening of the door to North Korea and the cross-recognition of both South and North Korea by the four neighboring powers. In other words, the July 7 Declaration presents the basic direction of measures necessary to create a reconciliation structure between the two Koreas. In keeping with the spirit of the July 7 Declaration, President Roh Tae-woo announced another unification formula called the Korean National Community Unification Formula at the National Assembly on September 11, 1989. The Formula, endorsed by all four major political parties in the South, emphasized active engagement in mutual exchanges and cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang in order to develop a strong national community and eventually achieve political unification. Following the “Korean National Community Unification Formula,” on August 1, 1990, the “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act” was enacted

to provide institutional support for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation.

Based on these efforts, the first Inter-Korean High-Level Talks were held in Seoul in September 1990, and on September 17, 1991, the two Koreas simultaneously joined the UN. At the 5th Inter-Korean High-Level Talks held in Seoul on December 12, 1991, the two Koreas agreed on the “Inter-Korean Agreement” (Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North), and also reaffirmed a “state of armistice” between the two Koreas. Both sides promised to abide by the Armistice Agreement until a “firm state of peace” was established. Then, on December 31, the two Koreas agreed on the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” arriving at the first concrete set of agreements on arms control between the two sides. However, the Inter-Korean Agreement was not able to serve its proper function as North Korea unilaterally halted its communication with South Korea.

The Kim Young-sam administration also adopted and supplemented the “Korean National Community Unification Formula” in what it called the “National Community Unification Formula” (a three-step unification formula for building the Korean community) (see Appendix 4). This unification formula reaffirmed the position that unification will be achieved in the direction of building one national community through a gradual and step-by-step practical process consisting of reconciliation and cooperation, inter-Korean union, and completion of one unified nation. The “National Community Unification formula” remains very much a part of South Korea’s unification policy and Formula today.

The Kim Dae-jung administration, which took office in 1998, set its priority on improving inter-Korean relations, and promoted policies encouraging reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea. This new policy of reconciliation and cooperation, called the “Sunshine Policy,” had a forward-looking perspective toward improving inter-Korean relations so that North Korea can come out of the shadows and into the sunshine for real change.

[Table 4-2] Evolution of Unification Policies

Syngman Rhee administration	“Forceful unification toward North Korea” to recover lost sovereign territory UN-supervised general elections in South and North Korea in proportion to population
Chang Myon administration	“Construction first, unification later” UN-supervised general elections in South and North Korea in proportion to population
Park Chung-hee administration (1960s)	“Construction first, unification later” Unification based on liberal democracy
Park Chung-hee administration (1970s)	Three basic principles for the peaceful unification (establishing peace and inter-Korean dialogue, trust-building and homogenization, general elections), and “peace first, unification later”
Chun Doo-hwan administration	“Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification” Unification through democratic procedures and peaceful means under the principle of national self-determination (enactment of the unified Constitution → General elections in South and North Korea → Forming of a unified government)
Roh Tae-woo administration	“Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-esteem, Unification and Prosperity (July 5 Declaration),” “National Community Unification Formula”
Kim Young-sam administration	“National Community Unification Formula (a three-step unification plan for building Korean community)”
Kim Dae-jung administration	“Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy”
Roh Moo-hyun administration	“Peace and Prosperity Policy”
Lee Myung-bak administration	“Coexistence and Co-Prosperity Policy” and “Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness”
Park Geun-hye administration	“Trust-building Process on the Korean peninsula,” “Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula,” and “Three Corridors Proposal”
Moon Jae-in administration	“Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative”

From this standpoint, the Kim Dae-jung administration promoted a North Korea policy that focused on improving inter-Korean relations, recognizing that the two Koreas had to manage the division in a peaceful manner, and encourage cooperation for coexistence and co-prosperity in order to achieve unification. The first Inter-Korean Summit was held in June 2000, and both sides agreed to adopt the “June 15th South-North Joint Declaration,” which offered a direction for improving inter-Korean relations and five practical initiatives as well. Since then, inter-Korean relations have progressed in a direction that fosters an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula by increasing human and material exchanges through inter-Korean talks across a variety of fields.

The Roh Moo-hyun administration pursued a policy of peace and prosperity rooted in the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear threat. Defining North Korea as a partner for reconciliation and cooperation, and through collaborative projects such as tourism projects to Mount Geumgang and Gaeseong, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, the Roh Moo-hyun administration hoped to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula and pursue prosperity between both Koreas. The goal was to lay the groundwork for peaceful unification and develop Korea into an economic powerhouse in Northeast Asia. In October 2007, the second Inter-Korean summit was held and the “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity (October 4 South-North Summit Declaration)” was adopted. Both parties agreed, out of mutual respect for each other, to promote joint projects for unification in areas such as politics, military, economy, society, culture, humanitarian aid, and diplomatic support.

The Lee Myung-bak administration presented its “Coexistence

and Co-Prosperity Policy” for North Korea as well as the “Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness” as action plans pursuant to the Policy. The “Coexistence and Co-Prosperity Policy” and “Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness” prioritized the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, which is essential for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, in close cooperation with the international community. While resolutely responding to North Korea’s armed provocations, they sought to lay the foundation for unification built on peaceful inter-Korean relations and meaningful advancements in practical cooperation.

The Park Geun-hye administration proposed a “Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula” as its core North Korea policy and its “Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula,” followed by a “Three Corridor Proposal.” The “Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula” is a policy aimed at building trust between the two Koreas based on robust security to advance inter-Korean relations, and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula to lay a strong foundation for unification. Meanwhile, the “Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula (Dresden Initiative)” and “Three Corridors Proposal” were developed to help build a community based on trust between the two Koreas through projects on environment, people’s livelihood, and culture that both parties can promote together under current conditions.

The Moon Jae-in administration pursued a North Korea policy to achieve “peaceful coexistence” and “co-prosperity.” North Korea participated in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games in January 2018, and South and North Korea held three Summit meetings in

2018, which ultimately produced the “Panmunjom Declaration” and “Pyeongyang Joint Declaration.” However, North Korea did not live up to the agreement between the two Koreas when talks stalled at the Hanoi Summit between the U.S. and North Korea in February 2019. It then severed communication with South Korea and resumed its nuclear and missile programs. In June 2020, North Korea blew up the South-North Joint Liaison Office in Gaeseong, and in September 2020, a South Korean government official was shot in the West Sea, grinding inter-Korean relations to a complete standstill.

2

Yoon Suk Yeol Administration’s Policy on Unification and North Korea

Under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, circumstances surrounding the Korean Peninsula remain bleak. Tensions between U.S., China, and Russia are growing intense, further complicating the regional order in Northeast Asia. While security cooperation among the countries in the region is scarce, the arms race appears to gain steam, and the risk of confrontations and conflicts - accidental or otherwise - is ever-present. By successfully test-launching an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in March 2022, North Korea effectively withdrew its moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests declared in April 2018, and returned to an uncompromising nuclear development strategy it had pursued until 2017. On September 8, 2022, at the 7th meeting of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea legislated a law on the use of nuclear force that stipulated its right to a preemptive nuclear strike just a decade

after it declared itself a nuclear power in its Constitution.

Under these circumstances, the two biggest tasks for South Korea are denuclearizing North Korea and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. This is because achieving a denuclearized, peaceful, and prosperous Korean Peninsula by way of transforming the hostile relations between the two Koreas into a peaceful coexistence committed to unification has a direct profound impact on our very survival and future as a nation.

Thus, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration pursues peaceful unification based on its constitutional order of liberal democracy. It also adopted unification and North Korea policies aimed at creating a “Denuclearized, Peaceful and Prosperous Korean Peninsula.”

1) Policy Vision

The underlying vision of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s unification and North Korea policies is to achieve a “Denuclearized, Peaceful, and Prosperous Korean Peninsula” by promoting peaceful unification rooted in its constitutional order of liberal democracy. This vision has direct links to Article 4 of the South Korean Constitution, which clearly states, “The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.”

The Yun Suk Yeol administration’s unification and North Korea policies consist of three principles and five key tasks based on the vision of creating a “denuclearized, peaceful, and prosperous Korean Peninsula.”

[Table 4-3] Diagram of Unification and North Korea Policies Promoted by the Yoon Suk Yeol Administration

<p>Vision</p>	<p>Peaceful unification based on a free democratic order - A denuclearized, peaceful, and prosperous Korean Peninsula -</p>
<p>Driving Principles</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Ensure that military provocations of any kind will not be tolerated ② Develop mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations ③ Lay the foundation for peaceful unification
<p>Key Initiatives</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Create a virtuous cycle of denuclearization and trust building between the two Koreas ② Pursue normalization of inter-Korean relations based on mutual respect ③ Promote the human rights issues of North Korean people and address the pain brought by national division ④ Restore ethnic homogeneity through open access and communication ⑤ Prepare for unification with the Korean people and the international community

2) Guiding Principles

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration has established the following three principles to help create a non-nuclear, peaceful, and prosperous Korean Peninsula.

(1) Ensure that Military Provocations of Any Kind Will Not be Tolerated

The government has made clear that it does not seek to alter the status quo through force nor has any hostility towards North Korea. Yet, the government’s stance is that it will not tolerate North Korea’s nuclear threats or military provocations. Therefore the government will effectively deter and respond to North Korea’s military provocations with its solid ROK-U.S. alliance, and if necessary, will jointly respond to North Korea by working closely with the international community.

In addition to the government's coordination with the international community, continuous efforts will be made to prevent accidental military clashes between the two Koreas and to build confidence on military-related issues.

(2) Develop Mutually Beneficial Inter-Korean Relations

Believing that all inter-Korean issues should be resolved through dialogue, the government will try to establish a state of inter-Korean relations based on mutual benefit and flexible reciprocity. Such an approach will create a new order for inter-Korean relations that allows both Koreas to prosper. The government will line up to its principles while taking a pragmatic approach that considers the shared interests of the two Koreas as well as the differences between them.

(3) Lay the Foundation for Peaceful Unification

The government does not seek unification by absorption but instead will pursue peaceful unification based on a basic free and democratic order (as stipulated by Article 4 of the Constitution of South Korea). Peaceful unification will remain an ultimate goal of the government, and in the process of accomplishing such a goal, the government will work towards a denuclearized, peaceful, and prosperous Korean peninsula while enhancing cooperation and pursuing dialogue both domestically and internationally. By doing so, the government will create the favorable environment for unification in a step-by-step process.

3) Key Tasks

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration has set the following five key tasks under the above-stated vision and guiding principles.

(1) Create a Virtuous Cycle of Denuclearization and Trust-Building between the Two Koreas

The first task is to establish a virtuous cycle that ensures North Korea's complete denuclearization and builds trust between the two Koreas. To this end, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, with a keen sense of responsibility as a party to the North Korean nuclear issue, will promote the "Audacious Initiative" to complete the denuclearization of North Korea and deliver sustainable peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

The "Audacious Initiative" aims to take early measures centered on projects to improve people's livelihoods once North Korea returns to denuclearization negotiations, and it also seeks to simultaneously pursue comprehensive cooperative measures in the economic, political, and military sectors in line with North Korea's progress in denuclearization. On the economic level, the South Korean Government will prioritize five initiatives across three areas: building infrastructure, improving the lives of people, and developing the economy. To this end, it will set up the "Inter-Korean Joint Economic Development Committee (tentative name)" to discuss and coordinate economic cooperation plans between the two Koreas. At the political and military level, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration will promote measures to ease military tensions and establish genuine peace on the

Korean Peninsula.

Furthermore, efforts at the level of inter-Korean relations will continue to create a driving force for a virtuous cycle of North Korean denuclearization and trust-building between the two Koreas. Although the South Korean government does not plan to approach its counterpart in the North with its hat in hand, it is willing to resolve issues through dialogue regardless of the format and agenda, and will indeed continue to seek opportunities for dialogue. In particular, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration hopes to resolve humanitarian issues, such as humanitarian aid or the issue of separated families, without pushing for a political or military agenda. Moreover, it wants to prioritize exchanges and cooperation in the fields of social culture, climate, the environment, and people's livelihoods to restore ethnic homogeneity and create a foundation for co-prosperity between the two Koreas.

(2) Pursue Normalization of Inter-Korean Relations Based on Mutual Respect

Second on the list of key tasks is normalizing inter-Korean relations based on mutual respect.

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration wants to establish a mutually respectful and beneficial relationship between the two Koreas. The government wishes to establish a climate of mutual respect and reciprocity. To this end, it will establish a set of structures and traditions whereby “even the smallest agreements between the two Koreas are well implemented.” Based on this foundation, the government will be receptive to discussing a variety of issues regarding

inter-Korean cooperation from denuclearization and establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula to economic, humanitarian, and socio-cultural cooperation.

Furthermore, the government will maintain a practical and flexible approach to inter-Korean relations while upholding its national dignity and core values. Throughout the process, the government will point out North Korea's wrongful conduct while demanding that the North refrain from such action.

Any normalization of inter-Korean relations will be built on a legal and principled basis. Engagement and dialogue will take place as stipulated by the "Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act." Even if the process takes time, the government will increase the transparency of its North Korea policies by seeking consultations and taking all required steps through a domestically coordinated process.

(3) Promote the Human Rights of North Korean People and Address the Pain Brought about by National Division

The third critical task is to promote the human rights of North Koreans and relieve the pain caused by the division of the Korean Peninsula.

The government upholds its stance that humanitarian cooperation will continue regardless of political or military circumstances. This is in consideration of humanitarianism and inter-Korean solidarity. To that end, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration pledges to promote cooperation to improve the humanitarian situation of the North Korean people. The government will take proactive measures such as supporting vulnerable cohorts of the population in North Korea (including children, infants,

and pregnant women) and responding to pandemics and disasters. This will take place through close coordination with the international community, civil society organizations, and other institutions.

Furthermore, the South Korean government will take practical steps to improve human rights in North Korea. As promoting human rights will give people in North Korea more freedom and a better quality of life, such efforts will bring North Korea a step closer to the universal values of humanity. The government will prioritize establishing the “North Korea Human Rights Foundation” and a “North Korea Human Rights Advisory Committee” to reestablish government-citizen cooperation in the area of North Korean human rights and bolster the human rights-centered activities of civil society organizations. To ensure that universal values based on international norms are respected in North Korea, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration vows to work closely with the international community as well as North Korea to help promote human rights.

The South Korean government will actively seek to relieve the pain brought about by the division of the peninsula, offering support for separated families and addressing other humanitarian issues. Considering the advanced age of separated family members, the issue is urgent and requires a timely and practical solution. Confirming the life or death of all separated family members, arranging regular separated family meetings, and other basic solutions should be pursued while remaining prepared for future exchanges, video messages, DNA tests, and so on. Action will also be taken to confirm the life or death and return prisoners of the Korean War, abductees, and other detainees. Domestically, the South Korean government will designate

“Separated Families Day” as a national commemorative day to share the pain brought about by the division and promote understanding of the difficulties separated family members face.

Lastly, the government will closely assist North Korean defectors, and improve the social safety net for their successful settlement in South Korean society. Institutional support will also be provided to defectors so that they can become proud members of our community. This will include an effective early support system as well as tailored job training and education programs to improve their prospects for employment and their quality of life. Especially for people in potential blind spots of social services, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration will set up an integrated support system to resolve their difficulties.

(4) Restore Ethnic Homogeneity Through Open Access and Communication

The fourth task is to restore ethnic homogeneity through open access and communication between the two Koreas.

Since it is important to increase understanding of one another and restore ethnic homogeneity, the South Korean government believes that exchanges and cooperation are the most practical ways for improving inter-Korean relations. Thus, the government will carry out inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation even before North Korea denuclearizes. These initiatives will include the publishing of the “Grand Dictionary of Korean Language” (Gyeoremal-keunsajeon), the archeological excavation of the Gaeseong Manwoldae area, and other projects dealing with culture and history that the two Koreas already agreed to pursue but have since suspended. Once such projects resume

their work, the government will try to ensure that they can continue in a sustainable manner. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration will also actively support exchanges and cooperation that citizens initiate in the areas of sports, art, religion, academia, and so on while creating opportunities for youth to take part in such endeavors.

Another critical issue will be the “Green Détente” between the two Koreas for climate change policy and environmental sustainability on the Korean Peninsula. An appropriate response to climate change and environmental pollution is a challenge that we all face right now, and an issue that crosses borders. Thus, the government will take a step-by-step approach to an inter-Korean Green Détente as a joint response of the two Koreas. Starting with the areas of forestry, drinking water, and sanitation, inter-Korean cooperation will be expanded to environmentally-friendly cooperation between towns, cooperation in disaster and crisis response, joint use of water resources, and so on. Ultimately, such cooperation could help establish the infrastructure for responding to environmental issues and climate change. Furthermore, the Demilitarized Zone will be developed to become a platform for cooperation, communication, ecology, culture, peace, and global security.

(5) Prepare for Unification with the Korean People and the International Community

The fifth and final key task for the Yoon Suk Yeol administration is to prepare for unification together with the Korean people and the international community.

At its core, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration carries on the

legacy of the “National Community Unification Formula” with some improvements of its own. Thirty years have passed since the South Korean government announced the National Community Unification Formula in 1994. The current administration will improve and develop its unification policy in accordance with present circumstances, so it can become a policy that people can relate to. Throughout this process, the government will listen to public opinion both inside and outside the Korean peninsula to reignite the interest and determination of the Korean people.

To prepare for unification in a legal and institutional manner, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration will introduce the “Peaceful Unification Foundation Establishment Act,” which will include building a foundation for unification and training people for a unified Korean Peninsula. In doing so, the government will strengthen its foundation for unification and prepare for unification in a much more stable and organized manner.

Meanwhile, to promote understanding about unification among people from all backgrounds, the “social dialogue” project will be expanded across the country to encourage people from different backgrounds, including those in their 20s and 30s, to take part in discussions on unification and North Korea policy. In order to offer more people better access to high-quality unification-related administrative services and benefits, “Unification Plus (+) Centers” will work with local agencies related to unification to provide integrated services. Furthermore, to help improve the future generation’s views on unification, the government will utilize media platforms, metaverse technology, and other forms of media to provide diverse content

related to unification education for younger generations.

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration also wishes to induce support from the international community for the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. Through some close coordination and cooperation with related countries, the government will promote understanding and support from the international community. To this end, public diplomacy initiatives related to unification will be expanded, and the government will support the activities of the civilian sector and overseas Koreans as well.

4) The “Audacious Initiative”

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration, for its “Audacious Initiative,” aims to fundamentally resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, which has worsened over the past 30 years, through the simultaneous and step-by-step implementation of North Korea’s denuclearization measures and South Korea’s economic, political, and military measures. In essence, it is a proposal that looks to create a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula together. The “Audacious Initiative” is not simply about making proposals and waiting for North Korea’s response. Rather, it entails a comprehensive 3D approach outlined below. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration is focused on deterring North Korea’s nuclear threat; dissuading the North, with sanctions and pressure, from further developing its nuclear capabilities; and using dialogue to create an atmosphere for North Korea to return to denuclearization negotiations on its own accord.

If North Korea returns to denuclearization negotiations with

sincerity, this policy will pursue initial measures to improve the people's livelihood and build trust in North Korea, thereby creating a driving force for full-scale and further negotiations. Thereafter, if denuclearization negotiations proceed, a comprehensive agreement will be drafted on this, a multi-pronged denuclearization and economic, political, and military approach will be taken simultaneously so that North Korea can quickly move from “substantial denuclearization” to “complete denuclearization.”

At a press conference to mark his 100th day in office (on August 17, 2022), President Yoon Suk Yeol said that if North Korea shows genuine commitment toward denuclearization, his administration could take an “auspicious initiative.” The President also revealed that he did not expect complete denuclearization right away.

The “Audacious Initiative” is a key measure toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea as well as sustainable peace and



If North Korea ceases developing nuclear weapons and commits to actual denuclearization, I am willing to propose a Audacious Initiative that can drastically improve North Korea's economy and people's livelihood in line with their progress.

The Initiative could include large-scale food supply programs to North Korea, support for power generation, transmission, distribution infrastructure, modernization of ports and airports for international trade, technical support to improve agricultural productivity in North Korea, support to modernize hospitals and healthcare infrastructure, and international investment as well as financial assistance programs.


- August 15, 2022, Congratulatory speech on the 77th Anniversary of Liberation Day

prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. It acknowledges the fact that the South Korean government feels a sense of ownership and responsibility toward resolving the North Korean nuclear threat. If North Korea returns to denuclearization talks with sincerity, the government will take measures listed in the Audacious Initiative that will improve North Korean people's lives and build confidence between the two Koreas. As part of these initial measures, the government will move forward with the Resources for Food Exchange Program (R-FEP) as well as measures that could improve North Korean people's lives such as pilot projects in the areas of healthcare, water, sanitation, forestry, agriculture, and so on. If North Korea takes subsequent steps toward denuclearization, additional projects will be carried out. In coordination with the international community, R-FEP will partially exempt North Korea from sanctions to make it possible for them to export minerals and use the profits to purchase food, fertilizer, medication, and other humanitarian supplies.

Initial measures following North Korea's steps toward denuclearization will build momentum for negotiations to help establish a comprehensive agreement, and such an agreement will include a definition for the end state of denuclearization and corresponding measures for each step North Korea takes. Once a comprehensive agreement is secured, it will be used to implement a comprehensive set of measures in the economic, political, and military sectors, corresponding to steps that the North takes towards denuclearization. During the "actual denuclearization" stage, five key projects in three sectors, namely, infrastructure construction, improving people's lives, and economic development, will be carried out as the

main target areas. Here, the key projects will include assistance on power generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure, ports and airports modernization, technical assistance to enhance agricultural productivity, modernization of hospitals and medical infrastructure, promotion of international investment, and financial support initiatives. To this end, the “Inter-Korean Joint Economic Development Committee (tentative name)” will be established to coordinate and calibrate all the economic cooperation measures between the two Koreas.

On the political and military level, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration will promote measures to ease military tensions and establish genuine peace on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the government will assist North Korea to improve its relations with the U.S. through diplomatic measures, discuss means to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and look to build confidence between the two Koreas to reduce tensions and prevent accidental military clashes. Furthermore, efforts at the level of inter-Korean relations will continue to create a driving force for a virtuous cycle of North Korean denuclearization and trust-building between the two parties.



[Figure 4-1] Audacious Initiative for a Denuclearized, Peaceful, and Prosperous Korean Peninsula

Section 2

South and North Korea's Unification Formula

South and North Korea see unification as an important national goal, and thus have come up with a series of policies and what it calls “unification formulas.” Although South and North Korea both want to unify the Korean Peninsula, they do have differences in the specific means for unification and future vision on what a unified Korea should look like.

Article 4 of South Korean Constitution clearly states, “The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” Accordingly, South Korea envisions a new unified national community in which the individual freedoms, rule of law, and human dignity of each individual as the “owner” of the nation are guaranteed, and where everyone can enjoy a free and prosperous living. Thus, over the past few decades, the South Korean government has pursued an approach to achieve unification in a more gradual and step-by-step

manner via a democratic and peaceful method rooted in a nationwide consensus, and each successive government has carried on the legacy of the “National Community Unification Formula” while forming its own policy toward unification.

Meanwhile, guided by its goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula under a communist banner, North Korea has continued to promote the federal system, modifying the extent and details of its overarching unification policy according to changes in internal and external circumstances. North Korea first proposed a “South-North Federation” based on its policy of “Communist revolution of South Korea first, then Communist unification of the Korean Peninsula.” It was replaced by its proposal on a “Federation of Koryo” and “Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” as its official unification plan. North Korea’s unification plan, the “federation system,” means that the two Koreas form a single federal government with political, diplomatic, and military authority, while leaving their different ideologies and institutions intact. In the 1990s, amid drastic changes in its domestic and international environment, North Korea came up with a “Loose Federation” formula, then a “Low-level Federation” formula in which the two governments of the South and the North pursue unification gradually with their current functions and authorities, including political, military, and diplomatic powers intact.

It is evident the unification plans of the two Koreas are different in that they each prefer different systems - national community for the South and federation for the North - based on different future visions for unification. However, the confederation formula proposed by North Korea is a union of states only in the matter of sovereignty,

and is closer to a federation in terms of practical institutions and policy execution.

Both sides could find common ground in that the plan for unification between the two Koreas pursues unification through exchange and cooperation while maintaining their respective systems. This, in fact, was confirmed in the “June 15th Joint Declaration” signed back in 2000. Paragraph 2 of the “June 15th Joint Declaration” (“Acknowledging that there are common elements in the South’s proposal on a confederation and the North’s proposal on a federation of the lower level as the formulae for achieving unification, the South and the North agreed to promote unification in that direction”) implied that the two Koreas aim for unification on the basis of mutual recognition of systems while pursuing coexistence and co-prosperity.

1**South Korean Unification Formula: “National Community Unification Formula”**

The South Korean government is taking an approach aimed at building a national community through reconciliation and a broader scope of exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas through a gradual, step-by-step unification process. The experience in terms of inter-Korean relations since the division has made South Koreans recognize that the key to establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula lies in building mutual trust. Furthermore, since true unification can only be achieved when all members of the nation share the same set of community cultural values and beliefs that go beyond the unification

of territories and institutions, it is clear unification is a gradual, long-term process.

Taking this into account, the South Korean government has sought to ultimately deliver on its promise of unification through a functional integration of the two Koreas achieved with a transitional period that can help build mutual trust in the process. This was followed by the “Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification (1982),” the “Korean National Community Unification Formula (1989),” and “National Community Unification Formula (1994).” This last unification formula adds substance to the government’s stance of achieving “peace first, unification later.” It demands the two Koreas first build mutual trust through reconciliation and cooperation, then build a national community that can facilitate political integration down the road.

1) Guiding Value and Approaches to Unification

The “National Community Unification Formula” is based on liberal democracy as its philosophy of unification, and building one national community as its approach to unification.

Philosophically, South Korea’s unification policy is based on liberal democracy. Liberal democracy as a philosophy of unification includes guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of each member, rejecting social exclusion, and respecting the diversity of South and North Korea. To this end, liberal democracy is a philosophy that should be pursued consistently not only in the process and procedures of unification, but also after the unification of Korea.

Unification reflects the desire of our divided nation to be reborn

as one national community. This national community works as a root that unites a nation as one and stands as a destiny for Koreans. It also functions as a source of strength that enables Korean people to unite.

Thus, according to the approach under the National Community Unification Formula, the two Koreas are the partners which are to form economic, social, and cultural communities first and then a political community as the ultimate phase of unification with one nation, one country, one system, and one government.

2) Principles of Unification

The “National Community Unification Formula” presents “independence, peace, and democracy” as the basic principles of unification.

First, the principle of “independence” means that unification should be achieved through the will and strength of the Korean people and through mutual agreement between the authorities of the two Koreas. It means that Korea will make independent decisions regarding its position, while remaining in harmony with the world during the process of unification.

Second, the principle of “peace” emphasizes that unification must be realized only through a peaceful process. It means that no matter how lofty a task of unification may be, it should not be realized through force or violence.

Third, the principle of “democracy” states that unification must be achieved through democratic ways of integration based on the freedom and rights of all constituents. This means that the process and


procedures of unification should be based on democracy, and that a unified Korea should be a democratic state in which all members of the nation are stakeholders.

3) Process of Unification

Under the guiding principle that unification should be achieved gradually and step by step, the “National Community Unification Plan” proposes three gradual phases for achieving unification: the first phase of Reconciliation and Cooperation, the second phase of the Korean Commonwealth, and a Unified Korea with one nation, one state, one regime, and one government.

The first phase, called as Reconciliation and Cooperation, begins with a new chapter of cooperation between the two Koreas, designed to mitigate hostilities and mistrust. At this stage, the two Koreas

[Table 4-4] National Community Unification Formula



peacefully maintain the existing two systems and two governments, while promoting exchanges and cooperation in various fields. Here, the two Koreas recognize and respect each other's system, maintain peace, and ease the residual hostility and distrust through exchanges and cooperation in a variety of fields, including the economy, society, and culture.

The second Korean Commonwealth stage encourages and institutionalizes broader exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas based on the mutual trust generated at the Reconciliation and Cooperation stage. It is an intermediate step leading to unification. South and North Korea build mutual trust while promoting the establishment of peace and bringing back the common national identity. Various plans for national integration are put forward at Summit meetings, Ministerial meetings, inter-Korean councils, and a new Commonwealth Secretariat. In other words, this Commonwealth phase is where the two Koreas manage the integration process through cooperative relations geared toward unification under their different systems and governments.

The third and final phase involves a Unified Korea as one nation-state. At this stage, in accordance with the Unified Constitution, the two sides will proceed to hold a free general election in both areas and constitute a unified National Assembly and unified government. Thus, in a Unified Korea, every constituent will be guaranteed political, economic freedom, and welfare along with a dignity as human.

In short, the “National Community Unification Formula” envisions that the two Koreas first foster mutual trust through reconciliation and cooperation, and then create the basis for political integration.

Given the mutual mistrust and differences built up over the past seven decades of division, setting up a Korean Commonwealth as a transitional stage could go a long way in bringing the two sides closer toward unification. As such, the “National Community Unification Formula” aims to build a unified motherland of “one nation, one state” by melding the disparate societies of the South and the North to restore a single community with a gradual, step-by-step approach.

2 North Korean Unification Formula

For North Korea, unification has always meant inciting and completing a socialist and communist revolution in the South. Although North Korea continue to have its unification and South Korea strategy with the goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula under a communist banner, its unification formula has changed according to the prevailing circumstances of the times.

On August 15th, 1960, celebrating the 15th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan, North Korea proposed the “South-North Federation Formula” as its first unification formula in which existing systems both in the South and North are to remain. This formula has developed in the Federation of Koryo in 1973. In these two formulas, the Federation was a transitional system to unification. Then, at the 6th Labor Party Congress on October 10, 1980, North Korea proposed a “Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” as its final form of a unified Korea.

Since the 1990s, however, North Korea has made some tactical changes to its Federation system. In the face of greater diplomatic isolation and economic hardship in the post-Soviet era, North Korea has increasingly become anxious about the very survival of its regime. It thus began to seek means to co-exist with the South. In its New Year's address in 1991, Pyongyang unveiled its new Federation formula featuring one nation, one state, two systems, and two governments in which they insisted that regional autonomous government should be granted more powers as provisional measures until completing the final stage of a unified Korea.

Moving into the 2000s, the North proposed the “Low-level Federation” formula. At a conference in Pyongyang (October 2000) commemorating the 20th anniversary of its “Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” policy, North Korea announced the “Low-level Federation” system based on the principle of one nation, one state, two systems, and two governments, with both governments in the North and South retaining their respective functions and powers. At the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, North Korea amended the Platform of the Workers' Party of Korea regarding the matter of unification. The preamble of the North Korean Party Platform now states, “The immediate purpose of the Workers' Party of Korea is to 'build a prosperous and civilized socialist society' in the northern half of the Republic, to then 'ensure the independent and democratic development of society' nationwide, and the ultimate goal is to 'build a communist

society in which the ideals of the people are fully realized.”³

1) North Korea's South Korea Strategy

Given its stance on unification called “One Korea,” North Korea has approached the issue of unification only from the perspective of “revolution and liberation.” This means the North would be the revolutionary base for “revolutionizing all of the Korean Peninsula,” while South Korea remains an “un-liberated” territory under the occupation of “U.S. imperialists.” Therefore, North Korea’s concept of national unification was premised on revolutionizing South Korea under the banner of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Although North Korea’s strategy toward South Korea for the communist unification of the Korean Peninsula has remained consistent in principle over the past few decades, specific aspects of its strategy have changed from one guided by what it calls a “Democratic Base” theory to one guided by “revolution of national liberation and people’s democracy” due in large part to the changing circumstances both within and outside the Korean Peninsula.

3 The Preamble to the existing rules of the Workers’ Party of Korea revised at the 7th party congress in 2016 states, “The immediate purpose of the Workers’ Party of Korea is to ‘build a prosperous socialist state’ in the northern half of the Republic, to then ‘execute the task of national liberation and democratic revolution’ nationwide, and the ultimate goal is to ‘dynamically wage the struggle for modeling the whole society on Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.’”

(1) Democratic Base Theory

North Korea's strategy toward South Korea was first presented in the form of a "Democratic Base" theory in 1945, not long after liberation. According to this theory, North Korea argued that it (North Korea) should be revolutionized first to serve as a "revolutionary base" and then attempt to revolutionize the uninitiated South.

North Korea's decision to push its "Democratic Base" theory toward South Korea was to unify the entire Korean Peninsula leveraging the favorable conditions that North Korea enjoyed in many ways over South Korea immediately after the liberation.

(2) Revolution of National Liberation and People's Democracy Theory

In the early 1970s, North Korea adopted a strategy called "revolution of national liberation and people's democracy." The strategy implied that revolutionary forces of South Korea should first revolutionize in the South and then at the next stage, socialist revolution will be carried on. This "two-phased revolution theory" came out as Pyongyang saw it extremely difficult to unify the South by force any longer since different systems and ideologies had taken a deep root in North and South Korea after the Korea War.

Moreover, North Korea put forward the "strengthening of three major revolutionary capabilities" as practical means to complete the South Korean revolution: strengthening the revolutionary capacity of North Korea, of South Korea, and of the global community. Here, "strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities" is to enhance North Korea's ability and role as a "revolutionary base" for instigating and completing a revolution in the South. To this end, North Korea focused

on arming North Koreans with its *juche* ideology, both politically and ideologically building a robust autonomous national economy, and strengthening its military capabilities as a means of ensuring its victory on the Korean Peninsula.

In terms of its strategy toward South Korea, North Korea worked on deepening the social divide in the South, growing underground organizations, and forming a variety of different fronts on the unification issue to incite as much chaos as possible, which could then give impetus to a people's revolution from within the South Korean society itself. Internationally, North Korea used its diplomatic channels to establish conditions that could facilitate a communist unification of the Korean Peninsula.

(3) National Coordination Theory

At a “2001 Conference to Open the Door to Unification among Our People,” held in January 2001, North Korea suggested that “foreign power should be excluded in the process [of unification]” and the two Koreas should “resolve the unification issue on our own with better national coordination.” It started using phrases such as “national coordination” and “between Korean nationals” in its unification strategy.

With its isolation and economic crisis plunging deeper into a bottomless pit since the end of the Cold War, keeping its regime afloat has become a top priority of North Korea, and thus this “National Coordination” theory has become its core unification strategy toward South Korea. North Korea’s “National Coordination” continues to promote South-South conflict within South Korean society, and at the

same time, it is also used as an internal propaganda logic that South Korean aid to North Korea is based on the long-held tradition of mutual assistance between Koreans.

Like so, Pyeongyang's strategy toward South Korea has changed superficially to reflect the changing environment, but the core of its unification strategy, which remains to achieve communist unification by instigating anti-American campaigns and pro-North Korean sentiments within South Korean society without change virtually.

2) Changes to North Korea's Unification Formulas

North Korea's unification formula, based largely upon its Federation system, has evolved over the years to reflect the conditions and changes of the times. Before North Korea proposed its "Federation" system for the first time in 1960, it put forward military and communist unification based on its "Democratic Base" driven by the idea to create a unified Korea militarily. This "Democratic Base" theory developed into the "South Korean Revolution" theory' after South Korea's April Revolution in 1960. Here, North Korea proposed the "South-North Federation Formula" as a transitional step toward full unification. Thereafter, the "South Korean Revolution" gave way to the "Federation" proposal, then to the "Democratic Confederation of Koryo" in 1973 and "Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo" in 1980. Entering the 1990s, the Federation proposal for "one nation, one state, two systems, two governments" geared toward preserving the political systems in both Koreas took a turn toward what North Korea called a "Low-level Federation" system in the 2000s.


(1) 1950s: “Democratic Base” Theory and Unification by Force

From the liberation of Korea to the Korean War, North Korea’s unification strategy was inspired by its “Democratic Base” theory. To this end, Kim Il Sung declared on December 17, 1945, that he would “turn North Korea into a strong democratic base for a unified democratic state,” and went on to actually attempt the unification of Korea by force under its communist system.

(2) 1960s~1970s: South-North Federation and Federation of Koryo

Entering the 1960s, North Korea maintained its “Democratic Base” theory and deployed a dual strategy of proposing peaceful unification and inciting a “communist revolution in South Korea.” Here, the latter culminated in the “South-North Federation.” Kim Il Sung first proposed a new “South-North Federation” on August 14, 1960, in his speech celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of the National Liberation Day. He insisted that a free general election should be held in both North and South Korea without foreign intervention and if the authorities of South Korea could not accept it, Pyongyang proposes

[Table 4-5] Changes to North Korea’s Unification Formulas



a Federation of South and North Korea as an interim step toward unification.”

The main idea of this Federation proposal was to allow the current respective political systems of the two Koreas as they were, and then to form a National Supreme Committee to coordinate matters pertaining to the economic and cultural development of the two sides in a unified manner. North Korea’s proposal was, however, closer in reality to an inter-state system rather than a true Federation.

Following its “South-North Federation” proposal, North Korea presented its “Five-Point Policy for National Unification.” The Policy was formed to ① remove military confrontation and lessen tensions between the South and North; ② realize multi-sided cooperation and interchange between the South and North; ③ convene a Great National Congress comprising representatives of people of all strata, political parties, and social organizations from the South and North; ④ institute a South-North Federation under the single name of the Federation of Republic of Koryo; and to ⑤ enter the UN under the single name of the Federation of Republic of Koryo.

(3) 1980s: Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo

At the 6th Labor Party Congress on October 10, 1980, North Korea presented its “Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo,” which reorganized the existing unification plans and formulas based on a policy report compiled by Kim Il Sung. The constitutional principles of the federal system were to: ① establish a federal republic, each with its own territories with the same powers

and duties, in recognition of existing ideologies and systems in the South and the North; and ② form a Supreme National Federation Council for the Federation with an equal number of representatives, and a Standing Federation Committee as a permanent body for the Council to lead governments in the South and North.

Meanwhile, as a “prerequisite for an independent and peaceful unification,” North Korea demanded the abolition of the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Act in order to democratize South Korea, the legalization of all political parties and social organizations, the guarantee of free political activities for individual members of all political parties and social groups, and the release of democratic and patriotic figures. To ease tensions and eliminate the risk of war, North Korea proposed negotiations with the U.S. to convert the Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea in the near-term, non-intervention by the U.S. in the internal affairs of Korea, and put an end to U.S. policy of sustaining two different Koreas.

Ultimately, North Korea’s “Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” policy was flawed in that the prerequisites for independent and peaceful unification from its perspective were based on the idea of inciting a communist revolution in South Korea. Furthermore, the idea was proposed to establish a Federation while maintaining the ideology and systems of the two Koreas. A genuine Federation with two ideological and political systems is all but impossible in reality. The “Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” also unilaterally adopts the name of the supposedly new state, the form of the state, and foreign policy line, without presenting any specifics or

procedures leading to a Federation, such as a new constitution for the Federation.

(4) 1990s: Federation System for “One Nation, One State, Two Systems, Two Governments”

In the 1990s, North Korea made some tactical changes to its Federation system. Facing diplomatic isolation and economic hardships brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and other socialist blocs in Eastern Europe, North Korea sought ways to co-exist with South Korea in order to sustain its regime. Under such circumstances, North Korea proposed a new Federation system with “one nation, one state, two systems, two governments” in its 1991 New Year’s address.

North Korea suggested “gradual unification into a Federation” by which regional autonomous governments are to be granted more powers and authorities at an initial stage and then gradually those powers are to be transferred to the central government.” The North’s emphasis on “more powers on regional autonomous governments,” where regional governments exert the rights of diplomacy, military, and internal affairs, was driven to ensure the survival of its regime. From this standpoint, the Federation system for “one nation, one state, two systems, two governments” is closer to a defensive strategy and one that a regime on the brink of collapse would deploy compared to the previously proposed “Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo.”

However, regarding the actual unification process, North Korea continued to insist on its prerequisites for the Federation system.

When Pyeongyang unveiled its “Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo,” it also adopted the “10-point Programs for Great Unity of the Whole Nation,” which states “to achieve independent and peaceful unification, the entire nation must unite and establish an independent, peaceful, and neutral unified nation.” On top of its 10-point Program, North Korea unilaterally demanded the South to abandon reliance on foreign forces, to announce the pullout of American forces from the peninsula, to stop joint military exercises with the U.S., and to withdraw from the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Meanwhile, regarding its guiding principles of unification, North Korea arbitrarily interpreted the “Three Principles of Unification” agreed in the “July 4 South-North Joint Statement.” It argued “independence” as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the exclusion of U.S. interference, “peaceful unification” as the South stopping the modernization of its military and all military exercises, and “great national unity” as the abrogation of the National Security Act and the legalization of the Communist party in the South.

(5) 2000s: “Low-level Federation” and “Three Charters for National Unification”

At the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the two Koreas acknowledged that South Korea’s “Confederation” and North Korea’s “Low-level Federation” system do share some similarities. North Korea’s “Low-level Federation” system, is based on the principle of establishing “one nation, one state, two systems, and two governments,” and it requires a national unification organ on top of

the existing South and North Korean governments, which are left to exercise their full functions and powers in the political, military, and diplomatic fields.

On May 30, 2002, through a column in the *Rodong Sinmun*, North Korea stated that the “June 15 Joint Declaration” was aimed at establishing a Federation system for unification purposes, and that “the ‘Low-level Federation’ system does not mean that the South and North have completely agreed on the unification plan, but it rather means that both sides have agreed to leverage the commonalities found in each other’s unification policies to pursue unification.”

Kim Jong Un’s ascension to power has brought little change to North Korea’s strategy toward South Korea and unification. In 2014, through the “Special Proposal” promulgated by the National Defense Commission and a “Statement of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” North Korea renamed its unification plan, which had been referred to as a loose federation system and a low-level federation, as a “Federation system” plan. Then, in 2019, North Korea amended its constitution to “maintain its endeavors for independence, peaceful unification, and national unity” (Article 9) as a show of its commitment to carrying on the legacy and unification strategies previously pursued by both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

In the Preamble of the Platform of the Workers’ Party of Korea revised in January 2021, it states, “The immediate purpose of the Workers’ Party of Korea is to ‘build a prosperous and civilized socialist society’ in the northern half of the Republic, to then


[Table 4-6] Changes to South and North Korea’s Unification Formulas

Class	South Korea		North Korea	
1948–1960	Rhee Syngman administration	UN-supervised free general elections in South and North Korea		Unification by force and under communism based on the Democratic Base theory (national liberation theory)
1960	Chang Myon administration	Free general elections in South and North Korea (under UN supervision)		South-North Federation (1960)
	Park Chung-hee administration	Construction first, unification later (1966)		
1970	Park Chung-hee administration	Special Declaration on Foreign Policy for Peaceful Unification [June 23, 1973] Peace first, unification later (1974)	Kim Il Sung regime	Federation of Koryo (1973) Five-Point Policy for National Reunification
1980	Chun Doo-hwan administration	Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification (1982)		Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (1980) (Unification Formula for the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo)
1990	Roh Tae-woo administration	Korean National Community Unification Formula (1989)		Federation system with one nation, one state, two systems, two governments (1991)
2000	Kim Young-sam administration	National Community Unification Formula (one nation, one state) (1994)	Kim Jong Il regime	Lower-level Federation (2000)
	Kim Dae-jung administration			
	Roh Moo-hyun administration			
2010	Lee Myung-bak administration	National Community Unification Formula (one nation, one state) (1994)	Kim Jong Un regime	Three Charters for National Unification (Three policies for national unification, Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo, 10-point Programs for Great Unity of the Whole Nation)
	Park Geun-hye administration			
	Moon Jae-in administration			
2020	Yoon Suk Yeol administration			

‘ensure the independent and democratic development of society’ nationwide.” Although the provision stating “execute the task of national liberation and democratic revolution’ nationwide” was deleted, it is difficult to say that there has been a fundamental change in North Korea’s unification strategy.

[Table 4-7] Comparing the National Community Unification Formula (South Korea) and Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (North Korea)

Class	National Community Unification Formula	Measures for Establishing the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo
Unification philosophy	Liberal democracy	Juche ideology
Unification principles	Independence, peace, democracy	Independence, peace, great national unity (South Korean revolution, pro-communist cooperation, unification first, exchange and cooperation later)
Actors of unification	All persons of the Korean nation	Proletarian class
Prerequisites	-	Abolition of the National Security Act, legalization of communist activities, withdrawal of US forces from South Korea
Unification process	Reconciliation and Cooperation → South-North Commonwealth → Unified Korea (3-step process) ※ Prioritize the construction of a national community and society (Community unification → National unification)	Immediate formation of one Federation Two autonomous governments ※ Gradual forming of a Federation (1990s)
Transitional unification system	South-North Commonwealth - Adopt an "Inter-Korean Commonwealth Charter" at a Summit meeting, organize a South-North Commonwealth Secretariat ※ Draft a Unification Constitution based on mutual consent from both Koreas → Confirmed by referendum	-
Procedures toward a unified state	Democratic general elections between South and North Korea under the Unification Constitution	Political negotiations by way of joint negotiations
Form of the unified state	Unified country with one nation, one state	Federation with one nation, one state, two systems, and two governments
Governing body of the unified state	Unified government, unified national assembly (bicameral system)	Supreme People's Federation, Federal Standing Committee
Future values of the unified state	An advanced democratic country that guarantees freedom, welfare, and human dignity	-





Future Vision and Preparations for Unification

Section 1. Future Vision for a Unified Korean Peninsula

Section 2. Preparations to Achieve the Future Vision for Unification

Section 1

Future Vision for a Unified Korean Peninsula

Establishing a “future vision for unification” involves drawing a picture of how the Korean Peninsula would look upon achieving unification. A vision, in general, helps drive and motivate actors to achieve an objective. With the number of believers on the need for unification on the decline¹, the need to present a convincing case and well-organized plan for unification is growing every day. Moreover, we shall prepare a specific vision for unification to persuade the international community, featuring a wide variety of positions and interests, and to secure a contingent of countries that will actively

1 Based on the results of a “2021 Unification Awareness Survey” conducted in July 2021 on adults aged 19 and older commissioned by the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies to the Gallup Research Institute of Korea. To the question, “How much do you think South and North Korean unification is necessary? Or do you think it is not necessary?,” 44.6% of respondents answered unification is “necessary (highly necessary + somewhat necessary).” Responses saying unification is necessary stood at 63.8% in 2007, then hovered between 50-59% from 2008 to 2020. In 2021, responses saying unification is necessary dropped below the 50% mark for the first time ever.

support the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

It is also worth noting that a future vision for unification is not limited to the future attained after unification. It can also include various benefits expected during the process of unification. In other words, a future vision for unification entails all of the positive effects we can look forward to from a political, economic, social, and cultural standpoint. This could start with the mutual easing of tensions and mutually beneficial exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas. Thus, our future vision for unification is a concept that applies to the entire process toward unification.

1 Political Vision

At the political level, unification would end the tragic history brought on by the Japanese colonial rule and division, and help build a modern nation-state. As a modern nation-state, a unified Korea will pursue open nationalism that respects cultural diversity and will sustain a democratic country that lines up to universal values such as freedom, equality, and human rights, rather than a vessel for closed nationalism or ethnocentrism.

Currently, the Republic of Korea is pouring resources into its diplomatic endeavors to resolve the problems caused by the division between South and North Korea, including the North Korean nuclear threat. A unified Korea will not only end the needless diplomatic competitions between the two Koreas and help pursue the interests of

a unified Korean peninsula, but it will also transform itself into a leader for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world.

A unified Korean peninsula can play a role in contributing to the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia and the world leveraging the strength and experience it gained from peacefully resolving conflicts all the way back from the Cold War era. A unified Korean peninsula will be able to secure its national interests by resolving conflicts recently rearing its head in Northeast Asia, where maritime powers U.S. and Japan, are pitted against continental powers, China and Russia. By doing so, a unified Korea can ensure the common growth and prosperity of the Northeast Asian region as a whole. Furthermore, a unified Korean Peninsula can contribute to world peace by completely ridding itself of nuclear weapons and establishing itself as a peaceful nation.

2 Economic vision

A unified Korean Peninsula will provide an opportunity to drive new future growth once it reorients its industrial structure to take advantage of the strengths in both South and North Korea. South Korea has a proud legacy of lifting itself out of the devastation left behind by the Korean War, and growing itself from the poorest country in the world to one of the largest economies in the world in just a few decades. Given the changing global economic environment, highlighted by increasing costs to secure raw materials and energy (including logistical costs), however, South Korea is dire need of

new growth engines. Furthermore, its rapidly declining birth rate, aging population, and rising youth unemployment rate are painting a gloomy picture for the future of the Korean economy. South Korea's manufacturing industry, which has led its economic growth so far, is also facing challenges from multiple latecomers where it has excelled in the past.

Greater interaction and cooperation between the two Koreas could lead to some substantial economic benefits. First of all, the different strengths and industrial structures of South and North Korea will allow a unified Korea to maximize its potential in the global market. The unification process could deliver massive benefits that offset the cost of division, currently paid by both sides, even before the process is complete. In addition, if an overland transportation network connecting Korea and Eurasia is in operation, it can be used as an opportunity to restore the geoeconomic potential and competitiveness of the Korean Peninsula, which connects the Pacific Ocean, and the Eurasian continent, and this benefit will spread far beyond the Korean Peninsula itself. Specifically, the economic benefits of unification could come in three directions.

First, it can expand the overall economic scale and size of the Korean Peninsula, and create new growth engines across a number of different industries. The two Koreas together could create a single economic entity backed by a population of 80 million, and this could offer new opportunities for companies both in Korea and abroad. A more stable domestic market, better profits from greater economies of scale, and stronger bargaining power internationally will put the Korean Peninsula in a better position on the global stage. Moreover,

working together to leverage each others' strengths could help both Koreas overcome the limitations against economic growth and generate synergy in a variety of fields. For example, South and North Korea can build industrial and tourism hubs using joint economic zones, develop underground resources in North Korea to build a more efficient energy and mineral supply chain, establish an inter-Korean supply system for agriculture, forestry, livestock, and fisheries, promote joint research initiatives for new and emerging technologies, and enter new overseas markets to deliver innovation in different industries if they decide to work closer with each other.

Second, establishing a transportation and logistics network on the Korean Peninsula that connects the Pacific Ocean and the Eurasian continent can help Korea take a giant leap forward as a key economic hub in Northeast Asia. Although South Korea sits in a peninsula positioned at a strategically important corner of the Eurasian continent, it has not been able to enjoy the full breadth of geoeconomic benefits of being a gateway to and from the Pacific Ocean as it remains cut off from the rest of the continent. However, connecting the South-North railways and roads that pass through the Korean Peninsula, and restoring international air routes and sea routes in the East and Yellow Seas. could tie Korea back into the Eurasian continental transportation network, and help it emerge as a transportation hub connecting the continent and the ocean, as well as a major trade and logistics base in Northeast Asia. Railways can be connected to the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and the Trans-China Railway (TCR), and roads can be connected by the Asian Highway (AH1, AH6). This way, South Korea, which had been virtually an island, will finally be able to reconnect

with the rest of the Eurasian continent. Building a high-speed rail network across the length of the Korean Peninsula could usher in a new era where people and cargo can travel from Seoul to Harbin and Beijing in just five hours, effectively bringing the entire Northeast Asian region into a one-day travel zone. The Korean Peninsula can also be transformed into a tourist hub where tourists from all over the world come by Eurasian railroads or cruise ships to visit both Seoul and Pyongyang.

Third, a unified Korean Peninsula can make Korea more competitive and attractive on the global market, turning the “Korea discount” into a “Korea premium.” Over the past decades, conflict between the two Koreas, lack of stability, and poor security have resulted in what is called a “Korea discount,” leaving South Korea chronically underrated as a market. Resolving the threat of war and uncertainties stemming from the division through peaceful exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas could help secure the stability of capital and production markets, and further stimulate private investment and economic cooperation. Doing so could also reduce intangible division costs and improve Korea’s credit rating. In the international community, the Korean Peninsula can emerge as an important gateway into the Northeast Asian market. The added appeal of a peaceful Korea and greater investment from overseas thanks to more robust inter-Korean exchanges could replace the “Korea discount” with a “Korea premium.” Building new infrastructure and growing a wide variety of industries on the Korean Peninsula can also attract foreign capital and investments, leading to an increase in the inflow of highly competent experts and individuals from abroad. Moreover,

when North Korean real estate and human resources become available and the logistics network connected overland to the Eurasian continent comes on line, Korea could expect some significant “reshoring²,” in which South Korean companies that had previously relocated overseas for exports return to the Korean Peninsula. As tensions ease on the Korean Peninsula, resources spent to cover the costs of division can be diverted to solve other social problems such as welfare and education, and support younger generations to make sure they can focus on building a better future.

3 Socio-cultural vision

From a social and cultural perspective, unification provides an opportunity to address the suffering of separated families, fear of a possible war, lack of funds for better welfare and wellbeing of Koreans due to the arms race between the two Koreas, ideological conflicts, and confrontations, division of our national cultural heritage, and division of overseas Korean societies.

First, unification will be a great opportunity to heal the pain of separation that the nation has suffered due to the ongoing division. As of December 31, 2022, out of a total of 133,675 applicants for separated family reunions registered in the Integrated Information System for

² Means a “return to the home country of the manufacturing industry.” It refers to the phenomenon in which Korean companies that had gone abroad to reduce various costs, such as labor costs, return to Korea.

Separated Families of the Ministry of Unification, only 42,624 remain (91,051 now deceased). On December 31, 2021, the total number of deceased applicants stood at 87,404. This means that in the span of just a year, 3,647 people died without getting a chance to see their families again. The aging of families separated during the Korean War continuously dwindles the number of remaining applicants fast as the years go on. Families of abductees and North Korean defectors who left their families in North Korea are also suffering from the devastating effects of separation. Unification is the ultimate way to relieve and heal their pain.

Second, if the daily fear of war dissipates thanks to unification, resources spent to cover the costs of division, such as the cost of the arms race between the two Koreas, could be redirected to upgrade the social safety net, thereby raising the level of public welfare and mitigating various social inequalities. In a unified Korean Peninsula, based on the fruits of newly secured funds for welfare and economic growth, unfair distribution of wealth and social exclusion based on class could improve substantially, and our interest in as well as consideration for minorities such as the disabled, foreign workers, and multicultural families could also increase.

Third, unification will usher in a cultural pluralism in which the values and lifestyles of every member of the nation are respected. It could draw Korean society away from the ideological confrontation, authoritarianism, standardization of thinking, and prejudice built up over the past several decades. The division has brought about ideological confrontation within our nation, while limiting the diversity of individual thought and society by effectively encouraging

authoritarianism, prejudice, and discrimination between groups, and a homogeneous way of thinking. In the new era of unification, however, mutual trust and respect will emerge as our core values. Also with different cultures finding ways to coexist in harmony, individual autonomy and creativity will be promoted far more than in a divided Korea.



Announcement for the joint registration of “Ssireum” by South and North Korea (UNESCO Intangible Heritage Committee; November 26, 2018)

Fourth, unification can help to fully preserve and utilize the traditional culture of the Korean nation, and serve as an opportunity to contribute to the development of culture by melding the modern cultures that the two Koreas have created and enjoyed during the division to further enrich the culture of a newly unified Korea. As of the end of December 2022, South Korea has 15 World Heritage Sites, 22 Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, and 16 Memory of the Worlds registered at UNESCO, whereas North Korea has two World Heritage Sites (Goguryeo Tombs and Gaeseong Historic Areas), three Intangible Cultural Heritages of Humanity (Arirang Folk Song, Kimchi-making custom, and Ssireum), and one Memory of the Worlds (Martial Arts Dobotongji) registered at UNESCO. In 2018, “Ssireum” was listed as a joint UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity between South and North Korea for the first time in history. A unified Korean Peninsula can preserve and utilize various cultural heritages that are globally recognized as highly valuable. It could emerge as a world

leader in culture in which traditional and modern culture such as food, clothing, housing, language, and art that South and North Koreans have developed independently while divided are brought together to create perfect harmony.

Fifth, unification will have a positive impact on the lives of overseas Koreans. According to the official tally of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, as of December 2020, there are 7,325,143 Koreans living abroad in 193 countries.³

Currently, the division of South and North Korea has led to needless competition in the international community, and ideological divisions among the overseas Korean community, which hamstrings the diaspora Koreans from realizing their full potential. Overseas Koreans can promote unification by acting as bridges between the two Koreas, while also playing an active role as civilian diplomats who create favorable public opinion for unification in their country of residence. Upon unification, overseas Koreans will be able to live with pride as members of a unified Korea in their country of residence without further conflict or competition stemming from division.

In order to realize these visions of a unified Korean Peninsula, both Koreas must put their proposals and policies into practice. A unified Korea is not written in stone. It is not something that will be handed to us. Rather, unification is a future we, as a nation, have to work toward relentlessly and achieve.

³ By country, the U.S. is home to 2,633,777 overseas Koreans, followed by China (2,350,422), Japan (818,865), Canada (237,364), Uzbekistan (175,865), Russia (168,526), Australia (158,103), Vietnam (156,330), and Kazakhstan (109,495).

Section 2

Preparations to Achieve the Future Vision for Unification

1 Enhancing the Value of Liberal Democracy

The unified Korean Peninsula we envision as a nation is a liberal democratic country in which all members of the country become “owners” of the state, and one that guarantees the freedom, welfare, and dignity of each citizen. To achieve this vision, the Korean people should have a broad understanding of the universal values and rules, such as freedom and human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and market economy championed in a liberal democracy. Furthermore, the public must understand the value of liberal democracy as a way of life, and based on this, to have democratic decision-making and problem-solving capabilities, as well as the capacity to act according to democratic principles and procedures.

Promoting the value of liberal democracy is also essential to raise public awareness of unification, to understand North Korean defectors

who have settled in our society, and to make sure we can all live together as a nation. Public awareness of unification can also improve when the happiness of North Koreans is deemed a matter of respecting constitutional values and basic human rights, which they are entitled to as human beings. Also, the willingness to embrace the differences of North Korean defectors comes from the innate willingness to care for others as members of a free democratic society.

Finally, not only during the lead-up to unification, but also in preparation for the post-unification period, South Koreans themselves must first gain a mature understanding of liberal democratic values and institutions. This is because when our society becomes a more mature liberal democracy itself, we can persuade North Koreans to understand and accept the true value of liberal democracy much more effectively.

2 Raising the Public Awareness of Unification

If the public awareness of unification is low, it could be difficult to create the driving force needed to push the unification agenda forward. In the early 2000s, when exchanges and cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural fields of the two Koreas were thriving, public interest in and support for unification spiked. This shows that South-North relations have a profound impact on the public awareness of unification. Thus, above all else, it is necessary to normalize and further advance the relationship between the two Koreas. Restoring normal inter-Korean relations can stimulate economic cooperation and social

and cultural exchange. In turn, direct or indirect exposure to these benefits can help the general public understand the need for unification systematically, and therefore raise the awareness of unification.

In addition, the government, schools, and civil society should continue to strengthen their education on the subject of unification to further raise the public awareness of unification. The followings are key issues that unification education should aim for or supplement in order to raise the public awareness.

First, public education should focus on building a pro-unification atmosphere. The extended division of the two Koreas has led to a tendency among the people to be practically indifferent to unification or to be satisfied with the current situation. In fact, the number of skeptics about the need or benefits of unification in our society is growing. In order to stem this tide, the Korean government and competent authorities should present a convincing case for unification.

Second, unification education should help people understand that unification is a gradual and step-by-step process. In other words, unification is not going to happen overnight. Long-standing competition and military clashes have heightened the hostility and distrust toward each other among both South and North Koreans. Building an economic community without animosity this hostility and distrust between the two Koreas and pursuing political integration is no different than building a house of cards. Establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula, therefore, is an essential prerequisite for mutual prosperity and, ultimately, the unification of Korea. Furthermore, given the striking economic gap between the two Koreas, the economic burden would be substantial if unification is pursued too hastily. This

makes a gradual, step-by-step unification not only the rational option, but also the more desirable one. If this awareness spreads among the people through education, the concerns over the burden and sacrifices expected from unification could be abated.

Third, education on unification should be aimed at establishing an objective understanding of North Korean society. In other words, it should help South Koreans understand North Korean society as it is. Due to the long-standing division between the two Koreas, South Koreans' view of North Korean society is heavily influenced by prejudice, and distortions; some valid and others invalid. The stronger the misunderstanding against North Korea, the other half of a unified Korea, the lower the public perception of unification will be. Meanwhile, South and North Koreans have lived apart for decades under wholly different political and economic systems, thus they have different values, emotions, and lifestyles. Given these differences, emphasizing only the commonalities between the two Koreas would rather block our ability to gain an objective understanding of North Korean society. Unification education, therefore, needs to focus on helping the general public overcome their preconceived notions and prejudices about North Korean society, and accept both the "sameness" and "differences" of the two Koreas.

Fourth, unification education should pay attention to how we approach the costs of unification. The issue of unification costs, which emerged after Germany's unification, has been spreading skepticism over unification in South Korean society over the years. Unlike Germany, which spent massive sums of money over a short window of time upon unification to achieve immediate monetary and economic

integration, South and North Korea are pursuing a more gradual and step-by-step unification predicated on close economic cooperation. As such, education on the subject of unification should be able to explain that inter-Korean economic cooperation in various sectors such as logistics, energy, manufacturing, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, tourism, and ecology can benefit the South Korean economy and at the same time revitalize the North Korean economy. This can help bridge the economic gap between the two Koreas, which can then reduce the future cost of unification. Furthermore, education should help people recognize the fact that once peace is established on the Korean Peninsula, resources spent on covering the costs of inter-Korean confrontation can be spent on facilitating the unification process, which is something that could also reduce the expected cost of unification.

3 Establishing a Socio-economic Foundation for Unification

In order to realize the vision we have for a unified Korean Peninsula and enjoy its various advantages, we must build a robust political, economic, social, and cultural foundation for unification going forward. Creating and developing an economic community between the two Koreas is to establish an economic foundation for unification. Similarly, promoting inter-Korean social and cultural exchanges is to establish the social and cultural foundation of unification.

South and North Korea shared a collective vision for economic cooperation for the first time when they agreed, “To promote an

integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the two sides shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as domestic commerce and joint ventures” as part of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement adopted in 1991. In the 2000s, through Summit meetings and talks between various government agencies, both symbolic and practical examples of economic cooperation were established, including tourism programs to Mount Geumgang and Gaeseong, the Gaeseong Complex, and efforts to reconnect railroads and roads such as the Gyeongui and Donghae lines.

In order to form an integrated economic community, North Korea can first show some meaningful progress in its denuclearization, then economic sanctions against North Korea must be lifted if the results are satisfactory. Once the conditions for economic cooperation with North Korea are met, mutual interests should be promoted through various inter-Korean industrial and infrastructure projects based on the achievements and experiences gained over the preceding decades. Inter-Korean industrial and infrastructure cooperation - particularly with the division of labor between the two Koreas - can be an effective means of strengthening the comparative advantage of both South and North Korea on the global stage. As aforementioned, inter-Korean cooperation across various sectors such as logistics, energy, manufacturing, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and tourism could revitalize the South Korean economy and at the same time help the North Korean economy, bridging the economic gap between the two Koreas. As the economic gap between the two Koreas narrows, the economic burden of unification and the public concern over the

substantial cost of unification will gradually subside.

If the South-North economic community goes beyond industrial and infrastructure cooperation and evolves into a single market level where trade, investment, and the free movement of all production factors are guaranteed, the economic argument for unification will gain further momentum. At this stage, the two Koreas must prepare regulations related to the movement of goods, services, humans resources, and capital as well as financial resources necessary to sustain an integrated economic community.

Mutual trust and understanding between South and North Koreans is also an essential prerequisite for peace and unification. This requires a strong commitment on two fronts. One is to create a culture of inclusion and tolerance in Korean society where differences are accepted and every individual is respected and cared for. Spreading a culture that values tolerance and acceptance toward others and other cultures across Korean society can help build mutual trust and understanding between South and North Koreans.

The other is to actively create opportunities for South and North Koreans to meet and interact with one another. Beginning in the 2000s, South and North Koreans have built some extent of mutual trust and understanding through various sporting events, art, academic, and religious exchanges, as well as tours to Mount Geumgang and the city of Gaeseong. Using social and cultural exchanges between the two Koreas to further contribute to peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula requires the following. First, programs and events to bring South and North Koreans together should be designed to deepen their understanding and respect for not only the “similarities” between the

two Koreas, but also the “differences” in society and culture on both sides. Second, these programs must look beyond just building mutual trust and understanding, and go as far as creating a new common denominator from a cultural perspective. The deeper mutual trust and understanding between the South and North Koreas, and the more cultural elements shared, the fewer social and cultural conflicts that may arise on the path toward peace and unification.

4 Reorganizing Legal Systems on Related to Unification

In order to pursue unification in an orderly manner, we must focus on legal and institutional arrangements related to unification. In unification, the result and the process are equally important. All issues arising from the unification process must be dealt with in accordance with the proper “law and order.” In this context, laws and systems on unification need continued revisions and updates. The reason why Germany was able to unify its country peacefully and with widespread support both internally and externally was that it tried to abide by its laws and procedures.

Using the “National Community Unification Formula” proposed by the South Korean government as its primary formula requires laws and systems that can be applied to each stage of the unification process, including the Reconciliation and Cooperation step, the Korean Commonwealth step, and the Unified Korea step. For example, the Reconciliation and Cooperation step requires various laws on inter-

Korean travel, exchange, and cooperation. The Korean Commonwealth step requires laws on the South-North Cabinet meetings, the South-North Council, and the South-North Court of Justice. Meanwhile, the Unified Korea step requires other laws to facilitate integration in currency, education, welfare, judiciary, and military.

Meanwhile, in order for the unification process to proceed stably and seamlessly with the support of the international community, the two Koreas must maintain the following principles and directions. First, it is necessary to ensure that the laws and institutions of a unified Korea are not in conflict with international laws and institutions. For example, international legal considerations and preparations are required for the validity of treaties and agreements concluded between the two Koreas and on border issues. Second, legal and institutional arrangements related to unification must be made in a direction that respects universal human values such as human dignity, freedom, and equality.

These legal and institutional arrangements must be made through the government and the National Assembly, as well as through various discussions and initiatives in the private sector. The government must continue to host the “Unification Legislation Promotion Committee” in which relevant ministries and private sector experts can work together on improving relevant laws and systems in preparation for the unification process and post-unification integration process. Efforts to research inter-Korean laws, study overseas cases, and train legal experts should continue as well.

5 Supporting North Korean Defectors

As harbingers of unification, North Korean defectors provide South Korea with another set of challenges and opportunities with regard to unification. As of 2022, there are more than 33,000 defectors who have fled North Korea to come to South Korea after the Korean War.

North Korean defectors, however, face a myriad of difficulties in settling down in South Korean society. North Korean defectors are struggling not only to adjust to the different economic system in South Korea, but also with a sense of longing and guilt toward family members they have left behind in the North. Furthermore they fear living in a new environment, suffer from prejudice, and endure discrimination as well.

Helping North Korean defectors adapt to South Korean society is significant in terms of the social integration we should achieve upon unification. There is more to unification than the institutional integration between the two Koreas. Unification requires social integration in which South and North Korean residents overcome their prejudice, preconceived notions, and discrimination to build trust and coexist in an integrated community. In this context, communication and exchanges with North Korean defectors will help South Koreans understand North Koreans and promote social integration between the two Koreas.

Meanwhile, North Korean defectors cannot adapt to South Korean society on their own. In addition to various settlement support from the government and private organizations, the South Korean people

must first seek out more opportunities to engage with North Korean defectors, and continue their efforts to understand the culture, the environment and experiences North Korean defectors have lived in the past. In doing so, South Korea can broaden its understanding of the North Korean people, and furthermore, begin to lean more positively toward unification.

6 Reinforcing Cooperation with the International Community

Major powers such as the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia have interests in the Korean Peninsula, which is why it is critical to enlist the support and cooperation of neighboring countries when it comes to unification. Unification requires resolving the division between the two Koreas, and at the same time, it represents a major change in the Northeast Asian regional order that has kept its status quo for the most part since the Cold War in the 20th century to the present. As such, unification is not only a national problem, but also an international problem.

The core goal of international cooperation is to form a consensus in the international community on peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula, and thereby secure its cooperation. In order to receive support and cooperation from neighboring countries, the two Koreas must make a convincing case that peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula are in their interest and a boon for their security as well as future growth. South and North Korea should make neighboring countries aware that peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia

ultimately requires the peace and unification of the Korean Peninsula, and that a peaceful and united Korean Peninsula will stimulate regional economic cooperation and economic benefits across Northeast Asia.

Meanwhile, in order to broaden international support for unification, the two Koreas should strengthen “public diplomacy” along with “inter-governmental” cooperation. Here, public diplomacy refers to diplomatic activities that bolster diplomatic relations and enhance Korea’s influence in the international community by improving its national image and national brand. This typically requires building awareness on Korea’s history, tradition, culture, art, values, policies, vision, etc. and securing trust through direct communication with foreign audiences. Establishing peace and unifying the Korean Peninsula hold significance on an international level. Accordingly, given the fact that support from the international community is becoming more and more important in recent years, we should explore public diplomacy as well as traditional inter-governmental diplomacy.

7 Educating Future Generations to Lead Korea to Unification


Future generations, who can benefit the most from unification, should be interested in unification as well as improvement of inter-Korean relations, and have a vision for the future of the Korean Peninsula in order to become a driving force for unification. The contingent of younger Koreans concerned over the negative effects of unification, growing in numbers due in large part to misunderstanding on the potential cost of unification, could begin to believe that the

benefits brought on by unification are wholly unrelated to themselves and that unification itself is an unrealistic goal. This, ultimately, can dampen the drive toward a unified Korean Peninsula. Rectifying such misunderstanding and helping younger Koreans understand the benefits of unification can begin while the South Korean government lays the groundwork for inter-Korean reconciliation, exchange, and cooperation in anticipation of unification in the future.

In order for future generations to experience the benefits of unification firsthand, they need to be given additional opportunities to participate in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The government also has to engage younger Koreans in policy-making process and offer institutional support for quality employment and entrepreneurship opportunities tied to unification.

Examples could include creating a “Youth Startup Venture Complex” in the inter-Korean cooperation zone near the border area, and identifying potential initiatives to encourage inter-Korean economic cooperation designed to take advantage of the respective skill sets of younger South and North Koreans. The government could also build a future venue with exhibitions, concerts, and market facilities where young people from South and North Korea interact with each other and learn more about unification. Furthermore, in order for added opportunities to join the policy-making process, the South Korean government could host a “Future Strategy Forum” for younger generations and reflect the insights it gains from the Forum on its Korean Peninsula and unification policy, or a hackathon event to collect new ideas from young Koreans and use them in new policies going forward. The government could also build a “unified Korean

Peninsula metaverse” that showcases the future of the Korean Peninsula in a virtual space so that future generations can immerse themselves in the bright unified future of Korea using cutting-edge technology.





Appendix

1. July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué (1972)
2. Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, 1991)
3. Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1992)
4. National Community Unification Formula (Congratulatory Speech on Liberation Day, 1994)
5. June 15 South-North Joint Declaration (2000)
6. Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity (October 4 Declaration, 2007)
7. Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (Panmunjom Declaration, 2018)
8. Pyeongyang Joint Declaration (2018)
9. Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain (2018)

1. July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué

Recently, talks were held in Pyongyang and Seoul to discuss the problems of improving South-North relations and of unifying the divided country.

Lee Hu-rak, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in Seoul, visited Pyongyang from May 2 - 5, 1972, and held talks with Kim Young-joo of the Organization and Guidance Department of Pyongyang; Vice Premier Park Sung-chul, acting on behalf of Director Kim Young-joo visited Seoul from May 29 - June 1, 1972, and held further talks with Director Lee Hu-rak.

With the common desire of achieving the peaceful unification of the nation as early as possible, the two sides engaged in a frank and openhearted exchange of views during these talks, and made great progress towards promoting mutual understanding.

In an effort to remove the misunderstandings and mistrust, and mitigate the heightened tensions that have arisen between the South and the North as a consequence of their long period of division and moreover, to expedite unification, the two sides reached full agreement on the following points.

1. The two sides agreed on the following principles as a basis of achieving unification:

First, unification shall be achieved independently, without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference.

Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means,

without resorting to the use of force against each other.

Third, a great national unity as one people shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.

2. In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake military provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents.
3. In order to restore severed national ties, promote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful unification, the two sides have agreed to carry out numerous exchanges in various fields.
4. The two sides have agreed to actively cooperate in seeking the early success of the South-North Red Cross talks, which are currently in progress with the fervent support of the entire people of Korea.
5. In order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents, and to deal directly, promptly, and accurately with problems arising between the South and the North, the two sides have agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang.
6. In order to implement the above items, to solve various problems existing between the South and the North, and to settle the unification problem on the basis of the agreed principles for unification, the two sides have agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Lee Hu-rak and Director Kim Young-joo.

7. Firmly convinced that the above items of agreement correspond with the common aspirations of the entire Korean people, all of whom are anxious for an early unification, the two sides hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean people to faithfully carry out these agreed items.

Upholding the instructions of their respective superiors

Lee Hu-rak

Kim Young-joo

July 4, 1972

2. Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (Inter-Korean Basic Agreement)

The South and the North,

In keeping with the yearning of the entire Korean people for the peaceful unification of the divided land;

Reaffirming the three principles of unification set forth in the July 4 (1972) South-North Joint Communiqué;

Determined to remove the state of political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation;

Also determined to avoid armed aggression and hostilities, reduce tension and ensure peace;

Expressing the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to advance common national interests and prosperity;

Recognizing that their relations, not being a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification;

Pledging to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification;

Hereby have agreed as follows:

Chapter I: South-North Reconciliation

Article 1. The South and the North shall recognize and respect each other's system.

Article 2. The two sides shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs.

Article 3. The two sides shall not slander or vilify each other.

Article 4. The two sides shall not attempt any actions of sabotage or overthrow against each other.

Article 5. The two sides shall endeavor together to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement {July 27, 1953} until such a state of peace has been realized.

Article 6. The two sides shall cease to compete or confront each other and shall cooperate and endeavor together to promote national prestige and interests in the international arena.

Article 7. To ensure close consultations and liaison between the two sides, South-North Liaison Officers shall be established at Panmunjom within three (3) months after the coming into force of this Agreement.

Article 8. A South-North Political Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within (1) month of the coming into force of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South-North reconciliation.

Chapter II: South-North Non-aggression

Article 9. The two sides shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other.

Article 10. Differences of views and disputes arising between the two

sides shall be resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiation.

Article 11. The South-North demarcation line and areas for non-aggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time.

Article 12. To implement and guarantee non-aggression, the two sides shall set up a South-North Joint Military Commission within three (3) months of the coming into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.

Article 13. A telephone hotline shall be installed between the military authorities of the two sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and their escalation.

Article 14. A South-North Military Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this agreement in order to discuss concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on non-aggression and to remove military confrontation.

Chapter III: South-North Exchanges and Cooperation

Article 15. To promote an integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the two sides shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as domestic commerce and joint ventures.

Article 16. The two sides shall carry out exchanges and cooperation in various fields such as science and technology, education, literature and the arts, health, sports, environment, and publishing and journalism including newspapers, radio and television broadcasts and publications.

Article 17. The two sides shall promote free intra-Korea travel and contacts for the residents of their respective areas.

Article 18. The two sides shall permit free correspondence, meetings and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives and shall promote the voluntary reunion of divided families and shall take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues.

Article 19. The two sides shall reconnect railroads and roads that have been cut off and shall open South-North sea and air transport routes.

Article 20. The two sides shall establish and link facilities needed for South-North postal and telecommunications services and shall guarantee the confidentiality of intra-Korean mail and telecommunications.

Article 21. The two sides shall cooperate in the economic, cultural and various other fields in the international arena and carry out jointly undertakings abroad.

Article 22. To implement accords on exchanges and cooperation in

the economic, cultural and various other fields, the two sides shall establish joint commissions for specific sectors, including a Joint South-North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission, within three (3) months of the coming into force of this Agreement.

Article 23. A South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South-North exchanges and cooperation.

Chapter IV: Amendments and Effectuation

Article 24. This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by concurrence between the two sides.

Article 25. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the day the two sides exchange appropriate instruments following the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect.

December 13, 1991

Chief delegate of the South
delegation to the South-North
High-Level Talks
Prime Minister of the Republic
of Korea
Chung Won-shik

Head of the North delegation to
the South-North High-Level Talks
Premier of the Administration
Council of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea
Yon Hyong-muk

3. Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

South and North Korea,

Desiring to eliminate the danger of nuclear war through denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and thus create an environment and conditions favorable for peace and peaceful unification of our country and contribute to peace and security in Asia and the world.

Declare as follows;

1. The South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.
2. The South and the North shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.
3. The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.
4. The South and the North, in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, shall conduct inspection of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides, in accordance with procedures and methods to be determined by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.
5. The South and the North, in order to implement this joint declaration, shall organize and operate a South-North joint Nuclear Control Commission within one (1) month of the effectuation of this Joint Declaration.

6. This Joint Declaration shall enter into force as of the day the two sides exchange appropriate documents following through the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect.

January 20, 1992

Chief Delegate of the South
delegation to the South-North
High-Level Negotiations
Prime Minister of the Republic
of Korea
Chung Won-shik

Head of the North delegation
to the North-South High-Level
Negotiations
Premier of the Administration
Council of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea
Yon Hyong-muk

4. National Community Unification Formula (Congratulatory Speech on Liberation Day)

Fellow citizens,

I join all of you in heartily celebrating the 49th anniversary of national liberation. In observing the second National Liberation Day since the birth of this democratic civilian Administration, we are more hopeful and confident than ever before about the bright future of our nation. Over the past year and a half, our people have endeavored together to promote change, reform, openness and progress. We have enhanced the nation's competitiveness on the strength of a clean government.

We have restored the building in Shanghai that used to house the Provisional Korean Government. The remains of several patriotic ancestors have been brought home and entombed in their homeland.

The legitimacy of the Republic of Korea has been more firmly established than ever before. Our intrinsic national spirit is being revived as we are proudly shaping a brighter future for our nation. At the same time, the center of a new civilization is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific region. An opportunity is approaching for us to become a key player in this Asia-Pacific era and in the emerging new civilization.

The Korean people cannot live divided forever. We must pool all our national determination and energies. We must become one again and forge an era in which our proud people are at the forefront of a new civilization.

My 70 million compatriots at home and abroad,

As the President of the Republic of Korea, I have not forgotten for even

a single moment my responsibility for the security, survival, unification and prosperity of our 70 million people. It was with this acute sense of responsibility that this past July I pursued a South-North summit meeting.

Now that both the currents of world history and the trend of South-North relations are entering a new phase, I hereby wish to redefine the basic position of our Government on unification.

Over the past century, the Korean people have tirelessly striven to secure independence, freedom and democracy. National liberation will have been truly completed only when we have built a unified Korea marked by blooming democracy and brimming prosperity.

World history has already proclaimed the victory of freedom and democracy. We are now living in the age of ever-spreading democracy. With the advent of this civilian government, democracy is spreading its roots into our soil ever deeper and firmer. We will defend our hard-won freedom and democracy at any cost. I want to make it clear once again that any challenges to our free and democratic system will not be tolerated.

The basic philosophy behind our quest for unification is also centered on the values of freedom and democracy. Without freedom, there can be no democracy. Without democracy, there can be no genuine freedom and peace. With firm faith in democracy and on the strength of the independent abilities of our nation, we must strive harder to overcome the lingering remnants of the Cold War and end the territorial division in order to achieve the long-cherished goal of peaceful unification without fail.

The unification process should be focused not on how to distribute power but on how to enable our people to live together. Unification should be grounded on the values of freedom, democracy and well-being for all, rather than on any ideology focused narrowly on a specific class or group. Efforts toward unification should be concerned not so much with developing a hypothetical structure of a unified state as with building a national community within which all Koreans can live together.

Unification should be achieved on our own according to the wishes of our people and by virtue of our inherent national capabilities. Unification must be achieved peacefully without fail. It must not be achieved through war or one side overthrowing the other. Unification must be achieved democratically on the strength of the freedom and rights of all Koreans.

It will not be possible to unify the South and the North overnight, because the two parts of Korea have been locked into mutual hostility and distrust for as long as they have consistently pursued distinctly different ideologies and markedly different political and social systems. Unification should be a gradual and phased process of building a single national community.

The Government has already made public a three-stage unification formula for building a single national community. It calls first for reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North, next for forming a Korean commonwealth and lastly for completing a single unified nation-state.

First of all, the presently hostile and confrontational South-North relations must be replaced with an amicable and cooperative

relationship. Yemen failed to prevent a civil war even after it was politically unified. This is because it was unified hastily and superficially without having gone through a process of real reconciliation and cooperation.

South and North Korea must first promote coexistence and co-prosperity and then join together in a Korean commonwealth to ensure lasting peace. During the commonwealth stage, the two areas of Korea should form and develop a single socio-economic community to lay the groundwork for political integration.

In short, the Government's Three-Stage Unification Formula for Building a Korean National Community is designed to ultimately build a single nation-state after going through interim stages of integration. The path to unification must also be the path to democracy and prosperity. A unified homeland which will belong to all 70 million Koreans must be built on a national community and must guarantee every individual citizen freedom, welfare and human dignity.

My compatriots at home and abroad,

The Cold War era is finally leaving the Korean Peninsula, too. The competition between the South and the North over which can create a better society has already been decided. The 20th century has witnessed the failure of the experiments of socialism and Communism. Following the demise of the Cold War, the whole world is now marching down the avenue of freedom, well-being and openness. The Korean Peninsula alone cannot be excluded from this historic global trend.

The North Korean leadership must, as a matter of course, abandon their obsolete strategy of communizing the South. They must also

undertake bold reforms, including the improvement of the human rights situation. Pyongyang must not only recognize the plight of dispersed families as a basic human rights issue but also promptly cooperate to resolve the problem of South Koreans who were abducted.

South-North relations should be focused on how to promote the well-being of the entire populace, rather than be mired in futile ideological confrontation. Now is the time for us to endeavor harder to catch up with the changing times and make pragmatic preparations one after another for moving toward peace and cooperation.

Currently, North Korea is undergoing a major transition as it experiences its first succession of power since the regime was found (in 1948).

We hope that the North will come to pursue a path of reform and openness amidst stabilization. Our Government and our people, as fellow brethren, will spare no effort in supporting and cooperating with the North for such endeavors. Only after the people of the South and the North cooperate with each other and bring about mutual prosperity will it be possible to form a single economic community which will naturally pave the way for unification.

National unification should not hinder the Korean national community's efforts to join the ranks of the advanced nations; instead, it should help further develop the creativity and potential of our people. This is the reason that we do not desire unification by absorption.

The first step toward improving South-North relations should be to build mutual trust. Mutual trust can only be built when mutual commitments are sincerely translated into action. The Basic Agreement

between the South and the North and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula were landmark accords for reconciliation and cooperation declared before the entire Korean people and international society.

The North Korean nuclear issue which has created such serious tension on the Korean Peninsula during the past year, should be resolved by complying with the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For the sake of creating an atmosphere conducive to promoting reconciliation and cooperation, we must immediately stop slandering each other and expeditiously build up military trust so that the state of military confrontation can finally be ended.

Our doors are always open for dialogue with the North at any place and any time. The North must open its doors and join the rest of the international community. We have never wanted to see the North isolated from the rest of the world. For its part, the North must give up its isolationist adventurism emboldened by its nuclear ambition.

If and when the North guarantees the transparency of its nuclear activities, we are ready to support their development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including light-water nuclear reactor construction, by providing them with the necessary capital and technology. This could well become the very first joint project for national development leading to the establishment of a single community of the Korean people.

Fellow citizens,

I repeat once again that we are hoping for a unification which is gradual and step-by-step. However, there is, of course, the possibility that unification could occur unexpectedly at any time. We must

examine every possibility and be fully prepared for any outcome.

Whenever or however it happens, national unification must begin with the restoration and development of the presently divided and heterogeneous elements of Korean society into a unified national community. To this end, we must begin by developing our own society into a model democratic community. Unification will not only bring glory and joy, but will also entail pain and sacrifice, and we must gather the strength and courage needed to endure this.

We must always keep in mind the difficulties being experienced by our brethren in the North. The problems of the North are our own problems. We must always be prepared and ready to cooperate with our fellow brethren. We must resolutely prepare ourselves for national reconciliation and unification.

Fellow citizens and brethren overseas,

As we reflect on the past half-century, we cannot help but be emotionally moved and at the same time ashamed of ourselves, even more so as we recall the difficulties and sufferings of our people in the South, in the North and overseas. We must strive to make the year 1995, the 50th anniversary of the restoration of our independence, a milestone in our history. It is for this reason that we are beginning preparations now for commemorating that event.

I would like to propose to my compatriots at home and abroad that the 50th anniversary of liberation be made a catalyst for our concerted efforts toward opening an era of the 70 million Korean people living under one roof.

Our people successfully overcame the oppression of colonial rule, and

our independence was restored. Our people fought against dictatorship and successfully established a democracy. Our people rose from the ashes of the Korean War and brought about the Miracle on the Han River.

As an extension of this, now our people must endeavor to create a New Korea, a unified nation fully enjoying democracy and prosperity. Just as our forebears shed their precious blood for the liberation of our homeland, we must now shed our own sweat for a second liberation. By doing so, I hope we will be able to hand over to our posterity the unified, prosperous homeland our forebears and we dreamed about and have striven so long to create.

Our nation will stand tall at the center of a new world civilization without fail. Let us all pool our strength and closely cooperate for a second liberation. Let us all march together toward a great era of national unity.

Thank you.

August 15, 1994

President **Kim Young-sam**

5. June 15 South-North Joint Declaration

In accordance with the noble will of the entire people who yearn for the peaceful reunification of the nation, President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to June 15, 2000.

The leaders of the South and the North, recognizing that the meeting and the summit talks, the first since the division of the country, were of great significance in promoting mutual understanding, developing South-North relations and realizing peaceful reunification, declared as follows:

1. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification on their own Initiative and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.
2. Acknowledging that there are common elements in the South's proposal for a confederation and the North's proposal for a federation of lower stage as the formulae for achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.
3. The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question of former long-term prisoners who had refused to renounce Communism.

4. The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and all other fields.
5. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreement expeditiously.

President Kim Dae-jung cordially invited National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong-il decided to visit Seoul at an appropriate time.

June 15, 2000

The Republic of Korea
President
Kim Dae-jung

The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
Chairman, National Defense
Commission
Kim Jong-il

6. Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity (October 4 Declaration)

In accordance with the agreement between President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea and Chairman Kim Jong-il of the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, President Roh visited Pyongyang from October 2-4, 2007.

During the visit, there were historic meetings and discussions.

At the meetings and talks, the two sides have reaffirmed the spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration and had frank discussions on various issues related to realizing the advancement of South-North relations, peace on the Korean Peninsula, common prosperity of the Korean people and unification of Korea.

Expressing confidence that they can forge a new era of national prosperity and unification on their own initiative if they combine their will and capabilities, the two sides declare as follows, in order to expand and advance South-North relations based on the June 15 Joint Declaration:

1. The South and the North shall uphold and endeavor actively to realize the June 15 Declaration.

The South and the North have agreed to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of “by-the-Korean-people-themselves.”

The South and the North will work out ways to commemorate the June 15 anniversary of the announcement of the South-North Joint Declaration to reflect the common will to faithfully carry it out.

2. The South and the North have agreed to firmly transform inter-

Korean relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems.

The South and the North have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other and agreed to resolve inter-Korean issues in the spirit of reconciliation, cooperation and reunification.

The South and the North have agreed to overhaul their respective legislative and institutional apparatuses in a bid to develop inter-Korean relations in a reunification-oriented direction.

The South and the North have agreed to proactively pursue dialogue and contacts in various areas, including the legislatures of the two Koreas, in order to resolve matters concerning the expansion and advancement of inter-Korean relations in a way that meets the aspirations of the entire Korean people.

3. The South and the North have agreed to closely work together to put an end to military hostilities, mitigate tensions and guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The South and the North have agreed not to antagonize each other, reduce military tension, and resolve issues in dispute through dialogue and negotiation.

The South and the North have agreed to oppose war on the Korean Peninsula and to adhere strictly to their obligation to nonaggression.

The South and the North have agreed to hold talks between the South's Minister of Defense and the North's Minister of the People's Armed Forces in Pyongyang in November to discuss ways of designating a joint fishing area in the West Sea to avoid accidental clashes and turning it into a peace area and also to discuss measures to build military confidence, including security

guarantees for various cooperative projects.

4. The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime. The South and the North have also agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.

With regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the South and the North have agreed to work together to implement smoothly the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13, 2007 Agreement achieved at the Six-Party Talks.

5. The South and the North have agreed to facilitate, expand, and further develop inter-Korean economic cooperation projects on a continual basis for balanced economic development and co-prosperity on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the principles of common interests, co-prosperity and mutual aid.

The South and the North reached an agreement on promoting economic cooperation, including investments, pushing forward with the building of infrastructure and the development of natural resources. Given the special nature of inter-Korean cooperative projects, the South and the North have agreed to grant preferential conditions and benefits to those projects.

The South and the North have agreed to create a “special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea” encompassing Haeju and vicinity in a bid to proactively push ahead with the creation of a joint fishing zone and maritime peace zone, establishment of a special economic zone, utilization of Haeju harbor, passage of civilian vessels via direct routes in Haeju and the joint use of the Han River estuary.

The South and the North have agreed to complete the first-phase construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex at an early date and embark on the second-stage development project. The South and the North have agreed to open freight rail services between Munsan and Bongdong and promptly complete various institutional measures, including those related to passage, communication, and customs clearance procedures.

The South and the North have agreed to discuss repairs of the Gaeseong-Sinuiju railroad and the Gaeseong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint use.

The South and the North have agreed to establish cooperative complexes for shipbuilding in Anbyeon and Nampo, while continuing cooperative projects in various areas such as agriculture, health and medical services and environmental protection.

The South and the North have agreed to upgrade the status of the existing Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee to a Joint Committee for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation to be headed by deputy prime minister-level officials.

6. The South and the North have agreed to boost exchanges and cooperation in the social areas covering history, language, education, science and technology, culture and arts, and sports to highlight the long history and excellent culture of the Korean people.

The South and the North have agreed to carry out tours to Mt. Baekdu and open nonstop flight services between Seoul and Mt. Baekdu for this purpose.

The South and the North have agreed to send a joint cheering squad from both sides to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The squad will use the Gyeongui Railway Line for the first-ever joint

Olympic cheering.

7. The South and the North have agreed to actively promote humanitarian cooperation projects.

The South and the North have agreed to expand reunion of separated family members and their relatives and promote exchanges of video messages.

To this end, the South and the North have agreed to station resident representatives from each side at the reunion center at Kumgangsan Mountain when it is completed and regularize reunions of separated family members and their relatives.

The South and the North have agreed to actively cooperate in case of emergencies, including natural disasters, according to the principles of fraternal love, humanitarianism and mutual assistance.

8. The South and the North have agreed to increase cooperation to promote the interests of the Korean people and the rights and interests of overseas Koreans on the international stage.

The South and the North have agreed to hold inter-Korean prime ministers' talks for the implementation of this Declaration and have agreed to hold the first round of meetings in November 2007 in Seoul.

The South and the North have agreed that their highest authorities will meet frequently for the advancement of relations between the two sides.

October 04, 2007

The Republic of Korea
President
Roh Moo-hyun

The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
Chairman, National Defense
Commission
Kim Jong-il

7. Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (Panmunjom Declaration)

Kim Jong-un, President of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Moon Jae-in, President of the Republic of Korea, reflecting the unanimous aspiration of all the Koreans for peace, prosperity and reunification, held the Inter-Korean Summit Meeting at the "Peace House" at Panmunjom on 27 April, 2018 at the significant period of historic turn being made on the Korean peninsula.

The two leaders solemnly declared before the 80 million Koreans and the whole world that there will be no more war and a new era of peace has begun on the Korean peninsula.

They, sharing the firm commitment to bring a swift end to the Cold War relic of longstanding division and confrontation, to boldly open up a new era of national reconciliation, peace and prosperity, and to improve and cultivate inter-Korean relations in a more active manner, declared at this historic site of Panmunjom as follows:

1. The two sides will reconnect the blood relations of the nation and bring forward the future of co-prosperity and independent reunification led by Koreans by achieving comprehensive and epochal improvement and development in inter-Korean relations. Improving and developing inter-Korean relations is the prevalent desire of the whole nation and the urgent calling of the times that cannot be held back any further.
 - ① The two sides affirmed the principle of national independence

which specifies that the destiny of our nation is determined on their own accord and agreed to open up a watershed moment for the improvement and development of inter-Korean relations by fully implementing all existing inter-Korean declarations and agreements adopted thus far.

- ② The two sides agreed to hold dialogue and negotiations in various fields including the high-level talks at an early date and take active measures for the implementation of the agreements reached at the Summit.
- ③ The two sides agreed to establish a joint liaison office with resident representatives of both sides in Gaeseong area in order to ensure close consultation between the authorities and to satisfactorily facilitate civil exchanges and cooperation.
- ④ The two sides agreed to invigorate multi-faceted cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts of people from all levels of society in order to give further momentum to the atmosphere of national reconciliation and unity.

Between the north and the south, the two sides will boost the atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation by actively staging various joint events on the dates that hold special meaning for both South and North Korea, such as June 15, in which people from all levels of society including the authorities, parliaments, political parties, local governments and civil organizations, will be involved. On the international front, the two sides agreed to demonstrate the nation's wisdom, talents and unity by jointly participating in international sports events such as the 2018 Asian Games.

- ⑤ The two sides agreed to endeavor to swiftly resolve the humanitarian issues that resulted from the division of the

nation, and to convene the Inter-Korean Red Cross Meeting to discuss and solve various issues including the reunion of separated families and relatives.

For the present, the two sides agreed to hold the reunion of separated families and relatives with the upcoming August 15 as an occasion.

⑥ The two sides agreed to actively promote the projects agreed in the October 4 declaration in order to achieve the balanced development and co-prosperity of the nation's economy, and to take practical measures to relink and modernize railways and roads on the eastern and western coasts on a priority basis for their active use.

2. The two sides will make joint efforts to defuse the acute military tensions and to substantially remove the danger of a war on the Korean peninsula.

Alleviating the military tension and eliminating the danger of war is a very important issue related to the destiny of the nation and a very crucial issue for ensuring peaceful and stable life of the Koreans.

① The two sides agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain including land, sea and air that are the root cause of military tension and conflicts.

For the present, they agreed to stop all the hostile acts including the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) from May 1, to dismantle their means, and further to transform the DMZ into a peace zone in a genuine sense.

- ② The two sides agreed to devise a practical scheme to turn the area of the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone to prevent accidental military clashes and ensure safe fishing activities there.
- ③ The two sides agreed to, along with the reinvigoration of mutual cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts, take various military measures to ensure such endeavors.

The two sides agreed to hold frequent meetings between military authorities including the defense ministers' meeting in order to discuss and settle the military issues that may arise between the two sides without delay, and to convene military talks first at the rank of general within May to begin with.

- 3. The two sides will actively cooperate to build a permanent and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula.

Bringing an end to the current unnatural state of armistice and establishing a firm peace regime on the Korean peninsula is a historic mission that must not be delayed any further.

- ① The two sides reaffirmed the non-aggression agreement that precludes the use of force in any form against each other and agreed to strictly abide by it.
- ② The two sides agreed to carry out disarmament in a phased manner, as military tension is alleviated and substantial progress is made in military confidence-building.
- ③ The two sides agreed to declare the end of war this year that marks the 65th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement and actively promote the holding of trilateral meetings involving the two sides and the United States, or quadrilateral meetings

involving the two sides, the United States and China with a view to replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.

- ④ The two sides confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

The two sides shared the view that the measures being initiated by the north side are very meaningful and crucial for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and agreed to fulfill their respective responsibility and role.

The two sides agreed to make active efforts to seek the support and cooperation of the international community for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The two leaders agreed to frequently have an in-depth discussion on the important matters for the nation through regular meetings and hotlines, deepen confidence and jointly endeavor to further expand the favorable trend toward the sustained development of the north-south ties and peace, prosperity and reunification of the Korean peninsula.

In this context, President Moon Jae-in agreed to visit Pyongyang this fall.

April 27, 2018

The Republic of Korea
President
Moon Jae-in

The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
President, State Affairs
Commission
Kim Jong-un

8. Pyeongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018

Moon Jae-in, President of the Republic of Korea and Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held the Inter-Korean Summit Meeting in Pyeongyang from September 18 to 20, 2018.

The two leaders assessed the excellent progress made since the adoption of the historic Panmunjom Declaration, such as the close dialogue and communication between the authorities of the two sides, civilian exchanges and cooperation in many areas, and groundbreaking measures to defuse military tension.

The two leaders reaffirmed the principle of independence and self-determination of the Korean nation, and agreed to consistently and continuously develop inter-Korean relations for national reconciliation and cooperation, and unwavering peace and co-prosperity, and to make efforts to realize through policy measures the aspiration and hope of all Koreans that the current developments in inter-Korean relations will lead to reunification.

The two leaders held candid and in-depth discussions on various issues and practical steps to advance inter-Korean relations to a new and higher dimension by fully implementing the Panmunjom Declaration, shared the view that the Pyeongyang Summit will be an important historic milestone, and declared as follows.

1. The two sides agreed to expand the cessation of military hostilities in regions of confrontation such as the DMZ to the substantial removal of the danger of war across the entire Korean Peninsula

and a fundamental resolution of the hostile relations.

- ① The two sides agreed to fully abide by and faithfully implement the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” adopted as an annex to the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, and to actively take practical measures to transform the Korean Peninsula into a zone of permanent peace.
 - ② The two sides agreed to engage in constant communication and close consultations to review the implementation of the Agreement and prevent accidental military clashes by promptly activating the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee.
2. The two sides agreed to explore substantial measures to further advance exchanges and cooperation based on the spirit of mutual benefit and shared prosperity, and to develop the nation’s economy in a balanced manner.
- ① The two sides agreed to hold a ground-breaking ceremony within this year for the connection of railways and roads along the east and west coasts.
 - ② The two sides agreed, as conditions mature, to first normalize the Gaeseong industrial complex and the Kumgangsan Mountain Tourism Project, and to discuss the issue of forming a west coast joint special economic zone and an east coast joint special tourism zone.
 - ③ The two sides agreed to actively engage in inter-Korean environment cooperation in order to protect and restore the natural ecosystem, and as a first step, to endeavor to achieve substantial results in the currently on-going forestry cooperation.

- ④ The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in the areas of prevention of epidemics, public health and medical care, including emergency measures to prevent the influx and spread of contagious diseases.
3. The two sides agreed to strengthen humanitarian cooperation to fundamentally resolve the issue of separated families.
- ① The two sides agreed to open a permanent facility for family reunion meetings in the Kungangsan Mountain area at an early date, and to promptly restore the facility toward this end.
 - ② The two sides agreed to give priority to resolving the issue of video reunions and exchange of video messages between the separated families through Inter-Korean Red Cross talks.
4. The two sides agreed to actively promote exchanges and cooperation in various fields so as to rejuvenate the sense of reconciliation and unity and to demonstrate the spirit of the Korean nation both internally and externally.
- ① The two sides agreed to further promote cultural and artistic exchanges, and stage a performance of the Pyongyang Art Troupe in Seoul in October this year as a first step.
 - ② The two sides agreed to actively participate together in the 2020 Summer Olympic Games as well as other international games, and to cooperate in bidding for the joint hosting of the 2032 Summer Olympic Games.
 - ③ The two sides agreed to hold meaningful events to celebrate the 11th anniversary of the October 4 Declaration, to jointly commemorate the 100th anniversary of the March First Independence Movement Day, and to hold working-level

consultations toward this end.

5. The two sides shared the view that the Korean Peninsula must be turned into a land of peace free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats, and that substantial progress toward this end must be made in a prompt manner.
 - ① First, the North will permanently dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of experts from relevant countries.
 - ② The North expressed its willingness to continue to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Nyongbyon, as the United States takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 US-DPRK Joint Statement.
 - ③ The two sides agreed to cooperate closely in the process of pursuing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
6. Chairman Kim Jong Un agreed to visit Seoul at an early date at the invitation of President Moon Jae-in.

September 19, 2018

The Republic of Korea
President
Moon Jae-in

The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
President, State Affairs
Commission
Kim Jong-un

9. Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain

Based on the common understanding that easing military tension and building confidence on the Korean Peninsula is integral to securing lasting and stable peace, South and North Korea reached a comprehensive agreement on the following with a view to fully implementing the historic 'Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula' in the military domain.

1. South and North Korea agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, including land, air and sea that are the source of military tension and conflict.

① The two sides discussed various measures to prevent armed conflict in every domain, including land, air and sea.

The two sides agreed to consult and resolve all matters that may lead to military conflict in a peaceful way and preclude the use of military force under any circumstance.

The two sides agreed to refrain from any action to infiltrate, attack or occupy each other's area of jurisdiction by any means or method.

The two sides agreed to have consultations on matters including large-scale military exercises and military buildup aimed at each other, various forms of blockade, interdiction and obstruction of navigation as well as reconnaissance activities against each other through the 'Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee'.

The two sides agreed to continue to have consultations on

various implementation measures related to the 'Panmunjom Declaration', in which both sides agreed to realize phased arms reduction, in accordance with alleviation of military tension and confidence building.

- ② The two sides agreed to cease various military exercises aimed at each other along the Military Demarcation Line from November 1, 2018.

On ground, the two sides agreed to cease all live-fire artillery drills and field training exercises at the regiment level and above within 5km from the MDL.

At sea, the two sides agreed to cease all live-fire and maritime maneuver exercises within the zone north of Deokjeok-do and south of Cho-do in the West Sea, and within the zone north of Sokcho and south of Tongcheon in the East Sea. The two sides also agreed to install covers on the barrels of coastal artilleries and ship guns and close all gun ports within the zones.

In the air, the two sides agreed to ban tactical live-fire drills involving fixed-wing aircraft, including the firing of air-to-ground guided weapons within the designated No Fly Zones in the eastern and western regions of the MDL.

- ③ The two sides agreed to designate No Fly Zones for all aircraft types above the MDL, effective from 1 November, 2018, in the following way:

For fixed-wing aircraft, No Fly Zones will be designated within 40km from the MDL in the East (between MDL Markers No. 0646 and 1292) and within 20km from the MDL in the West (between MDL Markers No. 0001 and 0646).

Other No Fly Zones will be designated in the following way:

for rotary-wing aircraft, within 10km from the MDL; for UAVs, within 15km from the MDL in the East and 10km from the MDL in the West; for hot-air balloons, within 25km from the MDL.

However, when the employment of aircraft becomes necessary such as in the cases involving fire-fighting, ground & maritime rescue, medical evacuation, weather observation and farming support, aircraft will be permitted to fly subject to prior notification to the other side. The No Fly Zones mentioned above do not apply to commercial aircraft (including cargo planes).

- ④ The two sides agreed to take measures to prevent any accidental military clash at all times in every domain, including land, air and sea.

To this end, the two sides agreed to apply a five-step procedure (Initial warning broadcast → Secondary warning broadcast → Initial warning fire → Secondary warning fire → Military action) on ground and at sea, and a 4-step procedure (Warning radio & signal → Interdiction flight → Warning fire → Military action) in the air.

The two sides agreed to implement the above revised procedures from November 1, 2018.

- ⑤ The two sides agreed to solve all military issues through peaceful consultations by maintaining permanent communication channels in order to prevent at all times any accidental military clash in every domain, including land, air and sea and by immediately notifying each other when an abnormal situation arises.

2. South and North Korea agreed to devise substantive military measures to transform the Demilitarized Zone into a peace zone.
 - ① The two sides agreed to completely withdraw all Guard Posts (GP) that lie within 1km of each other as a preliminary measure to withdrawing all GPs within the DMZ.
 - ② The two sides agreed to demilitarize the Joint Security Area.
 - ③ The two sides agreed to proceed with a pilot project of an Inter-Korean Joint Operation to Recover Remains within the DMZ.
 - ④ The two sides agreed to continue consultations on military assurance measures related to joint survey and excavation of historical remains within the DMZ.

3. South and North Korea agreed to take military measures to prevent accidental military clashes and ensure safe fishing activities by turning the area around the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone.
 - ① The two sides reaffirmed the agreement related to the “prevention of accidental military clashes in the West Sea”, signed during the 2nd Inter-Korean General level Military Talks on 4 June, 2004 and agreed to fully restore and implement it.
 - ② The two sides agreed to establish a maritime peace zone and a pilot joint fishing zone in the West Sea.
 - ③ The two sides agreed to fully guarantee the safety of personnel and vessels that enter the maritime peace zone and the pilot joint fishing zone.
 - ④ The two sides agreed to devise and implement inter-Korean joint patrol measures in order to deny illegal fishing and to ensure safe fishing activities for South and North Korean

fishermen in the maritime peace zone and the pilot joint fishing zone.


4. South and North Korea agreed to devise military assurance measures necessary for invigorating exchanges, cooperation, contacts and visits.
 - ① The two sides agreed to establish military measures to ensure passage, communication and customs in the East and West Transportation Corridors.
 - ② The two sides agreed to devise military assurance measures to connect and modernize eastern/western railways and roads.
 - ③ The two sides agreed to establish a plan regarding issues related to permitting the use of Haeju Passage and Jeju Strait for North Korean vessels through consultations at the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee.
 - ④ The two sides agreed to devise military assurance measures for the shared use of Han River (Imjin River) Estuary.
5. South and North Korea agreed to devise various measures for mutual military confidence building.
 - ① The two sides agreed to continue consultations regarding the installation and operation of direct communication lines between the respective military officials.
 - ② The two sides agreed to have detailed consultations to resolve the issues concerning the composition and operation of the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee.
 - ③ The two sides agreed to fully implement all agreements reached between inter-Korean military authorities, and to regularly examine and assess the implementation progress.

6. This Agreement is effective from the date of exchange of the signed documents, following the procedures required for ratification from each party.
- ① Revisions and additions to the Agreement are permitted subject to agreement between both parties.
 - ② Two copies of the Agreement have been made with equal effect.

September 19, 2018

The Republic of Korea
Minister of National Defense
Song Young Moo

Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
Minister of the People's
Armed Forces, Korean People's
Army General
No Kwang-chol





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2023

Understanding Korean Unification

Published by the Department of R&D Division, Institute of Unification Education

123, 4.19-ro, Gangbuk-gu, Seoul (Suyu-dong)

TEL 02)901-7178 FAX 02)901-7088

Published in March 2023

Designed by Neulpum Plus Co., Ltd. 070-7090-1177

Printed by Korea Blind Union 070-7728-7786

Website at www.uniedu.go.kr [not for sale]

* Image source: Yonhap News Agency, Blue House, Ministry of Unification, Ongjin-gun,
Gyeoremalkeunsajeon Joint Compilation Project Committee,
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